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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is not the typical work that one might expect to be created within a 
department of sociology at a research one institution. I give this warning now as a respectful 
request to look elsewhere is "typical" sociological analysis is desired. Contemporary 
American mainstream sociological endeavors are often both atheoretical and ahistorical, and 
as such often lacking the innovation that ought to accompany the study of social 
relationships. Theory driven approaches, it is commonly believed, must be sacrificed in the 
name of more valid and reliable quantitative techniques. Further, numbers-based data is 
often believed to offer something approaching "value-free" research. 1 The number is largely 
universal, and not subject to the same subjective attacks as the written word. In the attempt 
to avoid attack, the number has replaced imaginative judgment. 
Numbers have their place in sociological research, but this place is much more 
limited than the pages of mainstream sociological journals would suggest. What can a 
number, even aptly interpreted, accomplish? It can tell you what did happen, but little more. 
On occasion this "accomplishment" is enough to address the research question under review, 
but often such an ex post-facto review is treated with more aspiration and enthusiasm than is 
reasonably warranted. Why trade a number representing a glimpse of the past with a 
qualitative or theoretical approach to sociology that is often more inventive and 
1 Max Weber is often attributed as endorsing the idea of "value free" research. Actually a closer, less 
superficial, reading of Weber's work reveals that Weber himself was quite skeptical as to the ability of 
removing subjectivity from the domain of academic (sociological) research. 
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imaginative?2 Where has the imagination of sociology gone? 
I am unsure of where the imagination has gone, but one reason suggests why it has 
gone. The worst action that one can take, provided they are not wearing a black robe and 
holding a gavel, is to judge. Judgment, if a secular religion is said to exist, is the venial sin of 
contemporary America. We are so afraid to judge others with our "subjective" conclusions, 
that instead cold, impersonal numbers are used as a way of avoiding such an insensitive and 
subjective fate. Judgments must be rendered carefully and with much consideration, but if 
social advancement is to occur they must be rendered. Furthermore, making a judgment 
might well mean that you will be called to defend it, and this defense might prove difficult or 
worse uncomfortable. Judgment likely leads to conflict, and sadly many professional 
sociologists would rather evaluate and be left alone than judge and defend their stance. To 
avoid judgment is to choose ease, but if sociologists refuse to address the difficult -or the 
fundamental, as I will later discuss- the discipline will fall to those that are less squeamish 
about rendering judgment. Judgment is understandably feared because it might lead to being 
"wrong," but when judgment itself is treated as wrong sociologists are condemning 
themselves to a far worse fate than potentially being considered wrong. Where there is no 
judgment there is no debate, and any intellectual discipline withers when confronted with this 
proposition. As you read this thesis I invite you to evaluate the ideas therein, and by all 
2 In no way am I suggesting the elimination of quantitative endeavors in sociological research. I am, however, 
concerned about why an ever-increasing theme of mainstream sociologists is to label the number good and the 
thoughtful sentence as bad, or worse insignificant. Actually, most serious sociological methodologists argue 
that the best research blends a heavy dose of quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
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means please judge them. If you do not my effort and your time will have meant nothing. 
The Social and Political Dynamics of Wealth Accumulation 
"What I want to see above all else is that this country remain a country where 
someone can always get rich." This telling sentiment offered by former President Ronald 
Reagan might correspond well with certain economically driven ideological conceptions of 
the "American Dream."3 Many notable social and political thinkers, however, have warned 
about the insurgence of potentially destructive (socially disorganizing) forces within a social 
order endorsing an economic system placing the material wealth of a sociopolitical 
community in the hands of a few. Writing in 1625, during the birth of the Enlightenment, 
Francis Bacon forewarned that if getting rich was a goal to be realized by only a few, which 
has represented the American experience both before and after the legacy of Former 
President Reagan,4 an undesirable social structure could emerge. As Bacon (1625) argued, 
Above all things, good policy is to be used that the treasure and monies in a state be not gathered in the 
hands of a few. For otherwise a state may have great stock and yet starve. Money is like muck not 
good unless it be spread. 
In addition, William Graham Summer an influential late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century American sociologist argued a similar point. Sumner (1909:3) maintained, 
The tendency of "a rapid accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few" is the subject which, with 
increasing insistency, occupies the chief attention of the American people. Already huge 
accumulations of property by corporate consolidations, accumulations such as the world has never 
seen, are subject to single control. .. In such a situation it does not take the public long to discover that 
monopoly and duress are identical - customers must deal with you or go without - and that is what 
gives value to monopoly. 
3 The "American Dream" of prosperity is usually invoked as an appeal "to all." It is fair to ask, however, 
whether the "someone" in Reagan's commentary can actually represent all, or if the "someone" is (must be) 
limited by number in some specific economic or social fashion. 
4 According to the survey of consumer finances, a joint undertaking between the Federal Reserve and the I.R.S., 
in 1995 the lower 90% of the population held 37% of all assets while the upper 10% held the additional 62%. 
Further, the top one half of one percent of the population held a quarter of all assets. 
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Sumner continues his line of thought by arguing that government regulations must be used to 
tame the "concentration of wealth," or consequently democratic rule will denigrate into 
plutocracy.5 Granting that Bacon and Sumner's views are at least somewhat informative, it 
follows that the "spread" of monies within a social system must involve some sort of 
organized redistributive effort.6 Absent a benevolent other-oriented population, someone or 
something -the sociopolitical mechanism (government) - must either play the role of Robin 
Hood, or collectively persuade the general community that actively playing this role leads to 
a worse as opposed to better economic and social environment. Moreover, the manner in 
which contemporary Americans view the role of Bacon's Robin Hood has the potential to be 
affected by the way in which they collectively understand social change, direction, and end-
social evolutionary arguments.7 
Bacon and Sumner were not the only intellectuals to question the social costs of 
wealth ( or more precisely the magnitude of consequences that could result when riches are ill 
distributed). In fact, J arnes Madison - one of the primary authors of the Federalist Papers-
also shared a skepticism regarding the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few. 
Madison ( 1900: 86) maintained, 
5 Sumner's essay, "On the Concentration of Wealth" is reprinted in Bruce Curtis's article William Graham 
Sumner "On the Concentration of Wealth," The Journal of American History, Vol.55 (Mar., 1960), 823-832. 
Curtis argues that much of the opinion of Sumner as a rabid supporter of government non-intervention is 
misplaced. Actually, Sumner maintained that the government, if it is to support democratic objectives, must 
ensure that a "concentration of wealth" does not become so pronounced as to bring instability into the 
sociopolitical community. Sumner was, however, a staunch supporter of the "middle class," and he used this 
position to justify much of his unfavorable attitudes toward the class redistribution of wealth to alleviate 
poverty. 
6 Organized in this sense might mean either deliberate (governmental) action, or organized around a model of 
the "marketplace" that functions best when deliberate governmental action is avoided. 
7 Often times this social evolutionary understanding is not always viewed as such, but the inability to proper 
label a sentiment does little to reduce its force. 
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The great objectives should be to combat the evil (potential within a political system): One, by 
establishing political equality among all. Two, by withholding unnecessary opportunities from the few 
to increase the inequality of property by an immoderate, and especially unmerited, accumulation of 
riches. 
Indeed, Madison foresaw a faction of wealthy property owners as providing one of the 
greatest challenges to the future social and political success of the newly formed American 
republic. 8 One of Madison's primary concerns with the health of a young America was that 
its citizens be inoculated with the opportunity to form and join meaningful political 
associations.9 For Madison, a sociopolitical faction of wealth and property was the greatest 
challenge confronting the meaning and reason underpinning most beneficial sociopolitical 
associations. As Madison might have asked, what can a sociopolitical association possibly 
accomplish if it is to compete with a mega-faction controlling most of the property and 
wealth of a community? The implications of a negative response to this question go well 
beyond the disappointment of a single (political) association. Instead, more than any other 
factor, America's "founding fathers" murmured the potential destruction of the democratic 
Federalism, which Madison and others held as the unwavering ideal of the emerging notion 
of American democratic pluralism. It is inaccurate to maintain that the foundations of 
America were built upon the pillars of greedy aspirations; economic pillars perhaps, but 
greed and the hoarding of wealth was to be feared, not applauded. 10 
8 See Federalist Papers#JO 
9 Alexis de Tocqueville writing in Democracy in America would place a similar importance upon political 
associations. For instance, in Democracy Tocqueville (1969: 192) argued, "An association may be formed for 
the purpose of discussion, but everybody's mind is preoccupied with the thought of impending action. An 
association is an army, talk is needed to count numbers and build up courage, but after that they march against 
the enemy." 
10 This is not to say, of course, that the American founders were not economic animals, they certainly were as 
brilliantly illustrated by Charles Beard's An Economic lnterpretation of the Constitution (New York, 1913 ). 
Nonetheless they realized that individualistic self-interested aspirations ofriches had to, in some way, be tamed 
if democracy was to be successful. 
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Whereas Reagan valued the prospect of Americans becoming rich and getting richer, 
Madison entertained the notion that when a few in society become grossly rich then the many 
will, by extension, lose the opportunity to match, or politically compete with, such a social -
wealth based- status. Perhaps Madison took his cue from the British Enlightenment thinker 
John Locke who maintained that it might well be foolish to advocate a viable social structure 
in which "everyone can get rich." As Locke (1676) maintained, 
Whenever either the desire or the need of property increases among men, (and) there is no extension, 
then and there, of the world's limits. . . . It is impossible for anyone to grow rich except at the expense 
of someone else. 
Locke's pragmatic, zero-sum, approach to understanding the accumulation of wealth 
suggests a social policy such as that offered by Reagan, if equally applied to all, might well 
result in the socially destructive faction of which Madison warned. If the accumulation of 
wealth is necessarily a finite endeavor, it stands to reason that the question, "Who Deserves 
What" is also subject to certain natural bounds. 11 Thus, the thinker (reformer) concerned 
with the class redistribution of wealth need only argue these bounds should be considered 
and dealt with by a sociopolitical community. A second mode of argument, however, 
categorically denies that a sociopolitical community ought to, in any way, interfere 
(redistribute wealth from one class to another) with Locke's notion of "bounded wealth." It 
is of little contention that the gross "concentration of wealth" challenges the dual American 
ideals of political liberty and social stability. The question then becomes, now what? What 
began with the observation that the "concentration of wealth" is generally not supportive of 
11 In other words, it is untenable to suggest that everyone deserves everything. Further, if everyone cannot 
deserve everything then it must be "decided" in some fashion "Who Deserves What." 
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current American democratic social stability will continue in the attempt of this thesis to 
bring together dueling parties who have very different ways of addressing this concern. 
Fundamental (Foundational) Social Question(s) 
Reagan's supposition concerning the dream of an "opportunity of riches (for all)" and 
the cautious warnings of a nightmarish cessation of the dream are positions trapped within a 
much larger, and indeed, fundamentally important sociological question. However, with so 
many potentially valuable sociological questions, how can the sociologist separate the 
interesting and important questions from the fundamental? After all, the contemporary 
sociologist has an opportunity to examine a plethora of social phenomena ranging from 
homelessness and inequality to complex organizations. This plethora of topics, rapidly 
growing in number, should not serve as a barrier to the study or minimization of appreciation 
towards fundamental social questions. What represents a fair and clear criterion for the 
establishment of a fundamental, as opposed to a merely important or interesting, social 
question? 
In order to identify a "fundamental" social question, only one of which is to be 
explicitly explored in this thesis, one need but adhere to one maxim; it is one whose 
elimination would render social structures, regardless of culture, time, or history, 
incomprehensible. In other words, a fundamental social question is fundamental because its 
understanding is necessary to a critique and analysis of any complex social structure. When 
sociologists discover which social questions must be addressed they are well on the way to 
formulating an understanding of the fundamental, as opposed merely to the interesting or 
important, aspect(s) of sociology. In many ways "fundamental social questions" are chasing 
the grand social question originally formulated by seventeenth century thinker Thomas 
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Hobbes, when he asked, "How is social order possible?" Sociologists can quickly arrive at 
the fundamental by asking the antithesis of the Hobbesian question, that is, "What would 
make social order impossible?" or more precisely, what factor removed would make social 
"comprehension" impossible. 12 One likely answer is, a social order that does not, in some 
way, decide "Who Deserves What." Sociology, since its inception, has been inundated with 
foundationalist appeals; attempts to discover (social) universal truths, i.e., laws of human 
social behavior. These attempts are, similar to the fundamental question proposed in this 
thesis, efforts to establish the fundamental by designating what must take place within any 
social structure regardless of culture, time, or history. Foundationalist attempts have, 
however, been subject to an increasing amount of scrutiny. As Stephen Turner (1992: 101) 
observed, "Richard Rorty' s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ( 1979) showed that 
Heidegger, Dewey, and Wittgenstein had each been groping toward a rejection of 
"foundationalism," the attempt to find some sort of grounding for our ultimate 
presuppositions." The distinction between traditional foundational approaches, and what 
this thesis seeks to employ as a fundamental social concern is one between the causes 
(questions) and effects (answers) of social life. Do social truths exist? Yes, but not in the 
answers or effects; they exist instead within the realm of unavoidable social questions. The 
question "Who Deserves What" is not socially constructed; instead it is a question that every 
social order must somehow address. 13 It is not a question we have the option to choose or 
12 It seems easier to abstract by taking what we are given and asking ourselves what we could not do without, 
rather than building a position from nothing and asking what is necessary to maintain our imaginative 
properties. 
13 The claim of the post-modernist that objective social truth does not exist in any capacity is inaccurate. Truth 
does exist, but it is a truth to be found in the questions that sociopolitical communities must address, as opposed 
to the countless ways in which these questions might be answered. 
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create. Individuals and social groups within every social order may use time, culture, history, 
or reason to answer this question in their specific (subjective) way, but they may not negate 
the question. The question "Who Deserves What" is foundational and fundamental, thus it 
may not be negated by any social order. Given the likelihood of countless contextual 
cultural, historical, and temporal appeals to the question, however, it will be necessarily 
addressed as a subjectively socially constructed undertaking. Despite the important, yet ill-
examined, distinction between "cause foundationalism" and "effect foundationalism" the 
attempt to mystically discover the latter continues to plague social theory, as well as 
preventing a proper treatment of the former. 
Why has sociology been unable to deliver its Isaac Newton, i.e. a thinker able to offer 
predictive laws of social organization or behavior that are able to stand the scrutiny of 
culture, history, and time? The answer appears to be that the genius which Newton provided 
to understandings of the physical world were directed towards inanimate unwilled objects, 
thus making possible the establishment of universal physical laws. If a billiard ball is hit at 
the proper speed and angle it must go in the designated direction. Scientific laws of behavior 
govern objects that lack choice, emotion, or ambition; and with such objects Newton 
established "effect foundationalism," i.e., he could with the proper information predict with 
absolute certainty the effects of an object's action. The traits of people, however, as willed, 
moral, political, and social agents cannot be likened to the predictive qualities of inanimate 
objects because the diverse properties of human thought and action make such prediction 
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extremely unlikely. 14 Social scientists are misguided in their search for foundationalism in 
the "effects" of social action; such attempts drastically miscalculate the complex nature of 
human social endeavors. If sociology is to find its Newton, it will not, and cannot, have 
identical concerns with the seventeenth century genius. A sociological search for universal 
social laws must look for the questions or causes underpinning subsequent collective actions 
or manifestations. Foundationalism need not involve the effects of a manifestation. 
"Modem social theorists from Hobbes to the present have employed foundationalist 
appeals" (Turner pp: 101). Nonetheless, as Turner continued, 
But all these arguments have been inconclusive. Each step in the argument proceeds as though, by 
raising the matter in theoretical dispute to the next level of abstraction to the level of criteria for 
theory-choice, we will arrive at an unequivocal victory for one of the solutions to the problem under 
dispute. But what occurs is something different: at each level there prove to be a variety of possible 
criteria. And when we try to resolve the conflict between them by going to the next level of 
abstraction, that is, to construct criteria of adequacy for these answers, we find the same thing. 
Turner (1992: 101-2) cumulates this line of thought with the rejection of foundationalism by 
stating, 
I will simply assume the rejection of foundationalism and concern myself with a problem that comes 
into view only once we separate out foundationalism from some of the issues with which 
foundationalism appeals are usually entangled. 
He is accurate, in that, the quest to find instances or principles of "effect foundationalism" 
are futile, and such attempts should be abandoned. This abandonment, however, should be 
viewed as an opportunity that allows for a better appreciation of what foundationalism, 
properly understood, can offer social thought. Foundational social causes, questions that 
14 B.F. Skinner and other behavioral psychologists argued the opposite point; that is, given the proper stimuli 
the response of the organism (human included) can be almost completely predicted. The difficulty with this 
view is that it works only so well as people do not figure out the game is "rigged." Thus behaviorism works 
very well on animals and small children, but exceedingly less well as humans develop the capacity to become 
frustrated and rebel against the "game." Of courser this critique of behaviorism depends upon people figuring 
out that the condition under review is a "managed situation." 
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must be socially addressed, do exist. 15 It is within the foundational causes of various 
subjective answers to "Who Deserves What" that the sociologically fundamental nature of 
the question takes shape. 
Social experience is different from individual experience in at least one fundamental 
way; where a social experience exists, the community must determine the means by which 
resources are to be allocated. The person living alone -on a deserted island- is not worried as 
to how fruit or fish might be shared, but if someone is to join this person, the matter of 
sharing (allocating) resources will be decided in some fashion. As George Simmel reminds, 
however, even on a deserted island the number of individuals within a social group might 
have an effect on how the group decides "Who Deserves What." Simmel maintained that in 
dyads, two person groups that constitute the elementary form of social interaction and 
exchange, reciprocity occurs immediately. If another joins the group, however, and a triad is 
formed, then the same reciprocity that would have immediately occurred within the dyad 
might either be postponed or never occur at all. This distinction between groups with two 
and three members illustrates how complicated the answer to "Who Deserves What" can 
become. 
All societies, regardless of their complexity or ideological dispositions, must 
determine in some manner how resources are to be allocated, 16 however, this stringent 
15 I gave this line of reasoning considerable thought, whereby I tried to think of examples in which social order 
would not have to address the question of "Who Deserves What." I could think of none. In fact, the only 
possible challenge to the notion of "cause foundationalism" by means of the question "Who Deserves What" 
came from Sine Anahita, a graduate student colleague of mine. Ms. Ananita suggested that in some (feminist) 
utopian novels the question of "Who Deserves What" had worked itself out, and accordingly was no longer 
fundamental to the social order under review. I agreed with this sentiment, but short of utopia neither of us 
could find viable challenge to the notion. Further, given this example of a utopian social order the question 
"Who Deserves What" has not become negated, it has instead endured the process of unanimous consent. 
16 As a student of social theory I invoke the word "all" with caution. In addition, this caution should serve as a 
reminder that fundamental questions are few in number. 
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economic definition, although accurate, is in need of sociological elaboration. Material 
resources must be allocated in some fashion; however, the system for this distribution is 
necessarily based upon a shared social consensus addressing the question, "Who Deserves 
What."17 Regardless of whether a social system, or social thinker, adheres to a Hegelian 
dialectic instigated when a "slave" afraid to risk his life succumbs to a "master" who shares 
no such fear, 18 or a Lockean vision of a sociopolitical community seeking to guarantee 
natural rights -largely understood as life, liberty, and property- the result is the same; an 
understanding must be formulated among members of society as to "Who Deserves What."19 
The term deserves is often associated with a moral sentiment, but this alone does not lend 
itself to a fair sociological reading of the term deserves. One deserves, in a social sense, 
what is socially designated, no more no less. Whether this designation is considered "good" 
or "bad" during an ex-post facto review of history misses the point. For the social 
designation of allocation to occur in the original instance, it stands to reason that the 
community making the determination already considered and settled the question "Who 
Deserves What." Consider for instance, the resource allocation that must accompany illicit 
social behavior. In Plato's Republic, Socrates explained that even a band of thieves must 
establish some criteria by which to divide the booty from a robbery. Even social behaviors 
that many would consider immoral must have established functional principles of justice, or 
17 I do not mean to settle the debate surrounding objective reality versus social construction brought into conflict 
by Plato 2300 years ago with his Allegory of the Cave; however it suffices to say that as matters of resource 
allocation are manifested into specific acts it is difficult to interpret the matter in a way different from social 
construction. 
18 It is this struggle for recognition that constitutes the basis of Hegel's social philosophy. 
19 Of course, these "understandings" are grossly different in application, but all social applications result from 
this process of "understanding," i.e., ideological assumptions. 
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likely the behavior would perish from lack of governing consensus. 20 Decisions of allocation 
may be made with insightfully inspired inclusive social deliberation or with the mass hysteria 
of an angry mob, but in either case a decision regarding "Who Deserves What" will result. 
Resource allocation can, consistent with adherence to designated principles of justice, 
become manifest into a moral experience, but it will nonetheless represent a social 
experience. While moral and social concerns are often interwoven it is important, as much as 
possible, to distinguish these concerns. Nonetheless, as Hayek (1958: 238) reminded the 
demarcation between the concepts "social" and "moral" might be in many ways false. 
An interesting symptom of the growing influence of this rationalist conception is the progressive 
substitution, in all languages known to me, of the word "social" for the word "moral" or simply 
"good." ... What is meant when people speak of a "social conscience" as against merely a 
"conscience" seems to be an awareness of the particular effects of our actions on other people, an 
endeavor to be guided in conduct not merely by traditional rules but by explicit consideration of the 
particular consequences of the action in question. 
Simply examining the allocation of resources within a social structure -the study of 
economics- is necessary to understand the rudimentary aspects of social order, but it is not 
unilaterally sufficient to explore the Hobbsian question ( or the antithesis proposed in this 
thesis) "how is social order impossible." In order to fulfill both the sufficient and necessary 
requirements of the (fundamental) Hobbsian question, in conjunction with the allocation of 
material resources, it is important to examine both the general idea "Who Deserves What," as 
well as the underlying arguments used to endorse the major competing "understanding" of 
20 The old adage, "there is no honor among thieves" is interesting in this context. Regardless, of the truth-value 
of this adage it would make no sense from a purely perceptual standpoint. If thieves really believed that no 
level of honor existed then it would be hard to envision "team robberies." Double-crosses, of course, occur, but 
they do not occur all the time. More importantly they are not assumed to necessarily occur. 
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"Who Deserves What" within twenty-first century American culture. 
Statement of the Problem 
Realizing the fundamental importance of addressing "Who Deserves What," it is 
important that the question be reviewed in a clear, oppositionally stated, and theoretically 
driven manner. To be clear, this thesis is concerned with "Who Deserves What" within the 
context of class based material redistribution programs. Often, this is simplified into the term 
welfare, which is a misleading term because it might in addition to AFDC,21 suggest 
agricultural or even corporate subsidies. If this thesis is reduced to an idea of welfare it 
must mean "poverty welfare,"22 i.e., money directly re-distributed from the upper 
socioeconomic classes to the lower socioeconomic classes, with the primary intent of 
alleviating poverty. Discussions of transferring wealth from one social class to another 
present the important conceptualization "problem" relating to how social class is to be 
defined. It seems inaccurate to simply revert back to the typical classification options of 
lower, middle, and upper, to describe social class in America. Class, indeed, could be 
viewed with this barrage of the "typical three," but this means of classification is not 
necessarily the best means of conceptualization. Thorstein Veblen, for instance, argued that 
social class is nothing more that the dichotomous breakdown between the "industrious" and 
the "leisurely." With the many different ways in which class might be conceptualized, it 
seems, given the breath of this thesis that to accept any "label" of social class would be 
21 AFDC is an acronym for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. While the general idea of AFDC persists, 
since 1996 it technically has been replaced by the TANF federal-to-state "block grant" welfare reform 
measures. The most impacting change associated with this replacement was the provision in the 1996 
legislation that a five-year time limit would be placed upon recipients of AFDC style provisions. While some 
beneficiaries have seen their welfare benefits "expire" other states have invoked legislation essentially assuring 
that this expiration could not take place if the recipient is below the poverty line. 
22 A graduate student colleague, Sue Seedorf-Keninger, brought this term to my attention. 
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overly narrow and self-defeating. This varied approach to social class, however, is not meant 
to suggest that nothing can be said of class. Actually, if anything conclusive can be said of 
class, it would be that it is a taboo topic for most Americans. Paul Fussell clearly described 
both the ambiguity and "taboo status" of social class in contemporary America. As Fussell 
(1983: 1) argued, 
Although most Americans sense that they live within an extremely complicated system of social 
classes and suspect that much of what is thought and done here is prompted by considerations of status, 
the subject has remained murky. And always touchy. You can outrage people today simply by 
mentioning social class, very much the same way, sipping tea among the aspidistras a century ago, you 
could silence a party by adverting too openly to sex. When, recently, asked what I am writing, I have 
answered, "A book about social class in America," people tend first to straighten their ties and sneak a 
glance at their cuffs to see how far frayed has advanced there. Then, a few minutes later, they silently 
get up and walk away. It is not just that I am feared as a class spy. It is as ifl had said, "I am working 
on a book urging the death of baby whales using the dead bodies of baby seals. 
Whatever might be said to describe the transfer of wealth among social classes -in the 
context of alleviating poverty- one term would be conspicuously absent from the list -
comfortable. If parts of this thesis are uncomfortable to read because they tread too closely 
to lines draw by our petrified and often erroneous conceptions of social class and 
deservedness, then all the better. 
Surrounding this notion of "poverty welfare," within twenty-first century American 
culture, are two oppositionally situated ideal types23 (characters), the contrarian and the 
interventionist. The contrarian, as an ideal type, argues that a sociopolitical community has 
no business implementing any type of "poverty welfare," while the ideal type interventionist 
makes the opposite claim, that is, to some designated degree, a sociopolitical community has 
the obligation to decide "Who Deserves What" through an implementation of "poverty 
23 This idea of ideal types is taken from Max Weber who used this theoretical conception to distinguish between 
different types of authority, i.e. charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational. Weber also used the idea of an ideal 
type to better understand bureaucratic organizational structure. Similar to Weber, I am not using the notion of 
ideal types to signify any idealistic notion, only to suggest that the ideal types of interventionist and the 
contrarian serve as models that can help understand their larger social importance. 
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welfare."24 The challenge, or difficulty, with a review of these ideal types is not their 
identification -they find themselves manifested into contemporary American culture at an 
astonishing level. Instead, the challenge is finding a means by which these types can carry 
on a meaningful discourse with each other that does not denigrate into a moralistic shouting 
match. It is doubtful that morality can, or should, be completely removed from an analysis of 
"Who Deserves What," however, morality can be guided into, as opposed to around, a 
discourse of poverty welfare. As it will be expanded throughout this thesis, the bridge by 
which to begin this discourse must emphasize social evolutionary arguments. 
Primary Objectives 
This thesis has two goals. The first and primarily goal is to demonstrate that social 
evolutionary arguments often provide, explicitly or implicitly, the logical justifications 
associated with deciding "Who Deserves What" in the context of poverty welfare. These 
arguments are often considered to be powerful because of their prophetically natural or 
deterministic implications.25 This influence is further observable when it is noted that, as 
opposed to dismissing evolutionary arguments, both the contrarian and the interventionist 
have opted to offer their own evolutionary interpretation and analysis as opposed to meeting 
the challenge with flip indignation. The second goal is to present a brief evolutionism of 
24 I do not mean to set-up a "strawman argument" by allowing the ideal type of the interventionist to have the 
latitude of endorsing "any" degree of compulsory poverty welfare. Certainly different interventionists might 
have very different ideas about the extent to which poverty welfare should take place; however for the purpose 
of parsimony it seems best to allow the ideal type of the interventionist to posses a wide latitude of 
interpretation. Remember, these characters are ideal types; their real social manifestation is almost never an "all 
or nothing" endeavor. 
25 The only comparable historical notion is that of religious or supernatural intervention. Irrespective of truth-
value, however, evolutionary theory and other aspects of modern science have taken over in prophetic appeal 
were religion has expired. 
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American poverty welfare, and in conjunction incorporate data from American state 
governments designed to present the best representations of the contrarian and 
interventionist. This analysis of state data regarding poverty welfare will span from 1958-
2001.26 It will be demonstrated that social evolutionary arguments, through general influence 
on culture and specific influence on policy makers, broadly correspond to the sociopolitical 
policies that make a significant difference in people's social and economic lives. 
Research (Thought) Question 
The general research question examined in this thesis is as follows: How have social 
evolutionary and naturalistic arguments significantly affected the way in which the 
fundamental social question, "Who Deserves What" becomes settled in contemporary 
America? While this statement is rather broad, the use of empirical quantitative data-the 
analysis of state welfare policy between 1958 and 2001 should be a useful guide in 
accurately demonstrating certain dimensions of the above question. The nature of this thesis 
is exploratory as opposed to explanatory. The work here cannot offer "complete" 
explanations as to why American policies towards poverty welfare exist in their current form; 
however, through the course of the arguments presented, the issue of "Who Deserves What" 
will be explored with a type of analysis that is unfortunately often neglected -social 
evolutionary and naturalistic arguments. Empirical quantitative data is invaluable in relation 
with an ex-post facto review of what occurred; however, a strictly quantitative 
26 The use of the latter half of the twentieth century as the time period under review was selected for a number 
of reasons. First, it is important to review state policy after evolutionary arguments gained their mass 
Darwinian appeal. Second, by starting the analysis significantly after Darwin's evolutionary treatise, The 
Origin of the Species by Means of natural Selection, should allow for any novelty of the idea to have warn 
away. Last, examining the most recent forty-three years should demonstrate the current relevance and 
importance of addressing "Who Deserves What." Also, the accuracy of statewide transfer payments, i.e., 
poverty welfare, data as aggregated and reported by the federal government is decades, typically not centuries, 
in the making. 
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methodological approach simply cannot unilaterally address the important "properties of 
thought" that allowed such a situation under review to manifest in a particular -usually 
ideologically driven- manner. Thus, if fundamental social questions are to be properly 
examined in their totality ( or as much totality as possible), the numbers explaining the 
outcomes of such questions are often tertiary to the process in which these questions, i.e., 
"Who Deserves What," spawn, develop, and evolve toward social consensus. Quantitative 
analysis is an important part of sociology that should not be neglected from theoretical 
considerations; however, numbers can only tell a researcher, at best, what concepts have been 
quantified and how much quantification has taken place, they can never offer an explanation 
as to why concepts "fit" into the "boxes" of quantification to begin with. Thus without 
blending sociological thought and theory with both qualitative and quantitative research the 
researcher will likely neglect that which they have abandoned. 
There exists a significant relationship between the general social consensus 
surrounding the appreciation of either the arguments presented by the contrarian or 
interventionist and the policy implementation of such ideas. 27 The force of this thesis can be 
fully realized only after clarifying the meaning and importance of social evolutionary theory 
as well as noting the best argument, consistent with social evolutionary theory, presented by 
the contrarian and the interventionist. Further, before dueling ideal types can be presented in 
27 Taken in the context of a liberal democracy this hypothesis should not seem very controversial. The notion 
that people get through policy what is most popular, so long as no violation of civil liberties occurs to another 
citizen, seems to be a primary tenement of a liberal democracy. However, in this case things are more 
"invisible." Likewise, the vast majority of people usually indirectly apply social evolutionary arguments. It is 
almost ridiculous to suggest that when the secretary of a congressperson answers the phone the voice of the 
constituent would likely say, "could you please inform congressperson x that due to my Darwinian 
interpretation of evolution compels me to encourage a no vote on the next social welfare bill." In this way my 
hypothesis is more contentious than it might first appear. 
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their most favorable light, a general background in (social) evolutionary thought must be 
properly examined. 
The Contrarian 
Deciding "Who Deserves What" is sometimes so abrasive that the confronted parties 
( either theorists or policy makers) will invoke a skeptical or contrarian position, and thus 
address the question on the grounds that they do not make, nor should they make, decisions 
that determine "Who Deserves What." Instead, they merely pursue ideas or advocate 
policies, which better enable individuals (and the marketplace) to "settle matters on their own 
terms."28 The contrarian's deference to a classical liberal interpretation of individualism and 
the unquestionable effectiveness of the economic marketplace remains an intentional, yet 
inactive, approach to deciding "Who Deserves What." Thus, the contrarian (classical 
liberal) is not cloaked in the mystic of a responsible actor, but instead as a bearer of 
individual responsibility (after all, any intervening actions they -the contrarian- might take 
would only serve to unjustly remove responsibility from individuals as well as the economic 
marketplace.) Consistent with this stance, "Who Deserves What" is not to be decided by 
anyone (unless one is willing to consider Adam Smith's notion of the invisible hand as 
anyone). Alternatively, the question is embarked upon between the combined forces of 
individual actors within a social system and the natural and artificial processes that dictate 
social, political, and economic interaction among individuals within the social system, the 
marketplace. 
28 The contrarian is labeled as such because the holder of such a position is not receptive to the idea that a 
political and social community can and/or should participate in the allocation of material recourses as a means 
to alleviate poverty welfare. 
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Interference with the market mechanism, i.e. redistributing monies from the upper to 
the lower social classes, would result in more powerful, not reduced, forms of injustice. As 
contemporary American economist Milton Friedman argued, the contrarian is not neglecting 
social responsibility, instead they are helping to ensure that the social structure in question 
remains free from political tyrants. As Friedman (1979: xvii) specifically stated," ... the free 
market provides an offset to whatever concentration of political power may arise. The 
combination of economic and political power in the same hands is a sure recipe for tyranny." 
Friedman suggested that the job of politics is to be trusted to the people, while the job of 
material distribution is a matter to be settled by the marketplace. How can people 
meaningfully "do" politics without addressing the matter of resource allocation, and by 
addressing this concern how can a sociopolitical community avoid deciding "Who Deserves 
What."29 This critique presents the greatest challenge to a contrarian position. Accordingly, 
it is the contrarian's use of social evolutionary theory, which attempts to undermine this 
formidable challenge. 
The Interventionist 
The "contrarian," on the other hand, does not monopolize the landscape of ideas 
surrounding the fundamental social question. The "interventionist," or modem liberal, 
represents the theorist or policy maker who decides to actively address the quandary of 
sorting through "Who Deserves What." The active approach of the interventionist can be 
29 Friedman's position seems to implicitly speak to the question of, what is government. If the claim is, as 
former President Reagan made, that "government is a necessary evil" then as people have no interest in 
believing they are evil, government becomes something else or "them." However, the idea of "government" 
based upon an American model has never been meant to represent "them," it was always meant to be 
understood as "us." The sovereign authority of America does lie in the hands of the President, Congress, or the 
twelve members of the Supreme Court, instead it is held be "the people." By considering government be a 
necessary evil, in at least an American tradition, the logical extension is that people are the necessary evil. The 
making of government as "them" is exactly the type of scenario that James Madison feared most. 
21 
described in the following manner: for some reason (insert choice of variable here) the status 
quo is operating in a manner, which is ultimately undesirable to the future success of the 
social structure in question. Likewise, the folly of human history begs the policy maker and 
social theorist alike, to actively sort through and decide "Who Deserves What." A "wrong" 
has been committed, by either natural or artificial sources, and it is the responsibility and 
obligation of policy makers, acting out their proper roles in the sociopolitical community, to 
actively vindicate the question "Who Deserves What" by means of endorsing some 
magnitude of poverty welfare. For whatever modem liberalism is, it is skeptical of how 
"history's gifts" have been allocated; so skeptical in fact that intervention must be used to re-
distribute these "historical gifts." It is a misunderstanding to suggest that the contrarian 
judges, using some traditional mechanism such as religion, while the interventionist takes a 
step away and has only to offer a nonjudgmental free flowing approach. The interventionist 
can act only after history has rendered its judgment. Speaking passionately about the impact 
of history on the experience of Black Americans, for example, former President Lyndon 
Johnson remarked, 
Freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away centuries of scars by saying: Now, you are free to go 
were you want, do as you desire, and choose the leaders you please. You do not take a man who for 
years has been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race, saying, "you are 
free to compete with all others." And still believe you have completely fair. Thus it is not enough to 
open the gates of opportunity .3° 
Why Social Evolutionary Theory 
A quick review of oppositionally stated ideal types reveals the antagonistic nature of 
these characters, seemingly entrenched within a battle of stagnating conservatism or 
30 June 1965, Address, Howard University 
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meddling liberalism. Thus, given the ideological gap among characters, it becomes difficult 
to bring about a mutually amenable criterion, or mode of examination by which to establish 
an "equal analytical footing" that would be useful in creating a starting point for discourse. It 
might seem that any proposed criteria of examination would be seen by the opposition as a 
means to "rig the discourse" in favor of the type that made the suggestion. Like two children 
fighting over the "bigger" half of a cookie, both the contrarian and interventionist are 
skeptical as to any mechanism of fairness that the other suggests. What could represent a 
criterion, undertaken in a contemporary American context, which would allow each singular 
type to being their specific discourse with roughly "equal analytical footing?" For a number 
of reasons, social evolutionary theory represents the best chance that such a necessary 
introductory step in the discourse of "Who Deserves What" will commence. 
First, decisions regarding "poverty welfare" are necessarily prophetic in nature. The 
decision to endorse or reject the notion of "poverty welfare" is intermingled with one's 
conception of how these decisions will ultimately "tum out." When a sociopolitical 
community makes, or fails to make, social policy it is in tum predicting, and in some cases 
affecting, the future. In a similar fashion, social evolutionary theory analogously uses history 
to formulate an understanding of the present as a way to offer more accurate insight into the 
future. This common theme associated with most social evolutionary theory, of a historical 
interpretation guiding future possibilities seems to be something the contrarian and the 
interventionist can both agree is potentially useful. Part of this agreement is consistent with a 
general deference to the idea of evolutionism. As Hofstadter (1992: 3) argued, "Many 
scientific theories affect ways of living more profoundly than evolution did; but none had a 
greater impact on ways of thinking and believing." Of course, these "historical 
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understandings" will be different, but the discourse between types must begin somewhere, 
and this -grounding in social evolutionary theory- seems to be as good a place as any other. 
The sheer force and prevalence of social evolutionism in its connection with 
American culture is difficult to quantify. A number of sources, however, tend to suggest that 
the influence of evolutionary thinking towards social thought was (and to a lesser extent 
today is) tremendous. Max Fisch, while discussing evolution in American philosophy 
demonstrates the acceptance and development of the idea. As Fisch (1947: 357) argued, 
In the middle period of the century of American thought with which our symposium is concerned (the 
nineteenth century), there was one idea which so far overshadowed all others that we may fairly 
confine our attention to it. That idea was evolution. Like the ideas of earlier periods, it was imported, 
and imported chiefly from Britain ... American thinkers were from the start acknowledged through 
junior partners in shaping, criticizing, and conforming the idea in its biological and other applications, 
and they have led the way in working out the logic of evolutionary theory and the theory of 
evolutionary logic. 
Mark Granovetter, writing 32 years after Fisch, supports the contention that evolutionism has 
played a major and sustainable role in the development of social theory. As Granovetter 
( 1979: 489) maintained, 
The idea of Evolutionism is one of the most durable in the history of social theory. Implicit in theories 
of social evolution are a number of assumptions. One of these is that the most important cause of 
social change lies in the necessity for societies to adapt to their surrounding physical and/or social 
environments. Because the range of "problems" posed by these environments is so broad, and so many 
different "solutions" to them can be imagined, evolutionary theory is embraced by those with highly 
different orientations. 
Charles Darwin (1871: 142) himself would write about the unique way in which his theory of 
evolution applied to American character: 
There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as 
the character of the people, are the results of natural selection; for the more energetic, restless, and 
courageous men from all parts of Europe have emigrated during the last ten or twelve generations to 
that great country, and have there succeed best (Hofstadter). 
Given the vast magnitude and numerous avenues that social evolutionary arguments might 
take, both the contrarian and the interventionist can use different understandings of social 
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evolutionism in order to talk with each other about poverty welfare, while still using similar 
language and criteria. Perhaps, a fusion of the two characters is not likely to happen, but at 
least the process of forming an understanding between seemingly antagonistic viewpoints 
can begin. 
Aside from the analogous relationship between the predictive aspect of social 
evolutionary theory and social policy as a means to find a starting place of "equal analytical 
footing," another concern arises, this time from the "temporal acceptability of adequate 
justification." The time and place of any particular argument will determine the degree of 
rationality of the method used to advance the argument. 31 For instance, in an aristocratic 
social structure, ruled largely by the interactions among a group of wealthy land owning 
lords and an absolute monarch with "divine right," a consideration of "Who Deserves What" 
is a settled, and largely unapproachable, question. However, with the historically recent 
advent of classical liberal thought and more contemporary notion of modern liberalism, 
further encouraging notions of political and social equality, the question of "Who Deserves 
What" has become -as a result of a breakdown in social consensus- an unsettled matter 
while, at the same time, retaining its fundamental status. 32 Matters of "Who Deserves What" 
become less approachable and likewise less rationally "troublesome" when "domain 
assumptions" of blatant inequities standing for thousands of years, and articulated by thinkers 
as respectable as Aristotle, are taken as unquestionably axiomatic. 
31 This sentiment is taken from the notion of historicism offered by Rousseau, and then significantly expanded 
by Hegel. 
32 The question of "Who Deserves What" has always been fundamental, but this is not to say that the question 
has always been "approachable." 
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Aristotle's arguments spelled out in Book One, Chapter Five, of Politics entitled 
Slavery According to Nature clearly offered a very different notion of human nature than 
would be acceptable in a modem climate of equality and political rights. As Aristotle (1991: 
563) argued, 
To rule and to be ruled are not only necessary but beneficial. For immediately after birth some are 
marked out to be ruled but others to rule .... It is evident, then, that it is by nature that some men are 
slaves but others are freemen, and that it is just and to the benefit of the former to serve the latter. 
These sentiments would mean little more than nonrational arguments within a present-day 
American sociopolitical temporal context. These "nonrational ramblings," however, were 
indeed quite rational before the Renaissance. Then Enlightenment thought began to shape 
social consensus, moving away from naturalistic limitations and towards the promise of 
perfectible human agents.33 Agents, whom Locke argued, are entitled to the recognition of 
equally assigned God given natural rights. The best example of Locke's deviation from the 
naturalistic assumptions of Aristotelian sociopolitical thought can be seen in chapter two 
section six of the Second Treatise of Government. As Locke (1997: 219) maintained, 
And being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be 
supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy another, as if we were 
made for another's use, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bounded to 
preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation 
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, 
unless it be to do justice to an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation 
of life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. 
This passage constitutes much of the rational modem basis for the rejection of natural 
slavery and the acceptance of natural rights. 
33 It would be a rebellion against the Enlightenment ideal of "perfectible" human agents which inspired Thomas 
Malthus to develop his Darwinian inspiring proclamation that population increases arithmetically while food 
increases geometrically. Thus by constricting people within this notion of "bounded ecology," Malthus greatly 
challenged the perfectible fate of the human animal. 
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Those who adhere to traditional religious sources, aristocratic reasoning, and 
unbridled selfishness are increasingly less able to build a rational social consensus capable of 
exploring "Who Deserves What."34 With increased liberalism, notions of political and social 
equality, and education, people exceedingly demand more logical and scientific forms of 
justification than they have in past times; often this craving finds itself feeding on the bread 
of social evolutionary arguments, perhaps because it provides an aura of scientific 
respectability. This is certainly a condition of the times, but it is this condition of temporal 
acceptability that creates the justification for the use of social evolutionary arguments as a 
means by which to evaluate fundamental social questions. Perhaps in a hundred years time, 
or less, evolutionary arguments will lose their aura of scientific respectability and signify a 
new form of nonrational thought. Until that time, however, the proper course of action for 
the sociologist is to show deference to history, while simultaneously fueling the flames that 
ignite a sense of contemporary rationality. 
34 As can be seen by changing attitudes towards people and their worth, social construction and likewise 
rationality are far removed from any static notion. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE BUILDING OF SOCIAL EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENTS 
Theory or Thought 
Given that social evolutionary arguments, and by extension a review of "Who 
Deserves What," are inescapably associated with Charles Darwin's, and Alfred Russell 
Wallace's35 now famous "theory of evolution"36 -as explained through the mechanism of 
natural selection- it is important to distinguish between what is meant by theory, and 
conversely what is meant by thought. The term theory is often misapplied as synonymous 
with the expression of any idea. Theory is, however, subject to greater constraints than the 
mere expression of an idea. As Issak (1985:167) explained, "A theory's major function is ... 
to explain singular facts and occurrences, but perhaps more importantly to explain empirical 
generalizations." Issak continued by stating that, "Theories also have two other functions: 
"to organize, systematize, and coordinate existing knowledge in the field" and to "predict an 
empirical generalization - predict what a particular relationship holds." Even if partial 
elements from Issak's understanding of theory are negated, theory is much more than the 
mere expression of an idea. For instance, one might suggest that human beings behave, as 
35 Wallace, while receiving much less recognition that Darwin, is credited with independently discovering the 
theory of natural selection. 
36 This association is not completely warranted. Comte, Hegel, and Spencer, for instance, all developed social 
evolutionary arguments before the publication of Darwin's famous treatise On the Origin of Species by Means 
of Natural Selection. Accordingly, while in a contemporary sense biological and social evolution have 
undergone a blending of sorts, it would be a mistake to assume the two evolutionary notions are intrinsically 
related. Thus, evolutionary arguments were very influential for sociological thought well before Darwin's 
seminal work. Alternatively, Marx, Veblen, Taylor, Pareto, and Sumner are probably the best examples of 
social theorists who were, in very different ways, most influenced by Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
28 
Hobbes maintained, "like wolves toward one another,"37 but it would take much greater 
development of this thought to constitute the development of theory. One could, however, 
incorporate a particular theory to arrive at this Hobbesian thought, presumably in order to 
bolster the credibility of the thought. Thoughts that can find "theoretical support" are almost 
always more impressive and meaningful than those which cannot. Social theory and social 
philosophy can be roughly distinguished by noting the latter is largely concerned with 
creating a system of "what ought to be," while social theory offers a conceptual image of 
"what is." In writing about the demarcation between social theory and philosophy, 
Timasheff and Theodorson (1976: 5) made the observation that, 
From the ultimate principles of total reality so established, philosophers can draw certain postulates 
and axioms and then use them to reinterpret the particular classes of objects that they distinguish in the 
observed facts. Thus, whereas sociologists explain society in terms of facts observed in society and, 
eventually, in related fields of empiric knowledge, social philosophers explain society in terms of the 
explanations they give to total reality. They can speak of first causes, supreme values, and ultimate 
ends; sociologists are not entitled to do so. 
Therefore, (sociological) theory is not a normative endeavor, but instead a task largely 
concerned with matching abstract thoughts to reality. 38 
Likewise, the use of evolutionary arguments often generates a type of "theoretical 
piggy backing." This occurs when a theory, such as social evolutionism, is used to give 
greater credence to a particular angle of vision on the social world. Auguste Comte, who 
coined the term sociology, demonstrated how sociology as a "science of society" could be 
understood and administered as a type of predictive social physics. Alex Callinicos ( 1999: 
65-6) clearly stated the "scientific order" by which Comte assigned sociology its value, 
37 Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin's grandfather, offers a similar commentary in 1803 as he wrote that "eat or 
be eaten" is the "first law" of nature. 
38 Social theories are not, are their face, true or false. They are, instead, tools of analysis. 
29 
The sciences constitute a definite order - what he (Comte) calls an "encyclopedic series" - starting 
with the most abstract and complex, and proceeding according to the greatest specificity and 
complexity of each successive discipline: thus the "six fundamental sciences" are mathematics, 
astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and "social physics" or sociology. 
Comte was, however, able to legitimize his affirmative thought of a highly scientifically 
regimented social order only by appealing to the larger notion of evolutionary theory. As 
such, he argued that because society, in tangent with the human mind, is destine to evolve 
from a theological to a metaphysical and finally to a positivistic state; the end result would 
be, by logical extension, the ability to scientifically address existing undesirable social 
conditions (problems). With an appeal to "social physics" Comte wrote, well before Darwin, 
of "the obvious necessity to founding sociology upon the whole of biology (Hofstadter 1992: 
67). For Comte, along with many other political and social thinkers of the Enlightenment era 
who were profoundly influenced by the powerful promise of Newtonian science, "social 
problems" were simply the result of not being able to adequately and/or accurately apply 
science to social action in a predictive manner. 
Comte's adherence to a "science of society" was accepted as credible only after it 
was woven into a broader evolutionary theoretical model.39 Without Comte's ability to blend 
evolutionism with social thought, it is possible that the development of sociology would have 
been pushed back an indeterminable amount of time. It cannot be neglected that significant 
social changes brought upon by the Industrial Revolution played a major role in the 
manifestation of sociological development. Social changes alone, however, are unable to 
explain why sociology came be viewed as something different from the much older and more 
39 Interestingly, Comte's reliance upon evolutionary theory took place nearly half a century before Darwin 
groundbreaking notion explained natural selection as the likely mechanism driving biological evolution. 
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traditional notion of social philosophy. The proper answer to this quandary seems to be that 
sociology was "invented," as Comte noted in The Course of Positive Philosophy, not as 
philosophy per se, but instead as "positivistic (scientific) social physics." 
Returning again to the Hobbesian proposition that "human beings are like wolves 
towards one another"; this might seem like a simple, undocumented, and unsubstantiated, 
statement about the elusive understanding of "human nature," but it could actually represent 
much more. For instance, classical theorists other than Hobbes might have advanced this 
thought with the descriptive mechanism of competitive natural selection as the guiding force 
of behavior. Based upon this line of reasoning, it could be argued that "human beings act 
like wolves toward one another," because of their sense of survival, their inclination toward 
selecting themselves at the expense of the other, dictates that they must behave like the wolf. 
If people must socially behave in a certain evolutionarily driven manner, then the aspirations 
of Comte's "social physics" seem much more likely to be measured and evaluated.40 The 
Hobbesian wolf becomes the agent of a powerful metaphor, the strength of which depends 
largely upon the collaboration between thought and theory. The same wording in two 
different sentences can express the same thought, however, in one sense the expression 
comes about as an effort to speculate about human nature, and in another human nature may 
be explained as part of a larger evolutionary model. 
As will be discussed in detail later, in the discussion of the contrarian character, 
Herbert Spencer who masterfully employed the use of social evolutionary theory as a bridge 
to advance his thoughts regarding "Who Deserves What" commonly and purposely 
40 Depending upon ones theoretical orientation the crux of this problem might be considered one of "free will." 
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intermingled social and moral concerns. Jonathan Turner advanced the argument that 
Spencer's social evolutionary synthesis is, and ought to be treated as, distinct from Spencer's 
thoughts regarding "Who Deserves What." Turner (1985:7) argued, 
At a time when social theorists genuflect at the sacred works of St. Marx, St. Durkheim, and St. 
Weber, we spit on the grave of Spencer because he held a moral philosophy repugnant to the political 
biases of many contemporary theorists .... One finds far less moralizing in Spencer's sociology than 
that of either Durkheim or Marx; and yet we continue to ignore Spencer. 
Turner is saying that when thought and theory are meshed, the true value of Spencer's work 
is often neglected because of his contrarian stance. (Accordingly, so Turner might suggest, 
the thesis of this work will only further denigrate the work of Spencer and other evolutionary 
sociologists.) Thus sociologists, in order to fully appreciate the valuable contributions of 
Spencer, should focus on theory or thought, but not both simultaneously if they wish too 
fully "appreciate" Spencer. While Turner's argument is well taken, it is important to 
consider that expressions of theory are made "real" through the piggybacking thoughts that 
flow, according to the theorist, from the theory. After all, Spencer himself took many 
opportunities (Social Statistics, Principles of Sociology, Man Versus the State) to explain 
why his philosophical evolutionary synthesis led logically to a contrarian position. Turner is 
suggesting that sociologists mount the horse (thinker) with a saddle (theory) and send it off 
with no rider, i.e., absent a mechanism by which to apply theory. Conversely, the social 
thinkers to be discussed in this thesis, to varying degrees, are placing the saddle on the horse 
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precisely so that they may send it off with their thoughts and ideologies.41 Their ideologies 
are most powerful when presented in the form of thought trickling from the brow of theory, 
particularly when the theory in question is as encompassing and influential as "the theory of 
evolution." 
Noticing the distinction yet linkage between theory and thought is a constant 
reminder to understand and respect the differences between the two while simultaneously 
confronting the challenge of unlocking the interplay that gives each of these powerful 
conceptions their respective force. There is an inherent symbiotic relationship between 
thought and theory, in that neither would typically have the ability to shape social consensus 
without the other. It is, therefore, important to realize that, strictly speaking, theory can be 
rightfully defined using the restrictions and constraints that Issak advocates. Nonetheless, if 
these factors are to hold meaning outside an intellectual debate it is imperative that scholars 
evaluate the "outcomes" (thoughts), which those advocating the theory under review regard 
as logical or beneficial extensions. Therefore, when the discussions of Spencerian attitudes 
towards "Who Deserves What" arise, they are not an assault on his larger theory of social 
evolution, but rather an integral part of, or practical extensions of, his broader social 
1 , · 42 evo utlomsm. 
41 The question must be asked of those who wish to separate theory and thought, were do theories come from, if 
not from thought? More importantly, while notions of motivation are often overly relied upon in sociological 
and psychological analysis, it should be noted that the purpose or rationale associated with "theory building" 
would become noticeably lacking if thought were either excluded from the process or rejected as an irrelevant 
byproduct. The drive to do exactly this within sociology appears to be the result of the rejection of subjective 
and quest for objectivity. Without falling too deeply in this important sociological debate, I can only add that 
objectivity -if it existed- was, in its original instance, likely established using some subjective set of criterion. 
From subjective agreement objectivity becomes a possibility. 
42 I use Spencer as a case example. The debate surrounding the proper use of work can be applied towards most 
every thinker to be included in this thesis. 
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The Origins of Linear Time 
For evolutionism to have the scientific meaning often associated with the term, time 
must be understood in a linear, or at least directional, way.43 For most of human history, 
punctuated by the legacy of ancient Greece, time and history have been understood as a 
cyclical rather than a linear process. As Fukuyama (1992:56) noted, 
Aristotle did not assume the continuity of history. That is, he believed that the cycle of regimes was 
embedded in a larger natural cycle whereby cataclysms like floods would periodically eliminate not 
only existing human societies, but all memory of them as well, forcing men to start the historical 
process over again from the beginning. In the Greek view, history thus is not secular but cyclical. 
It is conceivable that one might, to take a cue from Aristotle, develop a theory of evolution in 
accordance with a cyclical interpretation of time and history that would look different, and 
posses different implications, than the understanding of evolutionary theory (natural selection 
hypothesis) today. It is, nonetheless, doubtful that such a theory would correspond with 
either a Popperian or Kuhnian notion of science. 44 
Two forces paved the way for a contemporary notion of time as a linear construct: ( 1) 
the advent and spread of Christianity, and (2) the development and Enlightenment treatment 
of Sir. Isaac Newton's physics. For Christianity to have an intelligible interpretation -a 
notion that was a concern during the Middle Ages when The Church was the largest political 
body in the world- of God as Man's creator and final redeemer time must have a beginning 
43 Stephen Gould warns against understanding progress resulting from evolution to signify "better." Instead, 
Gould maintains that it is best to think of "progress" in evolution as directional. 
44 Karl Popper, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1961), advances the argument that scientific discovery 
ought to be likened with falsification. If an idea cannot be falsified then science cannot, according to Popper, 
occur. The mission of the scientist, therefore, is not to demonstrate why they are correct, but to constantly 
strive at proving himself or herself wrong. Only after all reasonable attempts at falsification have failed can 
scientific improvement occur. Not surprisingly, Popper was very skeptical at the prospect of evolutionism's 
scientific legitimacy. Alternatively, Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Reduction ( 1970), argued that 
science should be thought to occur when enough specific cases begin to challenge the present scientific status 
quo. For Kuhn, science occurs as a socially negotiated process wherein scientific change occurs when existing 
beliefs unable to stand scrutiny lose the ability to maintain scientific appeal. Thus, new science replaces older 
scientific models largely because of social (scientific) consensus. 
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(creation) and an end (apocalypse), and therefore must be understood as linear. Regardless 
of whether Christianity is understood as an individual quest for the salvation of one's soul, or 
the universal struggle for human equality and redemption, a linear understanding of time 
must persist.45 In either conception of Christianity, a clearly presented telos (final point) 
marks the perceived outcome46 of spiritual devotion.47 Many of Christianity's essential 
teachings, in particular the resurrection and reemergence of Jesus as a Christ, logically 
revolve around the conception of linear time. 
Taking this cue, the intellectually influential Saints Augustine and Aquinas devoted 
much of their writings to justify not only the existence and nature of God, but linear time as 
well. The socially formed consensus endorsing linear time was born of a search for 
theological consistency. If one is to be Christian, or live in a political environment 
dominated by Christianity, a simultaneous appreciation of linear time becomes axiomatic -
truth is formed by necessity, by consistency of belief. Ironically, it would be Enlightenment 
thinkers, e.g. Newton, who utilized the Christian imposition of linear time as the means by 
which to form the ideas that served as valuable and essential, precursor to the evolutionary 
works of Charles Darwin. In this way it was the critical notion of linear time, developed and 
maintained by The Church, that eventually lent credibility to the scientific, time inspired, 
evolutionary arguments advanced by Darwin, whose evolutionary theory would need more 
than linear time; it would need a new type of physics, Newtonian physics. 
45 This dichotomous treatment of Christianity is not to suggest that other rationales for belief do not persist, only 
that most of these rationales can generally fall into one of the two categories. 
46 Purpose seems to be too personal a word here. 
47 Not all religious faiths must articulate a linear notion of time. For instance, Hinduism with its emphasis on 
reincarnation might well consistently advocate a cyclical understanding of time. However, given the dreadful 
state of affairs during the Middle Ages (See William Manchester's "A Word Lit Only by Fire" esp. pp4-25) it 
made much more sense "religiopolitically" speaking to advocate salvation in a "better place" as opposed to 
"coming back" to this world as another being. 
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Newtonian Physics 
Aside from the pragmatically inspired theological movement towards a sense of time 
that looked more like a line than a circle, a second, quite different force would lead to a 
similar understanding. Aristotle, and the development of his Physics that went largely 
unchallenged for more than a millennium, understood circular motion as both objectively real 
and natural. Further, Aristotle's naturalistic views toward tautological (circular) reasoning 
and teleological (ends-based) reasoning would not be understood in the same negatively 
attributed sense that these types of reasoning would incur today, i.e., as illegitimate. For 
Aristotle, every living thing had a purpose (telos), and it was only natural and good to pursue 
that purpose.48 This circular naturalistic approach to time and science would come to a halt 
as serendipity struck Sir. Isaac Newton, i.e., in the form of an apple that fell from a tree. 
The Newtonian scientific model differed from the Aristotelian model in that it was 
based upon a linear interpretation of time and space. Consistent with the Newtonian 
scientific model, inertia and gravity act to direct the body away from its natural tendency 
towards straight-line motion. It would be this straight-line notion as synonymous with a 
naturally good quality that would encourage 1) nature as a good, and 2) the emergence of 
laissez faire economic theory. As Callinicos (1999: 16) articulated when referencing the 
manner in which Newton's physical laws were applied to the human condition, 
48 According to Aristotle the purpose of the human was to reach eudimonia. This Greek word does not have a 
good translation in English, but is often cited as a type of human flourishing or happiness. The idea is 
comparable to Abraham Mazlow's psychological notion of self-actualization. 
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The philosophes commonly identified a natural course of events to which things would tend unless 
interfered with. In doing so, they were undoubtedly influenced by the principle of inertia in physics 
formulated by Galileo and Newton, according to which a body tends to move in a given direction 
unless acted on by another body. But they gave natural a normal connotation, so that the natural 
course of events was also the right course. Thus Francois Quesnay, one of the French school of 
Psysiocrat economists, offered the following definition of a natural physical law: the regular course of 
all physical events in the natural order which is self-evidently the most advantageous to the human 
race. " Apparently enough it was Quesnay who coined the slogan of free-market economics: laissez 
faire, laissez-passer. 
For Newton, this simple natural process suggested that a type of equilibrium was being 
restored between the inertial motion of the body and the force of gravity. In this 
interpretation, objects travel in a straight line, and continue to do so, until a force (gravity) 
alters the motion. The contrasts between the Aristotelian and Newtonian scientific models 
are so great that for purposes of this thesis the differences are as distinct as that between a 
circle and a line. Whereas Aristotle understood that science and time traveled in a 
synchronized naturalistic ends-based circular direction, Newton viewed them as analogous to 
what happens when an object "veers from its straight-line tangent" and is brought back into 
the fray by some external source -gravity. 
At the height of the Enlightenment,49 Adam Smith, Thomas Multhus, and a new 
brand of political economists, e.g. Ricardo and Martineau, would offer an analogy of the 
object (as the individual) and the external force, which keep this object from "going off on a 
49 As of this point the question might arise, why so much talk of the "Enlightenment" and Western historical 
concerns? The answer to this has very little to do with ethnocentrism, and is generally because of the influence 
associated with Western civilization - the Enlightenment in particular - towards historical and contemporary 
American attitudes towards "Who Deserves What." Even the postmodernist Michel Foucault in his article 
"What is Enlightenment," argues it is simply wrong to argue that someone is "for or against" the 
Enlightenment. Foucault, instead, maintains that, "the Enlightenment is a set of political, economic, social, 
institutional, and cultural events on which we still depend in large part, constitutes a privileged domain for 
analysis. I also think that as an enterprise for linking the progress of truth and the history of liberty in a bond of 
direct relation, it formulated a philosophical question that remains for us to consider." 
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tangent" (as the marketplace).50 Armed with a new understanding of both time and science, 
the beginning of a social evolutionary argument concerned with "Who Deserves What" 
began to take form. The interpretation of social action as analogous with the "theory of 
evolution," would mold this (social evolutionism) to levels of respectability that continue to 
affect the direction of American social redistribution policies.51 
History as an Evolutionary Metaphor 
While generally most people have come to understand time in somewhat of a linear 
fashion, such a consensus does not surround a general notion of human history. In the 
concluding pages of the Origin of the Species, Darwin (1859:458) commented, "Light will be 
thrown on the origin of Man and his history, (Dickens, pp. 13)" thus, noting a direct link 
between human evolution and human history. Since 1859, however, the time of Darwin's 
prediction (social) evolutionary theory has been unable to form a consensus around any 
particular conception of human history. 52 Instead, notions of human history are often 
surrounded with a particular interpretation of evolutionary theory. Darwin was correct to 
suspect that his notion of evolutionary theory would illuminate the possibilities surrounding 
an understanding of human history. Nonetheless, he would probably not have suspected that 
his approach would have generated so many different angles of vision on theory, evolution, 
or history. His paradigm shifting work did not, and probably could not, have ended the 
50 If Newton's gravity could be such a powerful invisible force acting on natural objects then the same could, 
arguably, hold true for social objects (people) with regard to Adam Smith's market mechanism of the invisible 
hand. 
51 See Alexander Rosenberg's Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science, and Policy (2000). 
52 The knowledge base surrounding human history has certainly been tremendously increased since Darwin's 
prophetic statement; however, this increased knowledge has not manifested itself into a more holistic 
conception regarding what human history is to mean. 
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debate surrounding the relationship between human history and (social) evolutionism. 
Rather, it precipitated an ongoing discourse. 
For instance, if history is treated metaphorically it may be viewed as either a 
pendulum or a finishing line (with a wide array of ideas on a continuum between these two 
extremes). If history is viewed as a pendulum, then social evolutionary development and 
progress might occur, but this occurrence is subject to peaks and valleys in much the same 
way that Talcott Parsons viewed social systems, in a state of moving equilibrium. Once a 
peak towards one end of the spectrum occurs, the entire -historical- process reproduces itself 
in the opposite direction. Thus, when history is a pendulum, social development and change 
(evolutionism) is equally certain to advance and decline in a more or less cyclical fashion. 
Aside from the Ancient Greeks (without whom the influence of either Christianity or 
Newtonian Physics were quite satisfied with viewing time and history as a cyclical process of 
change and catastrophe) Spencer, under the influence of Victorian English culture, likewise 
shared the view of history as analogous to a pendulum. 
Spencer viewed the evolutionary processes governing the universe, including the 
social order, as a systems process involving: aggregation or evolution, differentiation and 
integration of elements, a state of equilibrium, and finally dissolution. Thus, the breakdown 
(dissolution) of an evolutionary trend is necessarily built into the process. As Spencer (1880: 
414) explained, there is 
a process toward equilibrium. That universal co-existence of antagonistic forces which, as we before 
saw, necessitates the universality ofrhythm, and which, as we before saw, necessitates decomposition 
of every force into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate establishment of a 
balance. Every motion being a motion under resistance is continually suffering deductions, and these 
unceasing deductions finally result in the cessation of motion. 
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If Spencer's general evolutionary view is applied to analyze human history, the implication is 
that it would be inaccurate to conclude that social evolution could or would ultimately 
suggest an end of history. While it might be possible to objectively evaluate the evolutionary 
trajectories of various sociopolitical systems, in terms of desirability and survivability it 
would be a mistake to imagine that any evolutionary trajectory was immune from eventual 
balance and dissolution. There can be no finish line, in history or elsewhere, if the processes 
governing advancement are inherently devised so that a pendulum-like equilibrium must 
occur.53 
Conversely, history could be viewed as a journey toward a finishing line, with no 
cyclical movements, just the elation of the runners as they break the tape of history's finish 
line. If social evolutionism is to break through that line, as opposed to reworking itself 
through a process of "endless swing," however, it must be asked: what does this line 
represent? Georg Hegel and Karl Marx, both extremely influential social evolutionary 
thinkers, made lasting contributions to the idea that human history -and human potentiality in 
the case of Marx- represents a manifestation of social evolutionism that dashes through the 
tape of the finishing line with no extenuating need to rerun the grueling event. Something 
causes social evolution to shed an unalterable and permanent end to human history, but what 
something could possibly put an end to human history?54 
Writing in Introduction to the Philosophy of History Hegel, (1832) elaborates his 
argument that, "The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness 
53 For this reason Spencer often used the word equilibration to describe what most evolutionary biologists 
refereed to as adaptation. 
54 The end of history does imply the end of human action and achievement, only that all fundamental 
sociopolitical questions have found their answers, and that these answers cannot be improved upon in any 
meaningful way. 
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of freedom." For Hegel, a universal spirit (guist) directs history towards the emancipation of 
human freedom. It does so first by way of the family, then by the formation of civil society. 
Finally the dialectic riddle of human freedom finds its answer within the creation of the state. 
The inherent problems (contradictions) with both the family and civil society become 
resolved for Hegel only after human history has evolved to the level of the state. Only in a 
liberal state could human consciousness and freedom reach an end that could, for Hegel, 
possibly signify the "end of history." Indeed, after the Battle of Jena in 1806, Hegel boldly 
stated, "history had ended." Its finish line (the consciousness of human freedom) had finally 
been broached by the principles extolled in both the French and American revolutionary 
efforts.55 The state had found a way, through the principles of liberalism, to become the end 
of human history, and thus the last stage of social evolution. Just as the marathon runner 
might run a faster pace, the principles of liberalism might be adjusted slightly to better allow 
for the dynamics of consciousness inherent in human freedom. Nonetheless, the marathon, 
like history, had been completed; all of the important social contradictions of previous times 
have been addressed with the "proper" form of the state -liberal democracy. 56 
55 Hegel's philosophical system is much more complicated than merely an elaboration of sociopolitical 
determinism. Hegel's philosophy of history is embedded within a larger dialectical progression. The 
progression can be said to begin with a thesis, but the thesis will inevitably contain inherent contradictions. 
These contradictions lead to the creation of the antithesis, the opposite of the thesis. As thesis and antithesis 
become resolved a synthesis of the two becomes formed. The synthesis, however, is destine to once again 
begin the dialectical process; that is, until the resolution of the dialectic (in the form of spirit guist) finds its end 
with the consciousness of human freedom. 
56 Shortly after Hegel argued that liberal democracy was the emancipation of human freedom Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1969:12) made the argument in Democracy in America that democracy as a political institution 
was an inevitable bi-product of social evolutionary forces. 
Therefore the gradual process of equality is something fated. The main features of this progress are 
the following: it is universal and permanent, it is daily passing beyond human control, and every event 
and every man helps it along. Is it wise to suppose that a movement, which has been so long in train, 
could be halted in one generation? Does anyone imagine that democracy, which has destroyed the 
feudal system and vanquished kings, will fall back before the middle classes and the rich? Will it stop 
now, when it has grown so strong and its adversaries so weak? 
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In 1992 Francis Fukuyama sought to demonstrate that since 1782, Hegel's general 
thesis had been supported. Hegel was, that is, correct in arguing that human history, as a 
search for new or better governing sociopolitical principles, was over (and had been since the 
end of the American and French Revolutions). Fukuyama (1992: xi) stated his general 
argument as follows: 
I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and 
the "final form of human government" and as such constituted the "end of history". That is while 
earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their 
eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such internal contradictions. This was not 
to say that today's stable democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not without 
injustice or serious social problems. But these problems were ones of incomplete implementation of 
the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than the 
flaws of the principles themselves. 
Progress in history then becomes, for Fukuyama, an enhancement or elaboration of what has 
existed since 1806, as opposed to the development of new principles. In other words, for 
Hegel, and more recently Fukuyama, liberal democracy as a sociopolitical system resolving 
the dialectical contradictions of human past, is the finishing line of history; it cannot be 
qualitatively improved. 
Karl Marx57 also perceived human history as a finishing line, but unlike Hegel Marx's 
finishing line did not take the form of a liberal democracy. Instead for Marx, human history 
would reach fruition -its finishing line- only after the working class (proletariat) acting 
under the direction of a shared "collective consciousness" would rise up in glorious 
revolution and topple the oppressive owner class (bourgeoisie). This revolution would 
57 Marx is used here because his communist vision of history as a finishing line provides an alternative to the 
Hegelian approach. However, although Marx did discuss social evolutionary theory in tangent with the 
question "Who Deserves What" I have opted not to utilize Marxist theory as the best way to represent the 
Interventionist ideal type. While Marx is extremely influential, for reasons that will be expanded as this thesis 
develops, I am very concerned that a Marxist argument is not only unlikely to appeal on a theoretical level, but 
also likely to repel -after its implications are noted- on a realistic level. Thus, Thorstein Veblen will be utilized 
as the best representative of the interventionist. 
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signify the end of human history because, for Marx, history is the culmination of class 
struggle and economic exploitation among peoples -historical materialism. Friedrich Engels 
(1978: 472) -while crediting Marx- clearly reinforces this sentiment in the preface to the 
Manifesto of the Communist Party as he wrote: 
The basic thought running through the Manifesto -that economic production and the structure of 
society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the 
political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently ( ever since the dissolution of the 
primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles 
between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of 
social development; that is struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and 
oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and 
oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from 
exploitation, oppression and class struggles -this basic thought belongs solely and exclusively to Marx 
The end of history would occur for Marx only after socioeconomic class (a vertical form of 
social organization), the force governing the inequitable and unjust treatment of people, is 
replaced with a classless (horizontal form of social organization) social order. 
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CHAPTER 3. A THEORY OF EVOLUTION, DARWINIAN STYLE 
Linking Darwinism and Social Concerns 
It is important, if no other reason than to recognize faulty or disingenuous attributions 
to Darwin, to understand the basic premises underlying Darwin's treatise on, The Origin of 
Species. 58 It is also noteworthy to recognize that many social evolutionary arguments were 
either written before Darwin's work or differ significantly from the evolutionism of Darwin. 
Why then should sociologists explore Darwin, or other competing explanations of 
biologically driven evolution as a precursor to socially driven evolutionary understandings of 
"Who Deserve What?" Biological and social evolutionism, after all, offer differing 
contentions and implications. The answer is found in an appreciation of the effect with 
which the interpretations regarding biological notions of evolution have thrust themselves 
upon both the contrarian and the interventionist. James Rogers (1972: 265), using a vivid 
analogy of a wine jar pointedly illustrated the lingering effects of Darwinism as applied to 
social and political ideologies: 
58 Charles Darwin influence is so pronounced that, on occasion, researchers "look" to find any connection 
between his ideas regarding biological evolution and social theory (evolution). A connection does exist, but not 
always as it is reported. For instance, it is often erroneously cited that Karl Marx offered to dedicate Das 
Kapital to Darwin, and that Darwin respectfully declined Marx's gesture. However, Terence Ball, in his article 
"Marx and Darwin: A Reconsideration" Political Theory, vol.7 (Nov., 1979) pp. 469-483 debunks this 
"academic myth." Marx, in all likelihood never offered Darwin the dedication. Nonetheless I have continued, 
in my research process, to observe this "academic myth" reappear on quite a few occasions in publications 
written well after Ball's 1979 article. The lesson here seems to be that myths, even academic ones, are very 
pervasive, and persuasive; and the only defense to such ideas is to have a better grasp of the original source -
for our concerns Charles Darwin. 
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Horace remarks in one of his letters that the wine jar retains for a long period the scent of the first wine 
which it contained. Intellectual concepts share this trait, among many other pleasant ones, with the 
classical amphora. They often evoke clusters of ideas with which they were one associated. Mention 
Darwinism, for example, and many will find lingering on the threshold of their sensibility concepts of 
"struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest." These concepts associated with Darwin's theory 
of natural selection were not original to Darwin. But are generally associated with Darwin's rather 
than to the ideologies which proceeded them. Later they became major slogans of the Social 
Darwinists who wanted to view human society through Darwin's vision of the animal world. 
James's thought triggers several interesting observations, not the least of which returns to the 
idea of the distinction between theory and thought. Why did Social Darwinists use 
"evolutionary theory" - in particular the notion of the "struggle for existence" - when such 
thoughts had been powerfully expressed well before Darwin? The answer is thoughts that 
build upon other thoughts are interesting, but theories that expand upon "old" thoughts are 
tremendously influential. This is the reason it would be ill advised to ignore why the 
association between biological evolutionary theory and fundamental social questions. 
Biological studies, in particular biology applied to the development of a species 
(evolutionary studies), add an aura of scientific respectability to fundamentally important 
sociological endeavors. It was precisely this type of scientific respectability "Comte's social 
physics," which triggered the initial development of sociology as a distinct academic 
discipline. No longer was social thought necessarily an ideologically laden quest; instead the 
systematic use of evolutionary theory offered more than an opinion of the nature, course, and 
effect of social action. 59 The scientific flavor of Darwinism is found in its biology, but a 
collaterally related issue is whether the sociologist can extend evolutionary science to 
examine human social order. The answer is yes, and both sociologists and social 
59 This is not to say, of course, that evolutionary theory will somehow negate ideology, but it does change how 
ideology is understood. (Thought - thought ideology) is much different and has much different implications 
that (thought - theory- thought ideology). 
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policymakers frequently apply a variant of Darwin's theory. 60 As Hofstadter argued," It 
(Social Darwinism) refers to the more general adaptation of Darwinian, and related 
biological concepts to social ideologies." Darwinism is, like any other theory, unable to 
render ideology moot. Nonetheless, consistent with an understanding of theory as a 
perceived image of reality, Darwinism, and social evolutionism in general, are able to create 
a theoretical base by which to find consistent meaning and use for ideological beliefs. 
The term, Social Darwinism, has been interpreted in a number of ways, each of which 
is consistent with the ideology of the person invoking the term.61 Darwinism can stress either 
competition or cooperation depending upon which variant the thinker understands as 
enhancing the struggles of natural selection. Darwin (1871: 151-2), in fact, on occasion more 
heavily stressed the competitive spirit of evolution, and in certain passages of his work seems 
like a "Social Darwinist" himself, 
We civilized men ... do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the 
imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor laws; and our medical men exert their utmost 
skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. ... Thus the weak members of civilized society 
propagate their kind. No one was has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this 
must be highly injurious to the race of man. 
Nonetheless, powerful social thinkers, e.g., Peter Kropotkin used Darwin's 
evolutionary theory to demonstrate the principle of cooperative Mutual Aid. It may well be 
prudent to approach the notion of "Social Darwinism" as a complex element of social 
evolutionary arguments, but not as the complete picture. The only adequate way to address 
the "social" when thinking about "social Darwinism" is to first understand the "Darwin," an 
60 I purposely avoid the moral language of "should" here. The moral philosopher could fill volumes with this 
question, but the focus of this thesis must be upon what is and not what ought to be. 
61 Often, Social Darwinism is thought to represent the most vulgar composite sketch of the contrarian character. 
This portrayal, however, is only one very specific adaptation of Darwin's contribution to social theory. In fact, 
writing in Rendezvous with Destiny (1952) Eric Goldman expanded the term "reform Darwinism," which would 
come to be associated with mutual aid, and the struggle for the life of others (Bannister). 
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important step that many proponents and opponents of "Social Darwinism" largely ignore. 
Along these lines Darwin would readily admit that he knew little "in matters of political 
economy," and would be much more comfortable with his evolutionary outlook as applied to 
"lower animals," rather than humans. 
Darwinism or Evolutionism is not correctly understood as a license to consistently 
advocate whatever social position one wishes. In briefly reviewing biological notions of 
evolution, it is possible to simultaneously review how these notions, positively or negatively, 
yield their influence over the credence and logical respectability of either the contrarian or 
the interventionist. It therefore becomes important to ask whether certain conceptions of 
evolution lend greater credibility to either character, or more importantly to answers to the 
question "Who Deserve What?" Thus, it becomes important to understand minimally the 
rudimentary aspects and influences of (Darwinian) evolutionary theory. No thought or 
ensuing larger theory develops in a vacuum, and evolutionism is no different. 
The Development of Darwinism 
One reason can explain why Charles Darwin, rather than Jean Baptiste de Lamarck, 
has come to be recognized as the driving force behind most contemporary understandings of 
evolutionary theory, Darwin's pivotal reliance upon natural selection as the mechanism by 
which to explain the evolutionary process.62 Lamarck, writing in the late eighteenth century, 
maintained in his treatise on the law of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, that 
evolutionary change occurred via "the transmission to offspring of all changes undergone by 
62 Darwin never argued that Lamarck's notion of evolution was wrong in every micro case. Instead, Darwin 
argued that on a specific individual level Lamarckian emphasis towards acquired characteristics could mean a 
great deal, but on a universal macro level the notion of natural selection must take precedence. 
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the parent generation."63 Children are thus viewed as biological expressions of both parental 
genes and actions i.e., if parents developed the skill to be talented musicians, then their 
children would inherent this "trait." Writing on the effect of Lamarckian evolutionary theory 
and social evolutionism in American thought George Stocking (1962: 241) demonstrated the 
profound effect the doctrine had upon Comte, Morgan, Spencer, and social evolutionism in 
general: 
The Lamarckianism of American social science also had sources within the tradition of nineteenth 
century American social thought. A number of its major figures - Auguste Comte, Lewis Henry 
Morgan, and Herbert Spencer - were either implicitly or avowed believers in the heritabilty of 
acquired characteristics. Comte spoke of the doctrine as an "incontestable principle"; Morgan if he did 
not specifically embrace the belief, made statements which can be given meaning only in its terms; 
Spencer was the father f Neo-Lamarckian biology, and defended the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics is long winded controversy with August Weismann in 1893. Like many other 
nineteenth century social theorists, each of these men embraced some form of unilateral social 
evolution; each felt that the normal evolution of human societies proceeded through a single 
progressive sequence of social or intellectual stages. 
Stocking (Ibid.) continued this line of reasoning by proposing two major outcomes from such 
a dependence on Lamarckian thought: 
Although by no means central to social evolutionary theory, the inheritance of acquired characteristics 
was able to play at least two roles in such a framework. Comte used the idea to explain the origin of 
racial differences, which in turn helped to explain deviations from the normal unilateral sequence of 
development. And for writers whose evolutionism, unlike Comte's, was biological as well as social, it 
provided a link between social and intellectual progress and organic mental evolution; indeed, for 
some writers it was the major mechanism of the evolution of the mind. 
This thoughtful treatment of Lamarckian evolutionary influence towards social thought 
should serve as a reminder that evolution is a vast notion with many different modes of 
interpretation. Evolutionism is not necessarily synonymous with Darwinism. 
63 It would be inaccurate to assess the scientific and cultural shift from Lamarckian evolutionary theory to 
Darwinism as a "smooth" transition. While some remnants of Lamarckian theory still exist today Darwinism is 
the much more scientifically accepted interpretation of the evolutionary process. This shift in scientific opinion 
was neither universal nor widespread with the publication of Darwin's primary evolutionary treatise. It took 
nearly seventy-five years for Darwinism to replace Lamarckianism as the accepted scientific evolutionary 
paradigm. 
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Darwin grew skeptical with Lamarck's evolutionary design, i.e. the notion of 
"artificial selection" based upon the complete inhabitability of traits from one generation to 
the next. This skepticism led Darwin to reason that something beyond merely a genetic 
generational inheritance must account for long-term macro evolutionary changes. Darwin's 
five-year South American journey on the Beagle, in particular his experiments with finches, 
led him to affirm his belief that something much more than generational inheritance was, at 
least on a macro scale, working toward the physical development of all animal species, 
humans included. Darwin (1868: 10), while writing nine years after the publication of On 
the Origin of Species ( 1859), recalls how his South American travels focused his attention 
towards the, 
Inexplicable problem (of) how the necessary degree of modification could have been effected (for 
evolution to occur), and it would have thus remained forever, had I not studied domestic productions, 
and thus acquired a just idea of the power of selection. As soon as I had fully realized this idea, I saw, 
on reading Malthus on Population, that natural selection was the was the inevitable result of the rapid 
increase of all organic beings; for I was prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence by having 
long studied the habits of animals. 
Some mechanism, other than artificial selection (simple single-generation reproduction), had 
to explain such wide scale adaptations in the human population; thus, from this concern 
Darwin developed the ideas surrounding the "struggle for existence" and "natural selection." 
Darwinian Evolutionary Principles 
Darwin observed the uncontroversial notion that almost all populations show multiple 
degrees of variations for almost every physical trait. Darwin further noted, again 
uncontroversially, that within a population certain traits improve the chances for survival, 
while others do not. It is important to note, however, that specific traits which enhance the 
chances for survival will not necessarily be the same across different populations; a view that 
was cleverly argued by the physical anthropologist Coon (1939:6): 
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Small, foetalized, relatively weak races may be more efficient and hence more suitable for survival in 
certain environments than larger, more muscular, and less infantile ones. Small, foetalized, and 
relatively defenseless mammals develop elaborate social devices by which the solidarity of the group 
compensates for the deficiency in individual aggressiveness. 
Consistent with this brief series of uncontroversial natural assumptions along with 
observation and experiment, Darwin concluded that natural traits, which best enhanced the 
"survival for existence" for any particular population, would be "naturally selected." The 
end-result of this proposition was, an increased survival rate for the population in question. 
If this idea at first glance appears too simplistic to be extremely influential do not be fooled. 
As noted by Dobzhansky and Allen (1956: 597), "Natural selection is a remarkable enough 
phenomenon, since it is the sole method known at present which begets adaptedness to the 
environment in living matter." 
Using survival as a primary criterion, evolution is often seen as developmental or 
progressive. However, when survival is not a direct concern, an objective notion of progress 
becomes at best a tenuous proposition. If a variable other than survival were used to assess 
progress, it would seem that on most occasions "cultural relativism" would play a significant 
role in subjectively defining progress. Aside from the fairly obvious observation that 
normally functioning people and cultures desire to survive, are there any other desires that 
transcend culture, time, and history? The contention that "Who Deserves What" is a 
universal social concern should not be misunderstood as an appeal to address this concern 
with a specific notion of universal desire or progress.64 Having a grasp of evolutionism can 
help make sense of how the question "Who Deserves What" is understood and treated. This 
64 Regarding progress Stephen Jay Gould (1988: 319) commented, "Progress is a noxious, culturally embedded, 
untestable, non-operational, intractable idea that must be replaced if we wish to understand the patterns of 
history." 
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understanding, however, must be broached with the cautions and limitations that are built 
into any evolutionary appeal. 
Writing in the Origin of Species, Darwin (1859: 115) clearly presented the conception 
of natural selection, 65 
Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it 
be in any degree profitable to an individual of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to any 
other organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual, and will 
generally be inherited by its offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of surviving, 
for, of the many individuals which are periodically born, but a small number can survive. I have called 
this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term natural selection. 
Peter Bowler (1976: 631-2) described the process of natural selection in the following way, 
The essence of natural selection lies in the differential rates of reproduction which result from the 
success or failure of the variations occurring within a species. Animals with a favorable variation, i.e., 
one that helps to adjust to a changing environment, will get more food and be and be healthier than the 
average, and will thus tend to produce more offspring sharing their particular character. Conversely, 
animals with an unfavorable variation will get less food, they will be less healthy and will have fewer 
offspring, and in harsh circumstances will be eliminated altogether. 
Finally, while still developing his theory of evolution, based upon the principle of natural 
selection, Darwin in 1844 provided a hypothetical example describing the process of natural 
selection. As Darwin (1958: 119-20) described: 
To give an imaginary example, from changes in progress on an island, let the organization of a canine 
animal become slightly plastic, which animal preyed chiefly on rabbits, but sometimes on hares; let 
these same changes cause the number of rabbits very slowly to decrease and the number of hares to 
increase; the effect of this would be that the fox or dog would be driven out to catch more hares, and 
his numbers would tend to decrease; his organization however, being slightly plastic, those individuals 
with the lightest forms, longest limbs, and best eyesight (though perhaps with less cunning or scent) 
would be slightly favored, let the difference be ever so small, and would tend to live longer and to 
survive during that time of year when food was the shortest; they would also rear more young, which 
would inherit these slight peculiarities. The less fleet ones would be rigidly destroyed. 
Given this information regarding the concept of natural selection it becomes possible to 
65 Darwin's intellectual creation and development of "natural selection" was not a product of serendipity. 
Darwin, in fact, began developing the idea of natural selection sometime in early 1838 -nearly twenty years 
before he published the Origin. Natural selection was a "secret," which Darwin highly guarded from all but his 
most trusted friends. 
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formulate a number of important extrapolations, which might be directly related to social 
arguments. Natural selection may be said to contain the following implications. 1) 
Dependence upon reproduction as a vehicle to pass along traits, i.e., if the best adapted 
organisms within a species are the ones reproducing at the highest rates, then natural 
selection can be said to apply in its fullest sense.66 2) The process is extremely gradual. 3) 
Because natural selection is governed by a correspondence between organism adaptation and 
environmental conditions teleological reasoning becomes logically removed from such a 
view of evolution. As explained by Gerald Runkle ( 1961: 111 ), "Darwin showed that natural 
forms have a history and that teleological considerations are not necessary in order to 
understand it." 
A brief review of natural selection allows very quickly for the opinion that its 
applicability to people would be extremely difficult, but is it an impossible linkage? 
Dobzhansky and Allen set out to address this very question in their article appropriately 
entitled, "Does Natural Selection Continue to Operate in Modem Mankind?" Dobzhansky's 
( 1956: 595) answer to his question is almost axiomatic, because as he noted: 
Natural selection would cease only if all human genotypes produced numbers of surviving children in 
exact proportion to the frequencies of these genotypes in the population. This idea does not, and never 
did, occur in history. Quite apart from the hereditary diseases and malformations for which no 
remedies are known and which decrease the reproductive fitness, the inhabitants of different parts of 
the world have different reproductive rates. 
By asking a number of well placed rhetorical questions Dobzhansky (Ibid.) makes clear that 
66 More than any other implication of natural selection this point demonstrates the difficulty in strictly applying 
the idea to "human animals." Such an approach taken to apply directly to people tends to advance a type of 
elitist alarmism. Consider, for instance, the danger described by Cook ( 1951 :260), "As this process continues 
... the average level of intelligence and the proportion of gifted individuals declines. Should the feeble minded 
level be reached, most of the plus genes will have been eliminated. But before that time growing inefficiency 
and incompetence would cause the collapse of modern industrial society. The period in history labeled the Dark 
Ages that spread over Europe with the fall of Rome represented a cultural blackout that lasted for a thousand 
years. The Dark Ages which would be caused by continued gene erosion could last five to ten times as long." 
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while natural selection is a gradual process it is not static, and likewise a static understanding 
of nature -and humanity's place therein- largely misses the evolutionary implications of 
natural selection. 
The frequent allegation that the selective processes in the human species are no longer "natural" is due 
to persistence of the obsolete nineteenth century concept of "natural" selection. The error of this view 
is made clear when we ask its proponents such questions as, why should the "surviving fittest" be able 
to withstand cold and inclement weather without the benefit of fire and clothing? Is it not ludicrous to 
expect selection to make us good at defending ourselves against wild beasts when wild beast are 
getting to be so rare that it is a privilege to see one outside of a zoo. Is it necessary to eliminate 
everyone who has poor teeth when our dentists stand ready to provide us with artificial ones? Is it a 
great virtue to be able to endure pain when anesthetics are available? 
It is possible to talk about the linkages between natural selection and modem mankind. These 
discussions, however, must take into account that natural selection, as a process of human 
evolution, is absent any intrinsic qualities. As the human environment is constantly changed 
through technological and other sources, so too are the manifestations of natural selection. 
As Dobzhansky (Ibid.) plainly puts it, 
The direction and the intensity of natural selection are as changeable as the environment. Selection in 
modern man cannot maintain our fitness for the conditions of the Old Stone Age, nor can it prepare us 
for novel conditions of the distant future except by increasing our adaptability. 
Darwin was not the first thinker to toil with the mechanism of natural selection as 
underpinning human evolutionary development. Compare, for instance, just how similar 
Darwin's explanation of natural selection is with that of Herbert Spencer's evolutionary 
thought. Writing just seven years before the publication of the Origin of Species Spencer 
(1852: 499-500) noted: 
All mankind in turn subject themselves more or less to the discipline described; they may or may not 
advance under it, but in the nature of things, only those who do advance under it eventually survive ... 
for as those prematurely carried off must, in the average of cases, be those in whom the power of self-
preservation is least, it unavoidably follows that those left behind to continue the race are those in 
whom the power of self-preservation is greatest -are the selected of their generation. 
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Spencer offered the idea of natural selection in his writing prior to Darwin's very similar 
conception; his blunder came in not carrying his idea to fruition. Spencer himself was too 
heavily wed to Lamarckian evolutionary thought to enable his appreciation of the 
revolutionary notion of natural selection, upon which Darwin would soon capitalize. Robert 
Young (1969: 137) maintained that Spencer's refusal to adopt Darwinism was a product of 
the ease with which a Lamarckian view could be contorted with other disciplines: 
Spencer says in the preface to separately published edition of 1887 that the reason he had clung so 
tenaciously to the inheritance of acquired characteristics in biological theory was because it had such 
important implications for psychology, ethics and sociology. 
Spencer, by not separating biological from social interests, was unwilling to see what was 
right in front of him -natural selection. Charles Darwin, on the other hand, would have little 
problem focusing strictly on biological (evolutionary) issues. After Darwin's study was 
cleaned proceeding his death a copy of Das Kapital, personally given to him by Karl Marx, 
was found with the pages set and apparently unread. Spencer, on the other hand, could 
simply not avoid what he understood as an insatiable linage between biological and social 
theory. 
While writing in his autobiography Spencer (1904: 389-90) recalled his most regretful 
oversight: 
It seems strange that, having long entertained a belief in the development of species through the 
operation of natural causes, I should have failed to see that the truth indicated in the above quoted 
passages, must hold, not of mankind only, but of all animals, and must everywhere be working changes 
among them. . .. Yet I completely overlooked this obvious corollary - was blind that here was a 
universally-operative factor in the development of species. 
Aside from the idea of natural selection, the "struggle for existence" represents 
Darwin's second impacting contribution often cited as a linkage between biological 
evolutionism and social evolutionary thought. The "struggle for existence" is often 
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erroneously cited as a simple way to suggest "raw tooth and claw struggle."67 This simplistic 
view, however, as pointed out by Peter Bowler (1976: 632) misses the more complex 
dualistic nature of evolutionary struggle. 
The one (view of the struggle for existence) which represents Darwin's most significant insight relates 
to the competition between the different individuals of the same species to see which of them shall 
survive and reproduce. This is the real core of the idea of a struggle for existence; for natural selection 
to work at all, those individuals with favorable variations must compete with and supplant those which 
are not so favored. This crucially important element if intraspecies competition I shall call "struggle 
(a)." It is evident from Darwin, however, that "struggle (a)" is related to another concept, namely, that 
of the struggle of the species as a whole against its environment. This emerges as the struggle against 
challenges imposed by the changing nature and limited supply of the other species which serve as 
food. This concept of interspecies struggle I shall call "struggle (b)." 
This dualistic treatment of struggle is especially important for human concerns, because 
much of "struggle (b )" would seem to be shaped by the policies socially settled to answer, 
"Who Deserves What." The multifaceted approach of interpreting the "struggle for 
existence" should not detract from the competitive spirit by which Darwin invoked the term. 
Spencer (1898: 530) suggested that the "struggle for existence" would better be understood 
as the "survival of the fittest," an interpretation that Darwin subsequently accepted. Darwin 
is, however, careful to qualify the extent to which "the struggle of existence" should be 
understood. As Darwin ( 1859: 116) would note, "I use the term struggle for existence in a 
large and metaphorical sense." 
67 I say erroneously because, pointed out by Castle, Opler, and Dobzhansky, often times evolution (natural 
selection) occurs more because of geographic separation as opposed to raw struggle per se. 
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CHAPTER 4. DARWIN'S INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES68 
Newtonian Influence 
Darwin's sources of influence ultimately began in the sphere of the Newtonian 
scientific model and continued onward through the grasps of the classical liberal political 
economists of the eighteenth century. "By adapting the work of political economists, Darwin 
in turn accessed the Newtonian tradition for biology, hoping thereby to gain a hearing for 
evolutionary theory" (Depew and Weber 1995: 8). This leads to an important question, why 
use Newton as an impetus for evolutionary theory? The answer can be directly related to the 
earlier introduced concept, "temporal acceptability of adequate justification." In the early 
and mid nineteenth century, good science meant peppering aspiring scientific views with a 
variant of Newtonian influence. Darwin managed to masterfully do this, as Depew and 
Weber (1995: 9) explained, 
Darwin sees organic adaptation and the differentiation of lineages in terms of a Newtonian model, a 
more or less abstract picture of how systems, whether they be planetary, economic, or biologic, ban be 
expected to behave at each instant over time. In general, whatever the entities are that conform to this 
model, they will have an inertial tendency of some sort driving them off on a tangent. This is diverted 
and shaped by an external force. The result is a system that maintains itself in equilibrium. 
The argument continues that the Darwinian evolutionary model meets this Newtonian 
68 Darwin had many influences including many prominent geologists of the early nineteenth century, most 
notably Charles Lyell. Lyell, for instance, would write, "In the universal struggle for existence, the right of the 
strongest eventually prevails; and the strength and durability of a race depends mainly on its prolificness, in 
which hybrids are acknowledged to be deficient." Principles of Geology, Being an Attempt to Explain the 
Former Changes of the Earth's Surface by Reference to causes Now in Operation, 2nd edn. (London, 1833) 
pp.58. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I am mostly concerned with the influences that can be directly 
associated with either the contrarian or the interventionist. 
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systems explanation in two important ways, 
(First), if individual organisms tend indefinitely to vary, something will be needed to pull them back 
into the natural kinds, such as species and genera, that we have every reason to think represents real 
deviations in nature. (Second), because Darwin assumes that parental traits are blended in offspring, 
sex, like gravity, performs this role. It pulls individual variants back into the circle of kinds. At the 
same time, the products of sexual blending, again like the force of gravity, trims variation to fit 
circumstances. 
The necessity of incorporating a Newtonian scientific vision is quite clearly a major 
contributing factor to the success and quickly realized wide-spread appeal of Darwinism, as 
noted by Depew and Weber (Ibid.): 
Darwin was not the first to present evolutionary theory, but he was the first to present an evolutionary 
model that was consistent with Newton's system. It is this accomplishment which made Darwin's 
evolutionary theory impossible to ignore. 
Further, much of the competitive spirit attributed to Darwinism, largely in the form of Social 
Darwinism, treats competition as natural as gravitational attraction. William Graham 
Sumner (1914:68), for instance, would note that, competition is a law of nature which, "can 
no more be done away with than gravitation." 
It is, therefore, possible, consistent with the general systems approach which Darwin 
took, to observe a chain of thought beginning with Newtonian Physics extending through a 
series of political economists -namely Malthus, Smith, and Ricardo69- and finishing in grand 
fashion with Darwinism. Similar with any theoretical construct, Darwinism did not emerge 
independently. Darwin's evolutionary model, instead, is only a piece in a larger jigsaw 
69 Ricardo is credited with speaking of people as "rational economic agents." 
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puzzle, and not the table on which the puzzle rests. No single theory can serve as such a 
table. 
The Malthus - Darwin Connection 
Tracing intellectual influences is a difficult and tedious endeavor; however, in the 
case of Darwin ( 1958: 120) his autobiography makes very clear that Thomas Malthus was of 
great influence to his evolutionary thought.70 
In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I began my systematic inquiry, I happened to read for 
amusement "Malthus on Population," and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence 
which everyone goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once 
struck me that under these circumstances favorable variations would tend to be preserved, and 
unfortunate ones to be destroyed. The result of which would be the formation of new species. Here 
then I had at last got a theory by which to work. 
Malthus is best recognized for his idea of "Malthusian Limits"; he argued that increases in 
population would inevitably cause a scarcity of resources and naturally, through starvation, 
serve as a population check. The language most commonly associated with Malthus is that 
"population increases geometrically i.e., 2.4.6.8, while the food supply increases 
arithmetically i.e., 1.2.3.4." Thus, regardless of whether the species in question breed in the 
numbers of a fruit fly or a tortoise, the result will eventually be the same; starvation is the 
mechanism by which populations are kept in check. Such an evolutionary check -
70 The Malthus - Darwin connection has been a widely studied area, i.e., Peter Vorzimmer, "Darwin, Malthus 
and the Theory of natural Selection," Journal of the History of Ideas, vol.30 (Oct., 1969), pp.527-42; Sandra 
Herbert, "Darwin, Malthus and Selection," Journal of the History of Biology, vol.4 (1971), 209-217; Robert M. 
Young, "Malthus and the Evolutionists: The Common Context of Biological and Social Theory," Past and 
Present, (May 1969), pp. 109-145; Barry G. Gale, "Darwin and the Concept of a Struggle For Existence: A 
Study in the Extrascientific Origins of Scientific Ideas," (1972), pp. 321-44; Peter J. Bowler, "Malthus, Darwin 
and the Concept of Struggle, "Journal of the History of Ideas, vol.37 (Oct - Dec., 1976) pp. 631-650; to name a 
few. While the degree of the Malthus - Darwin connection is vigorously debated; it is fairly well agreed that 
such a connection was significant. 
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Malthusian Limits-, however, take longer to become realized for slow breeding species.71 
Malthus' work, "An Essay on the Principle of Population" was written in direct 
response to what he considered overly optimistic Enlightenment thinkers, i.e. Godwin, and 
Condorcet. This becomes quite clear when the entire title of Malthus's seminal work is noted, 
An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future improvement of Society, 
with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers. Robert 
Young ( 1969: 112) described the intellectual process, by which the Malthusian law of 
population was established, 
In the writings of Condorcet and Godwin, Utopian speculation had reached a stage which 
contemplated indefinite progress toward the complete absence of struggle among men; no illness, no 
sexual urges, no cares .... Reason was supreme, birth and death could conceivable cease to occur, and 
society could approach perfect harmony. The significance of this view for the history of evolutionary 
theory is that it so affronted Malthus's sense ofreality that it occasioned his essay. Even though 
Malthus softened his doctrine in later editions, it altered the image of nature from benign harmony to 
an inexorable imbalance between nature's supply of subsistence and man's need for both food and sex. 
What began as a backlash against utopian Enlightenment though, found itself manifested in 
an "important catalyst for the development of evolutionary theory (Young)." The question is 
whether Malthus went too far in his attack upon what he maintained as destructive utopian 
thought, that is, whether he swung the pendulum of proposed human conditions too far in the 
opposite -struggle oriented- direction. Malthus (1826: 1) would, by the sixth edition of his 
Essay (1817), admit as much, 
It is probable that having found the bow bent too much one way, I was induced to bend it too much the 
other, in order to make it straight. But I shall always be quite ready to blot out any part of the work 
which is considered by a competent tribunal as having a tendency to prevent the bow from becoming 
finally straight, and to impede the progress of truth. 
71 Malthus argued that two types of checks, positive and preventive, might help strike a balance between 
humans and the food supply. Positive checks are those, which lead to the reduction of living people, these 
would include famine, disease and war. While preventative checks are those, which would lead to a lower birth 
rate this would involve, what Malthus would label "moral restraint" -basically less sex. Malthus did not hold 
much hope out that preventative checks would work. What Malthus could have never predicted is that 
preventative checks on the population now largely involve not "moral restraint," but contraception. 
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The tenuous attainment of the exact point of "equilibrium" sought by Malthus did little to 
detract from the popular and academic speculation, and treatment, of a Malthusian law of 
population. As made clear by one Malthusian scholar, "Malthus's ideas were as 
commonplace in the first half of the nineteenth century as Freud's were in the twentieth." 
The lasting impact of Malthusian thought upon Darwinism can be found in the 
importance that Malthus attaches with "competitive struggle." Malthus ( 1817: 17), for 
instance, when writing about early human primitive tribes noted, 
And when they fell in with any tribes like their own, the contest was a struggle for existence, and they 
fought with desperate courage, inspired by the reflection that death was the punishment for defeat and 
life the price of victory. 
This notion of the competitive struggle for scare resources would become an important part 
of what Darwin would refer to as the "struggle for existence." Darwin, for instance, 
consistent with his Malthusian influence noted, "Like a hundred thousand wedges trying to 
force every kind of adapted structure into the gaps by forcing out the weaker ones (Weber 
and Depew pp. 123)." Here, using a strict biological precept of evolution, the question "Who 
Deserves What" is being understood pursuant to a struggle for life-giving resources. The 
organism that can find food deserves to live because its life, and the future success of the 
species, is advanced through the competitive struggle for resources. Further, consistent with 
"natural selection," this struggle will only help to ensure that stronger and more adaptive 
traits are passed from each generation to the next. As the weak perish so too expire the 
disadvantageous trait(s) that led to demise of the less skillfully endowed organism. If these 
organisms reproduce, however, before they perish then it is likely that their offspring will be 
cursed with the same disadvantageous traits. 
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Natural selection works in nature because usually organisms with severe disadvantages 
perish before they can reproduce and pass along the disadvantage. By blending these 
evolutionary assumptions with a competitive interpretation it becomes possible to find a type 
of "social virtue" i.e., not assisting the survival of the poor, in the seemingly vulgar no.ti on of 
Malthusian Limits. Take for instance how Malthus (1817: 361) referred to the general 
condition of humanity, 
Man is sinful, inert, sluggish, and adverse to labor, unless compelled by necessity. Had population and 
food increased in the same ratio, it is probable that man might never have emerged from the savage state. 
The implication is clear; social evolutionism cannot occur unless people engage in a 
condition of competitive struggle. This idea should be remembered, as it might tend to 
suggest that if a sociopolitical community decides to "assist the poor," then its action -
although well intentioned- might thwart positive social evolution. Before, too much is made 
of this contention, however, it would be helpful to review how Malthus and Darwin 
suggested that population limits were related with modem human (social) evolution. 
Does the measure of one's wealth correlate with their evolutionary aptness, or 
alternatively is one's wealth a measure of chance occurrence (non-evolutionary aptness) and 
little more? This question does, after all, represent the crux of many connections between the 
natural selection hypothesis of biological evolution and sociopolitical concern of "Who 
Deserves What." If a measure of wealth somehow marks those who possess superior 
genotypes, then the implication is that by peeking at a bank statement, it is somehow possible 
to gauge the evolutionary aptness of the person in question. Helping the poor eat, therefore, 
will only artificially keep members of the species reproducing who are bound to pass along 
their disadvantageous traits to future generations. Malthus, while supporting the notion of 
laissez-faire market conditions, did, however, hold the above argument to be largely in error. 
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For Malthus, the poor generally owed their condition to a "lottery" of sorts, and not 
necessarily lack of ability or evolutionary station.72 As Peter Bowler (1976: 640) noted, 
Malthus tended to work with a single view of society as divided into two classes; a small group 
controlling enough wealth to escape the general misery, and the great mass of the laboring poor. In 
other words, for him "the poor" were not an underprivileged minority driven to the bottom of the social 
scale as a result of their own inefficiency, but the whole laboring population .... He spoke of the poor 
in fact, as those who have "in the great lottery of life, drawn a blank." 
This passage contains implications for the policy treatment of "Who Deserves What" based 
upon evolutionary concerns, especially when it is considered that Darwin's mention of a 
"struggle for existence" was a response to anti-utopian Malthusian sentiment. 
Granting the assumption that every person may start from an equal monetary position, 
with an equal opportunity to gain or lose the wealth with which he had started, then perhaps 
monetary measures might asses a general evolutionary adaptedness. By logical extension, 
the argument could be made that the "best of the species" would have the opportunity to have 
and care for more children, thus linking monetary gain with biological and social evolution. 
Even as a hypothetical situation, however, this description of the possible linkage between 
wealth accumulation and the natural selection theory of evolution fails under the weight of an 
unavoidable paradox. Grant for a moment the conditions under which an "equal economic 
playing field" has been assumed. The inheritance of material wealth from one generation to 
the next would implicitly suggest that chance of birth (the lottery of life) and not general 
ability would axiomatically begin to infect the next generation of the human species, i.e., 
ability and adaptedness to the environment would become secondary to the inheritance of 
72 While Malthus generally argued that the poor were not to blame for their condition, he did treat the matter 
deterministically. For Malthus, no amount of government intervention can change the fact that their will always 
be a far greater number of poor than wealthy. 
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wealth.73 In this manner, it becomes clear that to generally link monetary achievement with 
evolution adaptedness is not only a hopelessly hypothetical notion, but one that would have 
to be repeatedly conjured up for each successive generation under review.74 
From a social evolutionary perspective, progression could potentially be measured by 
the successful elimination of disadvantageous traits from the population, but what would 
constitute an assessment of these traits, and more troubling "how" would this elimination 
occur?75 Only a handful of contrarians, and no interventionists, would be willing to supplant 
the logical extrapolations from the above reasoning to advise the death of those who could 
not find food as a means to answer the question "Who Deserves What." The early twentieth 
century in America, however, was marked with a series of sterilization laws designed to 
prevent the "mentally unfit" from passing along their disadvantageous traits to future 
generations. For the interventionist, escaping the grips of natural selection's painful reality is 
an endeavor, perhaps the most important endeavor, to be waged by the policy maker. In 
rejecting this intervention, the contrarian holds steadfast to the belief that the unfettered 
73 Writing in, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argued that most of the success or failure that we endure in life is 
largely a condition of amoral traits surrounding the conditions circumstances of our birth. If an individual is 
born with a genetic disposition towards strength or intelligence, then they did well in the "natural lottery," but 
as Rawls continues this does not constitute a moral reason why they ought to deserve more than the individual 
who was born without the proper "lottery numbers." Rawls discussion is helpful because it goes beyond typical 
treatments of the "natural lottery" involving systems of privilege, i.e., race, class, and gender. Rawls, instead, 
makes the case that even the talents we are born potentially possessing offer us no increased moral claim to a 
higher level of deservedness. 
74 This is, of course, not to say that social evolutionary arguments mean nothing in a discourse involving "Who 
Deserves What." 
75 Many contemporary thinkers argue that rooting out "disadvantageous traits," better wise known as eugenics, 
is subject to a morally indefensible amount of subjective intrusion into individuals' lives. However, Plato 
shared no such moral outrage with eugenics-based social engineering. Plato advocated the selective mating 
practices, which he felt would help ensure the success of the larger sociopolitical (city) community. 
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market is best suited to emancipate the person from the pains of natural selection.76 
Making Evolutionism Fit into an Enlightenment Vision of Political Economy 
Recall from the brief treatment of Newtonian physics that the crux of the Newtonian 
scientific model is that an object "goes off on a tangent," and then is brought back to the fray 
by some external source. Adam Smith77 saw the potential for this physical scientific theory 
to be applied directly to human agents, and more specifically in the matter of deciding "Who 
Deserves What." For Smith, self-interest is both the driving force and stabilizer of economic 
activity. This notion of self-interest, however, does not imply acting in any manner one 
wishes. As noted by Hayek (1958: 238), 
What is frequently not understood but need not be stressed again is that to Smith and his 
contemporaries this result (self-interest) did not come from individuals acting completely as they 
pleased but from each confining himself to the sphere to which the rules of law and morals confined 
him. 
A full understanding of what Smith meant by the benevolence of self-interest suggests that a 
Darwinian "struggle for existence" is not constrained to a tooth and claw interpretation of 
raw struggle. 
As symbolically represented by the Newtonian model, the individual "goes off on a 
tangent," but it is not certain that this tangent will be destructive because external market 
forces (supply and demand) will ensure a sort of market equilibrium.78 It is often neglected 
76 In rejecting the concept of the English "poor laws" Spencer maintained that his position is often seen as harsh 
when in reality it is anything but harsh. Spencer maintained that by attempting to trump evolutionary and 
market process the government was only ensuring that more future individuals would suffer poverty. As 
Spencer might say a little pain now will save a lot of pain in the future. As unkind as the market may seem at 
times it is still the best means to decide "Who Deserves What." 
77 Smith is often treated as a political economist, which is not completely inaccurate. It is often forgotten or 
neglected, however, that Smith was a moral philosopher at the University of Glasgow. Smith was very much 
concerned with how a commercial economy under the control of moral actors could be understood in a moral 
sense. 
78 The contributions of both Smith and Benthem have been greatly under appreciated in one important manner. 
Both thinkers sought to apply scientific laws to the human. Without this important step social evolutionary 
arguments would forever be trapped in the realm of speculative thought. 
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that Smith readily admitted this equilibrium was dependent upon the absence of one, or a 
few, economic actors to enforce their self-interest as the prevailing interest of the 
marketplace, i.e., a successful market depends upon a fair market. With important 
implications for Darwin's evolutionism, Smith held that what happens to the whole is a 
function of what the separate parts do. Darwin, after all, viewed the process of natural 
selection as the natural mechanism that serves to explain the aggregate occurrence 
(evolution) involved when individual actors "struggle for existence." As Adam Smith (1937: 
26-7) is popularly quoted as saying, "It is not the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or 
the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Smith 
(1976: 25) is, nonetheless, less frequently noted as writing, "And hence it is, that to feel 
much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfishness, and to indulge our 
benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature." Given these qualifications 
that Smith places on the notion of self-interest as virtue it would be a mistake to understand 
the notion simplistically. Nevertheless, the metaphor of the competitive self-interested 
functional marketplace played a substantial role in the value that Darwin ascribed to the 
competitive individualistic "struggle for existence." By this point, however, it should 
become clearer that such a struggle is not necessarily competitive or individualistic. 
Why then the typical association with Darwinism as a conservative slogan for 
government non-interference and strict laissez faire economics? This question, after all, 
could become very important in an address of "Who Deserves What." The answer seems to 
be found in the way in which Darwinism formed as an intellectual influence for thinkers in 
the late nineteenth century. A slogan as broad as the "struggle for existence" can be 
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interpreted in many different ways. Consider, for instance, how William Graham Sumner 
( 1914: 90) used the idea of the "struggle for existence" to speak on behalf of millionaires, 
The millionaires are a product of natural selection, acting on the whole body of men to pick out those 
who can meet the requirement of certain work to be done ... They get high wages and live in luxury, 
but the bargain is a good one for society. 
Sumner's idea here seeks to synthesize Darwinian evolutionary theory with that of Smith's 
invisible hand and laissez faire assumptions, i.e., that Social Darwinism does not follow 
logically from Darwinism, but instead from a Darwinistic -usually ideologically laden-
cocktail of sorts. 
Darwin seldom, and never in the Origin, endorsed specific theories of social 
redistribution -or the lack thereof. Cultural influences, specifically those rooted in the 
Enlightenment hope of Newtonian scientific laws and Smith's market mechanism, i.e., the 
invisible hand, are evident in both Darwinian notions of the "struggle for existence" and the 
idea of "natural selection." It is important to realize, however, that Darwin's influences were 
exactly that, influences. It is foolish to become blind to the glaring similarities and 
consistencies between classical liberal (contrarian) thought and the undeniable tones explicit 
in the theory of evolution as presented by Darwin. A greater foolishness, however, can be 
found in the complete skeptic who can see no other way to apply evolutionary thought than 
to that of a contrarian mode. As it will become apparent as this thesis develops, 
interventionists are more than capable of using (Darwinism) evolutionism to advance their 
position. Darwin made evolutionary thinking scientifically respectable, just as Newton made 
science respectable, and just as Smith had challenged the social thinker to appreciate a 
proposed relationship between Newton's "new science" and the fundamental social question 
of "Who Deserves What." It would represent a defeatist attitude of the worst kind to 
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abandon an analysis of evolutionism simply because the idea was influenced by culture -a 
simplistic critique which could be used to attack any argument. Cultural influences should 
amplify the appreciation of how thoughts come about, not serve to dismiss the powerful 
influence of the fusion between culture and thought. 
67 
CHAPTER 5. EVOLUTIONISM IN SOCIOLOGY 
Background 
Evolutionary arguments, by their very nature, profess a certain degree of prophetic 
appeal, a magical sense of predicting the future schema of societal structure. Social 
evolutionary arguments, likewise, profess to make predictive statements, based largely upon 
an assessment of the past, about the future appearance and workings of societal 
organizational structure. Social evolutionism, however, struggles with one nagging concern, 
environmental change. Thinkers who espouse social evolutionary theory do not attempt to 
explain the result of any individual actor; instead they make predictions regarding the 
aggregate of collective social behavior and action. The relationship between society and 
nature is both under examined and vitally important. As Bookchin (1987: 59) explained, 
The evolution of society out of nature and the ongoing interaction between the two tend to be lost in 
the words that do not tell us enough about the vital association between nature and society and about 
the importance of defining such disciplines as economics, psychology, and sociology in natural as well 
as social terms. 
The biologist or psychologist is concerned with the changes of an individual 
organism, but the environment (the condition that enables change) is always one step ahead 
of any individually directed notion of change. Dobzhansky (1956: 591) makes clear the role 
of the environment in an evolutionary process as he remarked, 
The environment does not change the genotype of the living species directly, as some evolutionist of 
the past have wrongly assumed. The role of the environment consists rather in that it constantly 
presents challenges to the species; to these challenges the species may respond either by adaptive 
modification or by extinction. 
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It would seem that in order to survive and adapt the human species has survived because, 
"they were particularly sensitive and adaptable in their total reactions to each other, to other 
animals, and to the environment" (Opler 1947: 642). In other words, the ability of people or 
cultures to socially evolve marks the primary mechanism by which they adapt to 
environmental contingencies, i.e., social and biological evolutionism seem to be linked in this 
important fashion. Lamarck would deal with environmental contingencies by suggesting that 
organisms can "will" their direction, largely regardless of environmental concerns, a 
suggestion that Darwin, and most scientific studies since, have concluded is ridiculous. The 
"will to power," originally expressed in Lamarck's evolutionary biology, and more fully 
developed by Nietzsche's moral philosophy, might be a useful analytical tool concerned with 
evaluating human social relations, but it does little to explain the environmental struggle 
between peoples and their natural environments. How can one "will" away the winds of a 
tornado or the waters of a flood? 
It is a blending of social action with the dictates of seemingly unpredictable 
environmental forces that forms a void of "future knowledge." Even if Comte's hopes were 
to be realized, and sociologists are able to perform a sort of "social physics," i.e. offer 
predictive statements as to how an aggregate of individuals will behave, such an analysis 
would likely use a closed-systems environmental model. In order to make predictions 
regarding the behaviors of an organism, or an aggregate thereof, one must first know what it 
is environmentally "outside the control of the actor" that triggers the response of the 
organism. Thus when concerns of "future knowledge" are evaluated, two types of triggering 
emerge, 1) first cause triggering, or that which occurs unknown to the social actor, and 2) 
primary cause triggering, or that which occurs from first cause triggering to gain a reaction 
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from a social actor. The social evolutionary thinker holds that this environmental void is not 
bottomless, but instead can be filled, and indeed foreseen, as societies change in accordance 
with various environmental dictates and the will/action of the sociopolitical community 
under investigation. 
Scientific Magic 
As Richard Cavendish (1977: 1) explained, "Magic is as old as man." It "is an attempt 
to exert power through actions which are believed to have a direct and automatic influence 
on man, nature and the divine." This talk of magic is just foolishness; every educated person 
knows that magic, or the ability to tell the future, is just nonsense, right? Well, not exactly. 
Modem science, usually understood as possessing no magical characteristics, is indeed a sort 
of predictive magic. For instance, anyone, priest or pauper, can predict the time it will take 
for an object to fall to earth if he simply knows the mass of the object and the speed of 
gravity (9.8 meters/second2). Science is a powerful intellectual and practical force because, 
using basic Newtonian laws, a certain amount of the future exists without doubt, so long as 
the environment is controlled with unwavering certainty. The future of physical inanimate 
objects is not in dispute; however, in predicting the course of living organisms, 
environmental complications can challenge the amount of control necessary to make science 
magically predictive. Nonetheless, Man is, as Aristotle noted a "political animal"; and as 
such the curiosity with magical prediction cannot be silenced with the examination of a ball 
or apple, it must instead entertain a future conception of social order. It is this human 
condition of explaining and examining the circumstances of a "relentlessly changing social 
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order," that becomes the justification for finding magical (scientific) ways to advance social 
1 · 79 evo utlonary arguments. 
Charles Darwin may rightly be credited with utilizing Newtonian physics as a 
building block to formulate a respectable "scientific" theory of evolution; however, a variety 
of influential social thinkers did not wait for Newtonian Physics before offering speculation 
about evolutionary change in human society. Saint Augustine, in fact, would write about 
"Christian Evolutionism" in City of God nearly 1500 years before Darwin's seminal work. 
As the Renaissance, and shortly thereafter the Enlightenment, lifted the heavy religious veil 
of the Middle Ages from the fog of Europe, those invoking social evolutionary arguments 
would make further secular advancements. Bishop Bossuet, Baron Turgot, and Marie 
Condorcet all authored notable universal histories written during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (Orenstein). Even, or especially ancient scholars, such as Polybius, 
argued that generally, social and political structures followed a natural teleological sequence 
of stages. 
Sociology, if it is to imply anything about the future, is necessarily intertwined with 
the past. As Norman Gottwald reminds, "History without sociology is blind, sociology 
without history is empty (Goudsblom pp. 30)." Sociology without history is empty because 
the only way to realize the importance of contemporary social structures is to appreciate that 
these structures are part of a much larger historical cumulative process. The desire to make 
sense of the future by reviewing the past (the essential notion of evolutionary theory) is the 
79The notable twentieth century German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, would devote much of his writing to 
explaining that Western modernity, in Europe, is plagued with the insatiable desire to technologically "control." 
Perhaps social evolutionism is another means by which the conditions of Man seek to magically and predictably 
control. 
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temptation of sociopolitical animals. In describing social evolutionary theory Ashley and 
Orenstein (2001: 11) concluded, "Most classical social theorists believed that societies 
followed a series of sequential stages, each with its own form of social organization." In a 
similar, yet expanded treatment of social evolutionism, Erik Wright (1983: 26) offered the 
following description, 
For a theory of society to be evolutionary three conditions must hold: 
(1) The theory involves a typology of social forms which potentially has some kind of directionality 
to it. 
(2) It is possible to order these forms in such a way that the probability of staying at the same level of 
the typology is greater than the probability of regressing. 
(3) In the ordered typology, there is a positive probability of moving from a given level in the 
typology to the next higher level. 
These straightforward observations contain several important insights. First, social evolution 
is not a haphazard process; it is subject to follow a series of sequential stages. Second, each 
of these necessary stages contains a specific form of social organization. It is, therefore, a 
misunderstanding of social evolutionary thinking to conclude that "bad" stages of societal 
evolution exist. Instead, all stages are important as they pave the way for the development of 
future social stages.80 Alternatively, Mark Granovetter argued that an adequate measurement 
of advancement in social evolutionary arguments is impossible to achieve. Granovetter 
(1979: 511), stated his two-pronged argument in the following way, 
The attack has proceeded on two grounds. First, ranking societies according to current efficiency 
ultimately reduces to a task equivalent to the fruitless interpersonal comparison of utilities no longer 
attempted by economists. Second, ranking societies according to their flexibility or adaptability 
requires a level of prediction of future system problems which is unlikely, in principle, to be achieved. 
80 One of the best cases to illustrate this point is the manner in which Marx treated capitalism. Marx understood 
capitalism as a necessary precursor to the final goal of a communist state. While Marx felt that capitalism was 
morally repugnant he never suggested that it should not exist. Quite the opposite, Marx actually argued that 
capitalism had to exist if communism was ever to be realized. 
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Prominent Social Evolutionary Thinkers 
The most notable social thinkers to entertain evolutionary arguments include Comte, 
Hegel, Spencer, Marx, Veblen, and Pareto. This list, however, could be greatly extended 
consistent with a more encompassing view of social evolutionism.81 Interestingly, the 
common evolutionary tendency among these thinkers did not serve to create a unification of 
social thought; actually the level of thought integrated among these theorists spans across an 
ideological spectrum just as vast as that separating the contrarian and the interventionist. 82 
Auguste Comte, aside from successfully advocating positivistic means to study social 
phenomena, argued that the human mind along with human social order travel through three 
general stages of evolution: the theological, metaphysical, and positive stages.83 It is only 
after the human mind, and ensuing social structures thereof, advance to the positivistic stage 
of evolution that social ills might be fixed with a type of social physics. Thus Comte viewed 
the social evolutionary process as positive and developmentally beneficial. 
Hegel would introduce the idea of dialectic as the mechanism by which a universal 
spirit (guist) would direct the whole of human history. He argued that the "struggle for 
recognition" distinguishes the human being from the animal. Accordingly, Hegel would ask, 
what animal would risk death for such symbolic endeavors as the capture of an enemy flag? 
81 Durkhim and Tonnies, for instance, are generally not considered to be social evolutionary thinkers, however 
both thinkers expoused a view of society -mechanic/organic in the case of Durkheim and 
gemeinschaft/gesellschaft for Tonnies- as "evolving" from a simple homogenous social order to a more 
complex heterogeneous order. 
82 The brief mention and attention to each of these theorists is important to explore evolutionism in sociology. 
However, in the forthcoming sections outlining the contributions of the contrarian and the interventionist my 
focus will be upon social evolutionary arguments that are postulated to answer the question "Who Deserves 
What." 
83 It should also be noted that many social evolutionary thinkers also advocated a series of substages to 
compliment their general stages of social evolution. For instance, Comte had substages intermingled in with all 
three of his general evolutionary stages; Comte's theological stage involved the substage sequence of fetishism, 
polytheism, and monotheism. 
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If Hegel is granted his argument -a condition Thomas Hobbes and other materialists would 
not approve- human evolution becomes much more complicated than Darwin's notion of the 
"struggle for existence," it becomes more aptly a fierce "struggle of recognition." For Hegel, 
people not afraid to risk their lives became masters while those who valued safety above 
recognition became slaves. The masters wish to be recognized by their equals, but instead 
they have only slaves to show admiration. This internal contradiction (dialectic) constantly 
haunts social schema until the state, as a liberal democracy, emerges to settle all 
contradiction. Hegel would sometimes refer to the final settlement of all contradiction as the 
"negation of the negation." 
Spencer, like his predecessor Hegel, desired to create a complete philosophical 
evolutionary social synthesis, but unlike Hegel his approach to doing so was grounded in 
British empiricism rather than German idealism (as such his system was much more in tune 
with the "realistic" pragmatic disposition of most Americans). Spencer maintained that 
societies begin with very simple forms of organization then advance to the stage of doubly 
compound societies, and then finally advanced towards a trebly compound form of social 
organization. Spencer's primary goal in his evolutionary synthesis is to explain the change 
from homogenous to heterogeneous social structure. As Spencer (1891: 10) argued: 
It is settled beyond dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the 
heterogeneous. Now, we propose in the first place to show, that this law of organic progress is the law 
of all progress. Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of life upon its 
surface, in the development of society, of government, of manufactures, of commerce, of language, 
literature, sciences, art, this same evolution from the simple to the complex, through successive 
differentiations. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, 
we shall find the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which progress 
essentially consists. 
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The guiding force directing social evolution, for Spencer, was military style conflict, but he 
argued that social evolution -if it was to progress- moved away from the militant and 
towards the industrial. For this reason Spencer, throughout the course of his life, became 
increasingly dismayed with his government's decision to become increasingly involved with 
military affairs. 
Alternately, Karl Marx would introduce a system of social evolution, borrowing 
concepts from Hegel's dialectic, suggesting that class conflict as opposed to military 
aggression, best explained the processes of social evolution. For Marx, societal stages could 
be broken up in the following economic language: Preclass societies, Asiatic societies, 
Ancient societies, Feudal societies, Capitalistic societies, Socialist societies, and finally 
Communist societies. Marx maintained that the inherent conflict between the proletariat 
(workers) and the bourgeoisie (owners) within a capitalistic social structure would serve as 
the inevitable mechanism, driving contemporary social evolution towards a communist state. 
Finally, Thorstein Veblen would postulate that social evolution develops as societies 
move through the three basic stages of savagery, barbarianism, and finally civilization. The 
term "move" replaces "advance" in the above assessment because the change in social order 
as designated by the categorizations of savagery, barbarism, and civilization do not 
necessarily represent an "advancement." For Veblen savagery was the most simple and 
peaceful form of social order, barbarism representing the institutionalization of violence, and 
civilization as being more peaceful and industrialized that barbarism. With important 
implications for the question "Who Deserves What" Veblen viewed socioeconomic evolution 
and history as dichotomously represented by what he termed the "predatory class" and the 
"industrious class." The predatory or leisure class actually do little for the good of society, 
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but are able to maintain their status with an appeal to "conspicuous consumption" - a term he 
used to denote waste and the excesses glorified by the upper class, i.e., a well mowed yard, 
the newest fashions and jewelry. Veblen would ask, "what do these measures of wealth 
actually add to the efficiency or good of civilization? 
This simple review of classical social evolutionary thinkers should make clear that 
evolution is a frequently utilized theory in examining social order, but the use of this 
theoretical approach is open to a variety of sociological interpretations. Further, this wide 
variety of "evolutionary relativism" should not serve as a frustration to the contemporary 
sociologist, but should instead inspire appreciation to what C. Wright Mills would label the 
"sociological imagination." Evolutionism does indeed inspire a great deal of socially 
oriented imagination, and it is this imagination which best embraces the contrarian and 
interventionist. 
Confronting the "Ugly" Side of Social Evolutionism 
The seemingly magical and well-developed aspects of social evolutionary arguments 
do not preclude them from having a disadvantageous and destructive "ugly" component. For 
this reason Robert Bannister (1979:3) began his book Social Darwinism: Science and Myth 
in Anglo-American Social Thought by noting, "Social Darwinism, as almost everyone knows, 
is a bad thing." This observation, while biting, makes a clear point; often, too often indeed, 
social evolutionary arguments have been used to offer some sort of morally defensible racist 
or sexist argument. 84 There would come to be no shortage of futile attempts arguing that if 
84 It seems appropriate to distinguish between blatant racism and the type of ethnocentrism common during the 
late nineteenth century and still present today. Although neither position is adequate to broach moral concerns, 
they are not entirely equivalent. Often ethnocentric arguments were used by classical social theorists as 
descriptive measures to demonstrate the distinction between "simple societies" and more "complicated" 
(European) societies. 
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one group of people defeated another, militarily, economically, technologically or culturally, 
they were, according to Darwin's "struggle for existence," (morally) superior. After all, the 
members of the more "successful" group, survived while, those belonging to the other group 
did not. One noticeable flaw in this reason was in that Darwin never envisioned the "struggle 
for existence" would be waged with machine guns and the threat of nuclear weapons. Adding 
military technologies to the "struggle for existence" seems to do much more than establish 
who should naturally survive. 
It is logically indefensible to argue that because all members of a culture benefit from 
the innovations of a few, that somehow all members of the culture are superior to the 
members of an opposing culture, which did not have member(s) who made similar impacting 
innovations. Before arguing she is "better" because of what she possesses, she should ask 
herself, "How did I actually accumulate and contribute to the things that I have?" The 
comfort and security that many in Western culture enjoy is almost never solely earned. It is 
not surprising, however, that most of these same individuals extrapolate their comfort and 
security to some act they have done to deserve such conditions; just as this reasoning is 
flawed, it is also flawed to suggest that those with less physical comfort are inferior. 85 Any 
effort to use social evolutionary arguments (labeled as Social Darwinism or otherwise) to 
make blatant moral statements regarding an entire society or group therein will fail logical 
scrutiny. As Morris Opler (1947: 637) argued, 
Consequently, to discriminate or legislate against persons or groups on racial grounds is to penalize 
others because they are in average 95 or 98 percent like the average of your own group in physical 
traits instead of the sanctioned 100 percent. 
85 This concept of "getting what you deserve" can be traced back, in at least one sense, to the Protestant notion 
of "predestination." 
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What is worse is that such misplaced racist and sexist arguments have given a black eye to 
social evolutionary arguments in general. As observed by Callinicos (1999:6), 
Evolutionary social theory fell into discredit in part because of the influence of thinkers such as Weber, 
who stressed the intentional character of human action and therefore the fundamental difference 
between the social and the natural sciences, but also because of the role played by the biological racism 
in the NAZI holocaust. 
Social evolutionary arguments do not make real concurrent racist or sexist justifications; 
instead, to the logically consistent thinker, they act as a means by which to comprehend the 
complex process of social organization. 
Organicism and Naturalism 
Social evolutionism is often associated with two related concepts, organicism and 
naturalism. Organicism is the notion that the evolution of a social organization can be 
though of as analogous to the development of a singular biological organism. The most 
notable sociological use of organicism was that developed by Emile Durkheim in his use of 
the metaphor of an organism to describe the way in which social parts, through a division of 
labor, function properly.86 What organicism gains in speculative comparison it often loses in 
explanatory power. Whereas the development of an organism is a fairly settled matter (a 
normally developing person will develop two arms and two legs at a given time interval) the 
notion of evolution is a constantly (due to environmental conditions) changing proposition. 
The heart of a developing fetus must develop at specific time intervals or the organism will 
die, but the developmental patterns of any particular social order seem to be individualized to 
specific cultural and environmental dictates. The organicist is advocating, analogously 
86 Other notable instances of organicism in social thought include Hobbes's Leviathan and Spencer's conception 
of social order. 
78 
through the highly regimented natural processes of organisms, a teleologically determined 
view of social evolution. 
Interestingly, Darwin's theory of evolution is largely credited with removing 
teleological reasoning from naturalistic thought. Proponents of naturalism suggest that 
natural, as opposed to supernatural laws, dictate human affairs. The naturalistic view is by 
definition vague, but is most notably invoked with the frequently used, but seldom 
understood phrase, "according to human nature." Such an appeal to human nature or natural 
law is an extension of naturalistic reasoning. Naturalism might appear to be grounded in 
little more than philosophic speculation; however, this "speculation" often creates the 
intangible values that serve to direct the course over which social evolutionary arguments 
travel. It is this type of "speculation" that transformed naturalistic Darwinism into a 
prominent form of conservative anti-reform laissez faire social Darwinism of the early 
twentieth century. As Eric Foner maintained, 
Spencer, of course, preceded Darwin; well before the publication of The Origin of the Species, Spencer 
not only coined the term "survival of the fittest" but developed a powerful critique of all forms of state 
intervention with the "natural" workings of society, including regulation of business and public 
assistance to the poor. But Spencer's followers seized up the authority of Darwin's work to claim 
scientific legitimacy for their outlook and to press home the analogy between the natural and social 
world, both of which they claimed, evolved according to natural laws. 
Recall, that it was a conception of natural rights, as first politically outlined in the American 
Declaration of Independence as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which provided the 
justification for violent American Revolution. 
Returning to an earlier Hobbesian proposition, Men could "behave like wolves 
toward one another" for any number of naturalistic reasons. People are perhaps naturally 
programmed to feast on one another in their struggle for scarce resources, such as food. 
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Conversely, Men might be the "noble savages" that Rousseau envisioned them to be in their 
"natural state"; and thus it is the advent of society, not "human nature," which turns Man into 
an insatiable wolf. Marx, and other socialist thinkers, would come to advance this notion of 
the naturally good and perfectible person. In either event, it is important to take note that 
naturalistic arguments are often an integral part of larger more systematic approaches to 
social evolutionism. Naturalistic arguments provide the necessary origins associated with the 
many various historically induced conceptions, and subsequent treatments, of social 
evolution. 87 
87 The vast majority of human history, more than 90%, occurred before written records were kept. Thus, human 
nature, and the origins of humanity, remains a necessary speculative endeavor of the social evolutionary 
theorist. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE INTERVENTIONIST 
A Deeper Reading of the Ideal Type 
The general ideological disposition of the interventionist towards poverty welfare has 
been briefly examined, but more specificity is needed. After all, state intervention can 
manifest itself in an innumerable number of ways. The state, as represented by all 
contemporary nation-states, can actively intervene to prosecute and punish a citizen under a 
criminal statute, establish property and other civil rights, offer varying degrees of social 
services. The interventionist, however, is concerned with a specific, less broad, type of 
intervention: economic intervention intended to redistribute/transfer wealth from one social 
class to another -a mode of intervention which in various and disperse styles is practiced by 
most sociopolitical communities. The method of economic intervention, like general 
intervention, can occur in a plethora of ways. Policy boards in the former Soviet Union, for 
instance, actively intervened to set the prices of most publicly available commodities -this 
momentous, yet inefficient task contributed to the eventual collapse of the system. The 
interventionist described in this thesis is not concerned with using evolutionary theory or 
thought to justify whatever a state might decide regarding socioeconomic policy; only that 
evolutionary thinking can be used to justify the mandatory redistribution of wealth from one 
socioeconomic class to another. Thus, simply treating the interventionist as "one of those 
communists" is nothing more than an illogical ad hominen attack. 
The interventionist is aided by the observation that the question of whether a 
contemporary nation-state ought to intervene, in any fashion, has become an affirmatively 
settled matter. Even the most stringent modem libertarians advise the state to intervene when 
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"individual liberties," i.e. property rights, are unduly challenged.88 Therefore, every 
sociopolitical actor, be they in favor or opposition to poverty welfare, is in the business of 
settling "Who Deserves What." Even the establishment of property rights, a notion 
erroneously thought to be in some way "naturalistic," is an activity wherein people socially 
negotiate "Who Deserves What." As Rousseau ( 17 55) noted his sentiments toward the 
origins of property, 
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, thought to himself to say, this is mine, and 
found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. 
What remains an open concern in modem liberal states,89 such as the United States, however, 
is the extent to which this intervention should be involved with concerns of "poor 
deservedness," particularly in a material sense. It is not difficult to speculate or formalize 
through a series of written proclamations, "rules" governing how individuals within a social 
system, at least, theoretically, possess civil rights and equal opportunity. These speculations 
and proclamations, in fact, form the conceptualization necessary to reify, for many 
Americans, notions of the American Dream. These concerns become more difficult, 
however, when poverty is directly confronted. What happens when ideas are not sufficient to 
ensure that people have access to an adequate standard ofliving?90 The interventionist' s 
answer is quite simple; actively redistribute wealth among different social classes, regardless 
of "ideas" that have been socially adopted by some to supersede this transfer. 
This redistribution takes place as a sociopolitical community mandates that an upper 
socioeconomic class of citizens must transfer a portion of the wealth under its control to 
88 Only the anarchist might disagree with this assessment. 
89 In this sense I use "liberal state" to encompass the whole of classical liberal thought, not simply the branch of 
"modern liberalism." 
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those of a lower socioeconomic class (as it concerns, this thesis, the extent of this transfer 
will not serve as strategy to fracture the legitimacy of the interventionist). Notice two 
important conditions of the interventionist. First, material redistribution is a mandated, as 
opposed to a voluntary, order of the sociopolitical community. Charity, giving without the 
threat of legal sanction, is not the concern of the interventionist.91 In an 1860 speech to the 
New York legislature, Elizabeth Cady Stanton remarked, "You who have read the history of 
nations, from Moses down to our last election, where have you ever seen one class looking 
out after the interests of another?" Individuals might show occasional benevolence to others 
in need, but as an economic aggregate a socioeconomic class is concerned solely with the 
maintenance of the prestige, status, and wealth that class allows. Thus, it would be erroneous 
to assume that an upper socioeconomic class might decide, absent formal rules and the 
sanctions to enforce them, to advance the interests, i.e. economic prosperity, of the lower 
classes. For this reason, mandatory intervention driven social reforms become necessary. 
Second, the notion of class assumes a social order at least somewhat based upon 
economic factors. A class based economic structure -even if the subject is taboo for most, 
currently represents a primary component of the contemporary American social experience. 
This second condition is important because it makes it clear that the interventionist' s 
evolutionary argument will incorporate, as opposed to mock or "find a way around," the 
importance and permanence of socioeconomic class. Marx advanced the social evolutionary 
argument that the elimination of class is essential if humans are to reach the potential of their 
90 It might appear that "adequate" might be difficult to define in this sense. This, however, is not the case. The 
United States census uses a definition of poverty based upon income and the price of food to set the "poverty 
limit" -limit which roughly 15% of all Americans fall under. 
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species-being, and thus allow the full realization of social evolution, a communist state. 
Marx might have argued, if class is eliminated so too must wealth be eliminated, and thus the 
problem of intervention will take care of itself. That is, there is nothing to distribute because 
everyone within the system has an equal amount of material. This logical extension of 
Marxist thought, however, does not seem to be correct. How would any state, communist or 
otherwise, negate the question, "Who Deserves What?" Presumably, this question would 
find its answer in that everyone within the state would agree to have the same material 
possessions, thus "Who Deserves What" becomes settled as everyone within the state 
evolves towards a position of socially negotiated, and accepted, equality. Marx maintained it 
is possible for social evolution to be such a powerful force that it can allow for the 
elimination of a fundamental. 92 The primary problem with this view (the Marxist elimination 
of class) is that it depends upon almost unanimous social consent, and likewise becomes 
exceedingly less likely to find realization as population densities increase and social 
structures continue to evolve away from "mechanical solidarity" and towards "organic 
solidarity." In other words, it is much more probable that a sociopolitical community might 
agree to certain terms allowing for poverty welfare, than it would be to assume the realization 
of a communist ideal. Given that the elimination of hierarchical social relationships inherent 
91 Recall the primary question of concern is "Who Deserves What." How this question is addressed by the 
benevolence of an individual is interesting, but not sociological. Instead, it is more sociologically productive to 
evaluate how sociopolitical communities (states) settle this question. 
92 Aside from the skepticism ensuing from the Marxist argument that the essential might be neglected a more in-
depth analysis can ensue. Certainly, "Who Deserves What" is not simply a material question; it can find 
manifestation in many other ways. Thus it might be worth asking, does the negation of the question in a 
material sense necessarily negate the question in its entirety? I would suggest not. Thus let us assume that the 
Marxist vision of materially settling the question "Who Deserves What" becomes realized, what then? Would a 
utopic community ensue? No, not if "Who Deserves What" is a fundamental social question. People would 
simply find other nonmaterial means by which to settle "Who Deserves What." Quite possibly this address 
might actually make for a much less pleasure community. If it were not for money being used to settle our 
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in social class is unlikely, the interventionist would hold that wealth redistribution as opposed 
to wealth elimination is the proper means by which to alleviate history's wrongs. 
Making "Natural Selection" Applicable to People93 
When the uniqueness of individuals is coupled with the relativistic nature of culture 
what common experience(s) could possibly encompass the "totality of peoples?" Within 
animal populations the answer is usually reduced to survival; then, "natural selection" 
becomes noted, in animal populations, as the mechanism of evolution that enhances survival. 
While it cannot be ignored, the obvious importance of human survival, it would be 
concurrently shortsighted to consider biological survival -in a contemporary American 
context- as the direct aspiration of most social struggles. As Hofstadter (1992: 96) aptly 
pointed out, 
What is called the struggle for existence in modern society is really a struggle for the means of 
enjoyment. Only the desperately poor, the pauperized, and the criminal are engaged in a struggle for 
actual existence; and the struggle among the submerged 5 per cent of society can have no selective 
action on the whole, because even members of this class manage to multiply rapidly before they die. 
The struggle for enjoyment, while it may have a moderate selective action, is in no way analogous 
either to natural selection or the artificial selection of the horticulturist. Then the need of mankind is 
not acquiescence to nature, but a constant struggle to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State 
of Nature, the State of Art as an organized polity. 
People struggle for a vast number of reasons, but generally outright "survival" is not one of 
these reasons. This does not suggest that a type of "natural selection" does not affect social 
evolution, only that this selection must be interpreted with much more latitude than a strictly 
survival laden understanding provides. Thus, if natural selection is to be applied to human 
fundamental question, then what would be? The answer to this question might prove to be more disheartening 
than the "money as mechanism" that the Marxist vision tries so desperately to escape. 
93 The problem of how to go about applying "natural selection" to people is one of the most troubling concerns 
of those attempting to mesh social and biological evolutionary views. In this thesis I actively "cover" both 
views, but acknowledge that a meshing of the two usually results in grasping at straws. A social evolutionary 
view, however, that can provide an interpretation of "natural selection" will most often be more descriptive and 
enduring than one that cannot. 
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beings, something other than a literal interpretation of the "struggle for existence" must be 
interwoven with the operation of such selection. 
Under normal circumstances, survival (self-preservation) is sought by all; however, 
the simple suggestion that an organism, human or otherwise, seeks to continue existence is 
less than a revolutionary notion. What becomes more useful in a social evolutionary 
discussion is evaluating whether the totality of peoples figurative "struggles for existence" 
generally make use of any particularly designated mechanism. As was examined earlier, 
Darwin suggested, and has since been scientifically vindicated, in a general way, natural 
selection serves as the mechanism that guides the natural "struggle for existence." However, 
if the scientific language of natural selection were translated into a comprehensive 
understanding of human history, what would the mechanism of survival represent? What 
would be included in an evaluation of how the "totalities of all peoples" socially change and 
develop? A compelling case, using an interventionist argument, translates natural selection 
into interdependence as opposed to an autonomous sense of individuality. Without overly 
stressing the biological generational dependence of all infant mammals94 other convincing, 
historically driven, reasons suggest that human survival has long been an interdependent as 
opposed to an individualistic endeavor. 
Interventionist Thought 
Interventionist arguments, those that use evolutionary theory to advocate some 
94 Speaking in a strictly biological sense a human must be subject to almost complete dependence for the first 
five years of life. This dependence represents, especially in less complex societies, a tremendous human 
"investment" of both time and effort. This seemingly obvious fact appears to be lost on many who argue that 
humans are naturally very selfish and uncaring beings. If this were the case surely infanticide in most every 
instance would occur in one form or another well before five long years transpired. 
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degree of poverty welfare, are diverse in their origins and contentions. These arguments, 
nonetheless, may be generally captured by an appeal to one or a combination of the following 
concerns. 1) The nature and function of government has evolved to the point wherein "the 
people" are sovereign, i.e., United States. This being the case, there is less concern with a 
tyrannical political structure "redistributing" wealth in a capricious manner. Hofstadter 
(1992: 72) using this blending of political and social evolutionism as he noted, 
The natural-law and laissez-faire dogmas had been useful intellectual devices in the days when society 
was being freed from monarchical and oligarchic rule. It was natural enough to oppose governmental 
interference when government was in the hands of autocrats, but it is a folly to cling to this opposition 
in an age of representative government when the popular will can be exerted through legislative action. 
The assumptions are obsolete. 
2) Cooperation as opposed to competition offers the best treatment of "natural selection," and 
the "struggle for existence" as applied to social evolutionism. Poverty welfare, therefore, is 
an action of the community, which by its cooperative mission serves to advance social 
evolution. 3) When speaking of a "social" environment most common assumptions 
regarding the idea of "nature" are either ambiguous or wrong. Thus sociologists must be 
extremely careful about making assumptions imposed by capitalistic ideology, and applying 
them towards discourses regarding poverty welfare. It is not that ideology is "right" or 
"wrong," but that it serves to reify conceptions of nature and evolutionary processes that are 
then thought to be unquestionably correct. As a review of prominent interventionist thinkers 
is introduced, it should be noted that many of their ensuing arguments fall short of suggesting 
that poverty welfare is an immediate condition of social evolutionism. Their arguments 
instead often lead to conditions that render poverty welfare a viable choice, which a 
sociopolitical community could make given the correct environmental circumstances. As the 
interventionist' s position is presented, it is noted that many of the arguments therein were 
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likely not intended to be included in a discourse of poverty welfare. These positions, 
however, actively address "Who Deserves What," and consistently and logically mesh well 
with a discourse involving poverty welfare. In the next chapter, the disconnection between 
social evolutionism and a direct interventionist argument will be reconciled with a 
sociohistorical argument intended to mesh social evolutionism directly with "Who Deserves 
What" in the context of American class redistribution. 
Karl Marx: Anti-Interventionist 
When social evolutionism is discussed in relation with "matters of money," the 
mention of Karl Marx -or Marxist thought, often erroneously enters the conversation. In 
certain contexts such a mention might be warranted;95 however, in the context of poverty 
welfare there are good reasons to exclude much of Marxist thought. Marx, to be sure, was a 
social evolutionist, and he primarily viewed this evolution to be guided by the process of 
class struggle and conflict.96 Would Marx, however, advance an interventionist argument? 
Oddly, given his belief that capitalism was doomed to failure, the answer is, probably not. 
For Marx's version of social evolutionism to be realized, the oppressed poor must rise up in 
95 The connection between Marx and Darwin is well researched; however, as argued by Terence Ball, "Marx 
and Darwin: A Reconsideration" Political Theory, vol.7, (Nov., 1979), much of this relationship is a matter of 
academic folklore. Ball writes, "the Marx-Darwin myth, as created and fostered by Engels and the Social 
Darwinists, was made even more credible by the discovery of two letters written by Darwin to Marx." Ball 
continues, however, by noting that even these correspondences were a product of academic courtesy and 
positioning. Marx was displeased with the English reception of Das Kapital, and sent a copy to not only 
Darwin, but also his nemesis Herbert Spencer. 
96 Karl Kautsky, a leading socialist theoretician of the SPD in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, 
meshed Darwinism with his view of human history. Using more accurate anthropological data than Marx 
utilized, Kautsky concluded that capitalism was merely a blimp on the radar screen of human history. Writing 
in, The Materialists Conception of History, Kautsky argued that primitive communism has existed for 800,000 
years and class society a mere 10,000 years. As Kautsky put it, "Measured solely to its temporal duration, it is 
then not classless society, but rather society divided into classes which that presents itself to us as the exception, 
a mere episode in the history of human society (250)." Viewed in this way capitalism is not, in a Marxist sense, 
deterministic or necessary for a communist society to emerge. The above information was drawn from 
Callinicos ( 1999: 111-13). 
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glorious revolution and overthrow their capitalist exploiters, thereby creating a socialist (and 
shortly, a communist) state. If, however, the poor are given "welfare"97 they will logically be 
less likely to revolt, and therein create a better social circumstance for themselves. Poverty 
welfare, then, becomes the mechanism which hampers communism -Marx's social telos-
from realization. If the poor are given poverty welfare within the context of a capitalist 
economic and political system, then it stands to reason that such an act of intervention might 
discourage the social act of rebellion necessary to create the Marxist vision of a communist 
state. Ironically Marx, as the issue of "poverty welfare" is concerned, would be much closer 
-for much different reasons- to the contrarian sentiments of Herbert Spencer than towards 
interventionist appeals. 98 
Rousseau: Artificial Inequality 
Jean Jacques Rousseau makes an important distinction between "natural" and 
"artificial" inequality.99 Rousseau, while not an evolutionist per se, was concerned with the 
origins and development of social, political, and economic inequality. Could inequalities of 
these varieties be owed to the natural differences among people? For Rousseau an answer to 
this question is not an absolute matter, but instead one of degree. Different people, of course, 
have different talents and abilities e.g., strength and intelligence, which tend to produce 
97 P.T. Barnum put the idea of keeping the poor content in the context of, "bread and circuses." 
98 Social theory, like politics, can make strange bedfellows. Social Reforms, such as poverty welfare, would 
probably be opposed by anyone be they a lazzie faire capitalist or a communist if they held a highly 
deterministic view of social evolutionism. Both Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx held such a position. 
99 See Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
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"natural inequality."100 Thus as an absolute matter, natural inequalities set the stage for 
"small" social inequalities. These inequities, however, are not, in most cases, substantial 
enough to account for the level of inequity within current capitalistic sociopolitical systems. 
The millionaire, while hundreds of times richer than the laborer, is neither hundreds of times 
stronger nor necessarily more intelligent than the laborer who might be in need of "poverty 
welfare." Then what explains the huge material disparages between "king" and "pauper?" 
The answer, for Rousseau, is that people have historically devised sociopolitical systems of 
"artificial inequality" that serve to make small -natural- differences manifest into conditions 
of vastly disproportionate levels of socially designated inequality. In this manner, small 
natural differences are manifested in broad, materially expressed social differences. Thus, 
the poor are seen as victims not of their nature, but of "artificial inequality." Rousseau's 
powerful insight aids the interventionist who is constantly reminded by the contrarian that, 
"reform will not work because the poor are naturally meant to have very little." The 
response of the interventionist could be that, "reform will work because the poor are not poor 
because of nature, but instead because of a socially constructed "artificial inequality." As 
such, they find themselves in a material situation far removed from wholly natural 
100 Thomas Jefferson was also interested in the question of natural versus artificial inequality. In a letter to John 
Adams, Jefferson (1963: 266-67) would write, "For I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among 
men. The grounds of this are virtue and talent. Formerly, bodily powers gave place among the aristoi. But 
since the invention of gunpowder has armed the weak as well as the strong with missile death, bodily strength 
like beauty, good, humor, politeness, and other accomplishments, has become but an auxiliary ground of 
distinction. There is also an artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents; 
for with these it would belong to the first class." While Jefferson adheres to the view that the "natural lottery" 
is important, he cannot attribute the effects of this lottery as a possible way to exactly distinguish between the 
classes. 
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contingencies. 
Lester Ward: Debunking Nature 
Lester Ward, a Lamarkian and Eugenicist, was one of the first academics to actively 
study sociology in the United States. Ward is included in the interventionist strain of thought 
because as Hofstadter (1992:68) noted, "He was the first and most formidable thinker who 
attacked the unitary assumptions of Social Darwinism and natural-law laissez-faire 
individualism." It was the analogous treatment between (biologically driven) animal 
evolution and (socially driven) human evolution that caused Ward his greatest concern. As 
Ward (1893: 134-5) articulated while noting the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" 
selection in evolution: 
The fundamental principle of biology is natural selection, that of sociology is artificial selection. The 
survival of the fittest is simply the survival of the strong, which implies and would better be called the 
destruction of the weak. If nature progresses through the destruction of the weak, man progress 
through the protection of the weak (Hofstadter, pp. 79). 
The message in this passage is clear: nature along with the process of natural selection is 
brutal and unkind, but why should "natural brutality", i.e., the typical results of natural 
selection, stand as the proper measure of human conduct or decision-making. Thus the 
contrarian (Social Darwinist) is not wrong to point out the harsh aspects of nature; he 
becomes wrong only after he applies these natural realities to the lives of people. Ward 
might ask, "aren't we better than nature would have us be if we were mere animals?" 
Consistent with a positive answer, Ward maintained that social reforms ( or social 
applications), such as poverty welfare, were the best mechanisms by which science could 
legitimize sociology as well as advance social evolution. As Ward (1913: 352) argued: 
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It is only through the artificial control of natural phenomena that science is made to minister the human 
needs; and is social laws are really analogous to physical laws, there is no reason why social science 
may not receive practical applications such as have been given to the physical sciences (Hofstadter, 
pp.73). 
Notwithstanding the observation that the social sciences lack "effect foundationalism," or 
predictive laws of effect, Ward's point is well taken. If no social reforms come about as a 
product of sociology, there is little practical distinction between sociology and philosophy. 
In an earlier section of this thesis the idea of organicism -treating human social order 
as analogous to a living organism- was briefly examined. In a classical argument Ward 
posed the question, "if organicism is an accurate depiction of social evolution then what part 
of the body would government ( action) represent?" The context of this question takes place 
when Herbert Spencer and other Social Darwinists' were advocating organicism as a strategy 
intended to promote the natural processes and virtue of "leaving things alone." This view, 
however, neglects the fact that the body does not just "leave things alone," it actively 
functions to ensure that all the parts work together. Thus, for Ward, if we are to accept the 
organicist' s analogy the result is not a lack of reform and adherence to extreme 
individualism, but instead extended reform and increased centralization. The body works 
best when its organs are part of an integrated system; therefore, society works best (evolves 
better) when its institutions are cooperative as opposed to being in a state of competitive. 
Kropotkin: Cooperation Not Competition 
Peter Kropotkin, 101 in response to contrarian accounts of Darwinism, argued Social 
Darwinists' had simply misinterpreted Darwin's evolutionary thought from the outset of their 
study. The contrarian's competitive fixation on Darwin's notion of "natural selection," and 
101 Kropotkin devoted the better part of his life attempting to form a synthesis between anarchism and 
communism. His primary focus was in arguing that the road to communism was best realized through an 
precursory acceptance and practice of anarchism. 
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the "struggle for existence," (especially as applied to people) was, for Kropotkin, simply 
wrong. Kropotkin, in his most influential work Mutual Aid, operated under the assumption 
that Darwin's evolutionary treatment of social organisms (such as people) was entrenched 
more deeply in cooperation than in competition. Kropotkin (1902: 75) diligently advocated 
the natural virtue of cooperation: 
Don't compete! Competition is always injurious to the species, and you have plenty of resources to 
avoid it. That is the tendency of nature, not always realized in full, but always present. That is the 
watchword which comes to us from the bush, the forest, the river, the ocean. Therefore combine 
practice mutual aid! That is the surest means for giving to each and to all the greatest safety, the best 
guarantee of existence and progress, bodily, intellectual, moral. That is what nature teaches us. 
Quite a bit of evidence from Darwin's writings, particularly The Descent of Man tends to 
suggest Darwin was not far removed from Kropotkin's sentiments. As Hofstadter (1992: 91-
2) noted, 
Darwin devoted many pages of The Descent of Man to the sociality of Man and the origins of his 
moral sense. He believed that primeval man and their apelike progenitors, along with many lower 
animals, were probably social in their habits, that remote primitives practiced division of labor, and 
that man's social habits have been of enormous importance to his survival. 
This discussion of the evolution of adaptive social processes (habits) lends credence to the 
position that it is probably a collaboration of competition and cooperation, which best 
exemplifies the process of social evolution. Given this collaboration, the interventionist 
could argue that it only makes logical sense, consistent with social evolutionism, for a 
sociopolitical community to decide for itself the issue of poverty welfare. After all, no 
natural concerns preempt its usage; in fact some naturalistic concerns might even encourage 
the notion. Accordingly, if the interventionist were somehow banned from acting, with a 
proclamation thwarting any action serving to endorse poverty welfare, then the cooperative 
nature of social evolution would cease to advance. 
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Veblen: The Rich Deserve What 
Thorstein Veblen dichotomized social class into industrious and predatory categories. 
Members of the industrious class actively add to the production of useful goods or services, 
thereby contributing positively to social evolution. The predatory class, on the other hand, is 
largely involved with capitalistic financial schemes, speculations, market positioning, and 
other economic activities which Veblen concluded do little or nothing to advance the 
productivity of society. 102 While Veblen acknowledged that some of society's poor might be 
considered to be members of the predatory class, by and large it was the idle rich, doing 
nothing except perhaps playing "financial games," that constitute the bulk of this class. For 
this reason, the ideas of "predatory" and "leisure" classes are, for Veblen, somewhat 
interchangeable. That is, the coal miner -a member of the industrious class- by contributing 
to the good of the society with his labor was more valuable to the advancement of the social 
order than a wealthy individual -a member of the predatory class- who clipped bond coupons 
as a means of continuing his indefinite leisure. As Veblen might ask, "what good could 
clipping a bond coupon add to society?" Consistent, with a negative response to this 
question, Veblen argued that by socially supporting the idleness of the leisure class the result 
would serve only as an impediment to social evolution. They, after all, added no actual 
productivity to society. Veblen understood social evolution to occur in tangent with 
102 Veblen was one of those thinkers who actually "practiced what he preached." For instance, although he 
could afford a permanent residence he never purchased a home or any other real estate. Often, he would live 
with friends, or set up residence in the woods. On occasion when he left a room he would use the window and 
not the door. When questioned about his behavior he would respond, "the window is closer." 
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production, thus any measure that encourages production at the expense of idleness, such as, 
poverty welfare, would likewise advance positive social evolution. 103 
The contrarian response to this talk of a "predatory class" would likely revert into a 
functionalist defense, i.e., if the idleness of the rich was not in some way functional, it would 
cease to exist. In other words, the fact that the predatory class exists necessarily 
demonstrates its social function. Aside from the tautological nature of this defense, Veblen 
offers yet another reason why the "leisure class" continues to exist, thereby subverting social 
evolution. The rich, Veblen argued, had found ways to symbolically communicate their 
"superior" position to the rest of society. 104 This symbolic communication could not involve 
productivity because that would suggest working, something the leisure class tries 
desperately to avoid. In lieu of production, therefore, the leisure class "invented" the practice 
of consumption, "conspicuous consumption." Oddly, through the process of symbolic 
communication, anti-productivity became revered and respected by the "industrious class." 
As Veblen described it, e.g., long fingernails worn by members of the traditional Chinese 
upper class demonstrated to everyone who could observe them that they were "beyond" 
participating in laborious activities. 105 Additionally, Veblen argued that much of what is 
103 The common contemporary American conception of poverty welfare is that it will lead to laziness and less 
productivity. This view, however, is extremely shortsighted and misses the productive enhancements which 
poverty welfare could well add. For instance, ensuring that workers can afford proper diets and health care will 
in turn likely equate into more productive workers, if for no other reason than that they will live longer and 
more productive lives. Poverty welfare, viewed in this light is not necessarily a drag on a society, but might 
indeed prove to be more uplifting than financial speculations 
104 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class 
105 Before one concludes that Veblen's view is too far-fetched, consider the significance of unproductive 
"wealth symbols" within contemporary American society. What does a diamond ring on a young women's 
finger suggest? Not merely that she is getting married, but depending upon the size of the ring the wealth of her 
future husband. What do mansions represent? Not merely that one is comfortable, but that the owner is 
conspicuously wealthy. The notion of conspicuous consumption is so much a part of contemporary social 
structure that many in the "industrious class" probably do not notice its every instance, even though it is often 
observed on a daily if not hourly basis. 
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called fashion and style is little more than a willingness of the "industrious class" to mimic 
those members of the "leisure class" who are most admired. Thus the existence of an 
unproductive leisure class depends upon the rest of society (the industrious class) showing 
admiration and respect for their level and extent of consumption. Veblen's dismay with the 
industrious class for allowing itself to be duped into a showing of such admiration and 
respect for the leisure class is clearly expressed in many of his writings. For this reason, 
Veblen, while in favor of social reforms, could hardly be said to have held the same positive 
feeling towards the masses that many of his socialist contemporaries held. 
Veblen's contribution to an interventionist position is enormous. The contrarian 
contention that the rich are such because they are the most biologically fit -nature has 
dictated their riches- becomes laughable when it is considered that the rich, in the context of 
civilization, posses their wealth largely because of predatory as opposed to productive 
behaviors. Veblen (1899: 237) went as far to call most members of the leisure class "moral 
delinquents." Nature did not dictate the course of their riches; instead the advent of 
nonproductive business dealings, as treated more highly than industrious behavior, led to 
such strange (unproductive) measures of wealth and status in present society. Once wealth is 
established as a socially constructed symbol, (barring an extremely odd coincidence) it 
cannot also then be a naturally dictated state of affairs. The attainment of wealth must be 
more of one than the other, and Veblen gives us good reason to believe that it is simply not a 
natural phenomenon. Wealth posses its social force because members of society agree that it 
does, not because nature dictates that it must. 
The aforementioned interventionist thought of, Rousseau, Ward, Kropotkin, and 
Veblen, is quite helpful in setting up the groundwork for a social evolutionary argument that 
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allows room for the practice of poverty welfare. 106 This thought, however, falls just short of 
advocating a social evolutionary position that serves to provide the basis of poverty welfare. 
What I hope to demonstrate in the next chapter is, consistent with interventionist thought, 
that it becomes quite possible to advocate a social evolutionary argument that logically ends 
with the ability of a sociopolitical community to justifiably mandate the practice of poverty 
welfare. 
106 This list is certainly not intended to be exhaustive. For instance, other interventionist writers include: 
Thomas Henry Huxley's Evolution and Ethics (1894), Benjamin Kidd's Social Evolution (1894), Henry 
Drummond's The Ascent of Man (1894), Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1889), Henry Holt's On the 
Civic Relations (1907), to name a few. These works were not stressed, however, because their interventionist 
sentiment was more difficult to tease out than the utilized works. 
97 
CHAPTER 7. THE INTERVENTINIST'S ARGUMENT107 
Framing the Argument 
A very effective social evolutionary approach that the interventionist can put forward 
to defend the class redistribution of wealth will involve a collaboration between an 
evolutionary schema stressing the development of class interdependence with that of 
Veblen's general social evolutionary framework. The argument will be advanced, consistent 
with Veblen's social evolutionary schema, that social order is best represented by a "history 
of interdependence." An interdependence, which began well before the advent of social 
class, (during what Veblen would coin the "savage" era) interdependence occurred among 
peoples and not classes (30,000 BCE - 12,000 BCE). 108 As the savage era made way for 
"barbarism," however, and finally "civilization," interdependence evolved away from being 
among peoples and towards the direction of interdependence of socioeconomic classes. The 
argument proceeds that human social interdependence, as concerned among socioeconomic 
classes, can be deviated into three historically evident sub-stages (guidance (12,000 BCE-
8,000 BCE, protection (8,000 BCE - 4,000 BCE, and perceived opportunity 4,000 BCE until 
present) that mark the general social evolutionary trend of social order. 
107 The difficult of presenting a broad ranging wide sweeping social evolutionary approach is that such an 
approach is bound to miss the detailed description which a more specifically concentrated historical approach 
would be better suited to handle. Thus the ensuing account is not a "magic bullet" able to address all the 
concerns of the interventionist. Broad histories are difficult to coherently create, and even provided their 
creation they necessarily create more questions than they answer. While I acknowledge this limitation the task 
at hand is still a worthwhile and profitable goal of the interventionist. 
108 While Veblen originally reviewed this evolutionary schema as an economic and social arrangement, it 
should be remembered that the anthropologist Morgan was to first to introduce this schema in the framework of 
a historical analysis. Thus as this schema is used to advance the interventionist position it should be noted that 
it was first advanced by Morgan and then Veblen. The language of guidance, protection, and perceived 
opportunity are mine, the schema of savagery, barbarism, and civilization are borrowed. 
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The utilization of Veblen's social evolutionary schema will offer an established 
framework to better reinforce the proposed manner (guidance, protection, and perceived 
opportunity) by which the case can be made that socioeconomic classes are interdependent. 
The logical extension of the argument will continue by noting that if social classes are indeed 
interdependent, then the members of the upper class owe something, to be determined in 
specific cases by the interventionist, to members of the lower class. This is because 
particular social class(es), and the members therein, exist, and continue to survive, because 
they are involved interdependently with the members of a different social class. Of course, 
the proposed relationship between members of different social classes is not always direct, 
nor is it always consciously acknowledged, but it exists nonetheless. The task of the 
interventionist is not an easy one, but a discourse incorporating social evolutionary 
arguments with a specific conception of "Who Deserves What" in the context of poverty 
welfare is certainly not an impossibility. Relying heavily upon social evolutionary 
arguments, along with the acceptance and development of "interdependent social class," 
leads to the emergence of a healthy position, quite able to provide formidable discourse with 
the approach soon to be taken by the ideal type of the contrarian. 
A "Conservative Continuance," as Opposed to a History of Nation-States 
The reason for the interventionist's earlier careful agreement with Stanton's skeptical 
account of "class benevolence" is that her concern with class conflict is in regards to 
members of Nations. If, however, human history began roughly 32,000 years ago, as Homo 
Sapiens realized the potential to ascend to the heights of most all land-based ecological 
niches, then Stanton's concern directly addresses only about two percent of human social 
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experience. 109 Even if the beginnings of civilization are taken to represent a relic of the of 
contemporary Nation-State, and thus serve to begin a social evolutionary argument, three 
quarters of the human social experience would, in tum, be entirely neglected. The historical 
starting place of social evolution is not to be found in the "nation-state," a political endeavor 
nearly three centuries in the making. A condition of social organization that Max Weber 
(1919) described as, "An organization which successfully upholds a claim to binding rule 
making over a territory, by virtue of commanding a monopoly of the legitimate use of 
violence." It is likely that such a social organization -the nation-state-, if for no better reason 
the difficulties surrounding a socially shared understanding of legitimacy, would represent a 
stage of social evolution as opposed to the inception of such. It is, therefore, almost certain 
that the first instance of socioeconomic class substantially pre-dated the "creation" of the 
Nation-State. 110 While the exact quantification of this discrepancy is in dispute, generally 
social evolution can be understood as a process which began about 30,000 BCE, human 
civilization beginning about 5,000 BCE, and the nation-state as 300-year young social 
creation. 
Thinking about social organization void the state (the solely legitimized bearer of 
109 The determination that human history began 32,000 years ago resulted primarily from two considerations. l) 
Before 32,000 years ago people survived by means of scavenging (not hunting and gathering), and likewise 
could not be said to rule their ecological niche. 2) Given newfound anthropological data the genetic delineation 
between Neanderthals and Homo Sapiens is a somewhat twisted affair. Some evidence even suggests that 
crossbreeding between these "species" did indeed occur. What is known for sure is that sometime around 
30,000 years ago Neanderthals disappeared, and Homo Sapiens gradually came to dominate land-based 
ecological niches. Until more anthropological evidence is uncovered it seems wise to begin a study of human 
history post-Neanderthal extinction. Thus I consider human history to have begun roughly 32,000 years ago. 
110 The extent of meaningful human history has the tendency to begin at sometime in between the advent of 
civilization (5,000 BCE) and that of the Nation-State; however, the power of interventionist argument is 
contingent upon this very limited understanding of history to become significantly broadened. As this 
broadening occurs the hope will be that the redistribution of wealth among the classes becomes an ever-
appealing freedom to allow a sociopolitical community to embark upon. 
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violence) is difficult in a modem context inundated with vast territorial monsters separating 
millions of peoples with little more power than guns and guards occupying socially and 
culturally created "lines of chalk." In order to appreciate the totality of social evolutionary 
arguments, however, these "lines of chalk" must be understood as pieces of a much broader 
historical process. To begin a social evolutionary argument with talk of the nation-state is 
like starting the 100-meter dash at the 97-meter mark. The race will be completed quickly, 
but the time of the race will have little meaning. If the time of the dash is to be meaningful a 
review of social evolutionary thought must broach a starting line of roughly 32,000 years 
ago. Running the full 100 meters, most of which occurring substantially before the inception 
of the nation-state, allows for a much more comprehensive and convincing treatment of 
"Darwinian Survival" as well as the mechanism -interdependence- by which this survival has 
become manifested via the human social experience. 
The interventionist is best served by welcoming the Darwinian suggestion of "natural 
selection" as well as the mechanism of the "struggle for existence" by which this selection is 
realized. This welcome reception, however, should stress the historically evident 
interdependent nature of human survival, while calling into question any notion of 
autonomous "individualistic survival." After an interdependence of human survival and 
achievement -first through peoples and then through classes- is historically established, the 
interventionist will continue by maintaining that social evolution should continue to advance 
along this established path by distributing wealth from one socially interdependent class to 
another. The social history of peoples' demands that class-based reciprocity be mandated if 
necessary. This is not to suggest that vulgar class-based inequities have been absent 
throughout human history; only that "the interdependence of social class" has been the rule 
101 
of human social history rather than the exception. As such, material redistribution from one 
class to another becomes, in a modern context, the means by which the mechanism of 
interdependence shapes social evolution. 
In what most contemporary observers would regard as an odd sequence of events, the 
interventionist would be best served to advocate a "conservative continuance" to the already 
historically determined "interdependence of social class." The interventionist's general 
strategy is to advance a schema of social evolution that has continually existed since the 
spark of social existence (interdependence), predating even class-based social structures. 
Before classes were interdependent upon each other individual peoples were. Inherent in this 
strategy (conservative continuance) of justifying social redistribution both theft and dismissal 
occur. The theft occurs as the interventionist "steals" conservatism back away from the 
contrarian, who made the original theft of "conservatism" about three centuries ago -roughly 
the same time nation-states emerged. The modern conservative (contrarian) is a conservative 
only if it is accepted that meaningful human history began about 1700 A.D. This intellectual 
theft, moreover, simultaneously dismisses the contrarian notion of individualism. The 
modern conservative's (contrarian's) mantra of unwavering and unalterable individual rights 
seems to be an extremely questionable aspect of social evolutionary thought if the totality of 
human social existence has been a struggle of interdependent, as opposed to individualistic, 
development. As this theft and dismissal undergo further development be certain that the 
contrarian will, when space is allotted, respond to this powerful avenue of interventionist 
justification. 
If the interventionist were to mistakenly concede that the human social evolutionary 
journey began in tangent with the construction of the first city (civilization), Veblen's last 
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stage of social evolution, then their stance towards socioeconomic redistribution would be 
substantially weakened. This is because, after the institutionalization of social class, 
alongside individual rights, the interventionist becomes the bearer not of a particular social 
evolutionary tradition, but instead as the instigator of meddling fairness, change, and the 
pilferage of individualistic claims. In other words, they become the brunt of all typical 
present day attacks against liberalism, a disadvantageous position for any social evolutionary 
argument. The starting point of any social evolutionary argument will separate the righteous 
position from the meddling and the conservative from the liberal. Assumptions that govern 
the origins of an evolutionary argument become the standards by which evolutionary 
mechanisms, i.e., natural selection and the struggle for existence are understood to be 
properly working. Given the importance of a "starting place" in evolutionary arguments, 
where can the interventionist seek to begin the theoretical justification for material 
redistribution?111 Strangely, or not so when recognizing that a "conservative continuance" 
marks the general mode of interventionist attack, the strongest interventionist treatment of a 
social evolutionary starting place can be found in the anti-revolutionary conservative writings 
of Edmond Burke. 
Finding the Theoretical Origins of an Interventionist's Social Order 
In Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke, an English statesman of the late 
eighteenth-century, showed alarm with both the French revolution as well as the values 
underpinning the effort. Burke, an aristocratic conservative, was quick to realize that 
revolutionary values offered a great threat to the aristocratic social structure that he had good 
111 While 30,000 BCE will mark the temporal beginnings of human history it seems as if a social contract style 
notion of "human beginnings" would aid the justification process of the interventionist. 
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personal reason to deeply admire. In an effort to intellectually protect the social and political 
status quo of Europe, in a time of revolutionary upheaval, Burke offered a far too 
underutilized notion of human nature, as well as the origins and conditions of social 
organization. Straddling the fence, or lack thereof as Burke would maintain, between a "state 
of nature" and society there exists nothing but fantasy. As Burke (1815: 210-11) argued, 
In a state of rude nature there is no such thing as a people. A number of men in themselves have no 
collective capacity. The idea of a people is the idea of a corporation. It is wholly artificial; and made 
like all other legal fictions by common agreement ... When men, therefore, break up the original 
compact or agreement which gives its corporate form and capacity to the state, they are no longer a 
people ... They are a number of vague loose individuals and nothing more. 
In accordance with this observation, the individual is little more than an abstraction, an entity 
that finds meaning only within a social setting. This community dependent notion of 
meaningful human existence has strong social evolutionary implications that are not lost on 
the interventionist. If it is indeed the building of a sociopolitical community that establishes 
social meaning and further the increase of survival and improvement-the crux of Darwin's 
"struggle for existence" - then it stands to reason that rights, property or otherwise, should not 
be solely, or perhaps not at all, individualistic claims. Rights and claims thereof, instead, 
belong to the only real consequence of human social evolution, the social group. Consistent 
with Burke's notion of the "social contract," therefore, individual rights become tertiary, not 
primary considerations, involved with an analysis of "Who Deserves What." The rich can no 
longer hoard wealth solely based on a claim of "property rights" because, if Burke's view is 
adopted, it is the collective that inspires the motivation to amass wealth in the first instance. 
From the base of a social collective, all else becomes possible, an uninviting idea in 
mainstream American culture. 
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It is no coincidence that most American discussions of Western political thought 
unrightfully exclude Burke, while applauding Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau's conceptions of 
an asocial person existing with varying degrees of happiness in a "state of nature" ( or in 
Hobbes's case a constant "state of war"). 112 Often this selective praise is almost solely 
ideologically driven -even though such praise is often misplaced. For instance, Rousseau 
who greatly admired the "noble savage" -an essentially asocial human being who happily 
existed void any discernible social structure- also makes clear that (1963: 205), "the social 
order is a sacred right which serves for the basis of all others." For Burke, as well as many 
sociologists and communitarians, asocial persons lacking society "are a number of vague 
loose individuals and nothing more." In this fashion, it matters a great deal whether society 
was formed as an arena of individual endeavor, or conversely if social creation represents 
the only avenue available for meaningful human achievement. In agreement with the latter 
suggestion Emile Durkheim would tackle the "problem" of self-interest -a concern that must 
almost always be addressed when material resources are at stake- by arguing that man has a 
dual nature, concerned with both "self-interest" as well as the interests of others. As 
Durkheim argued (1964: 337): 
It is not without reason, therefore, that man feels himself to be double: he actually is double. There are 
in him two classes of states of consciousness that differ from each other in origin and nature, and in the 
ends toward which they aim. One class merely expresses our organisms and the objects to which they 
are most directly related. Strictly individual, the states of consciousness of this class connect us only 
with ourselves, and we can no more detach them from us than we can detach ourselves from our 
bodies. The states of consciousness of the other class, on the contrary, come to us from society; they 
transfer society into us and connect us with something that surpasses us (Ashley and Orenstein, pp. 
90). 
112 Immanuel Kant's notion of "asocial sociability" argues that social creation is a result of Man's vanity and 
competitive spirit. Resources are not pooled so much for purposes of survival, but instead are incorporated so 
that one may be on the "winning" side. However, a necessary precursor to being on the "winning" side is 
playing within a social environment. 
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This notion of a social consciousness "surpassing us" -and simultaneously self-interested 
concerns- might well serve the interventionist who is confronted with a barrage of contrarian 
appeals endorsing a strictly self-indulged starting and ending point of social evolution. 113 
Clearly, the origins of human social evolution, for Burke, are synonymous with the 
origins of meaningful human improvement and achievement. Humans cannot evolve 
independently of their social surroundings; therefore, no meaningful human evolution occurs 
void an established social environment. The often times unspoken compact between peoples 
forming a "dependently woven web" of social relations -manifested through the notion of 
socioeconomic class- is a key ingredient making social development and evolution possible. 
Viewed in this manner social evolution began and continues to develop as an attempt to 
increase survival and comfort by relying on the pooled resources of a social environment. 
Burke explained that this compact of social agreement represents much more than the 
protection of individual concerns, such as personal liberties. As Burke ( 1969: 194) 
elaborates his understanding of "social contract": 
Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be 
dissolved at pleasure - but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than partnership 
agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be 
taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved at the fancy of the parties ... It is a 
partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in all virtue; and in all perfection. As 
the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not 
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those 
who are to be born. 
Burke's language seems to be elusive. His formation of a social order represents three 
different groups, two of which are physically nonexistent. How can the dead and the yet to 
J1
3 Alex de Tocqueville writing in Democracy in America argues for a type of "enlightened self-interest," or 
self-interest properly understood. Accordingly, as individuals become more "enlightened" they would realize 
that long-term group interests are almost always superior to short term selfishness. Self-interest, as such, for the 
enlightened would have exceedingly less to do with the short-term desires of the self. 
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be born have any claim to the continuing social structure of society? Further, why is a 
"social contract" so much different from an "economic contract?" 
The dead and the yet to be born, in a much greater sense the latter, can advance in 
only one fundamental sense, a social sense, and as such the idea of a social contract is not 
strictly a free choice, because making the alternative choice -not establishing a social order-
would condemn not only current but future generations to an existence that necessarily lacks 
meaning. The social contract instead, is a necessary covenant stretching between the first 
and last persons and including the totality of humanity in between. 114 An economic contract, 
however, is established in order to realize a specific goal -bringing buyer and seller together 
in mutual agreement. Society, on the other hand, is the mechanism by which the realization 
of all human agreement and achievement becomes possible. Without social order there is no 
money, no objects to purchase, and no comparisons by which to give objects value. The 
decision to end an economic contract is one of a deliberate analysis of interest; no such 
deliberation could, according to Burke, logically surround the negation of a social contract. 
Furthermore, it would be a misunderstanding of the social contract to hold that one party of 
contract, the living, posses the proper authority to renege in the name of all three interested 
parties, two of which are unable to speak for themselves. 
The Social Structure of the Savage115 
It is easy to suggest, as many have, that human ancestors living hundreds of 
generations ago were simply brutish savages with few commendable qualities or virtues. 
Whatever "brutish" means in this context, however, it should not suggest class-based 
114 Recall that the first man, in any sense that would be consistent with social evolution, would be a part of a 
social group. Thus Burke would likely suggest that there is no first man only a first group of people. 
115 The term savage here is synonymous with the notion of hunter-gatherer. 
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hierarchy. Boehm (1999:3-4), described social structures before 10,000 BCE with the 
following language: 
Before twelve thousand years ago, humans basically were egalitarian. They lived in what could be 
called societies of equals, with minimal political centralization and no social classes. Everyone 
participated in group decisions, and outside the family there were no dominators. 
This portrayal of a savage society might seem excessively favorable; however, this picture 
seems more realistic in light of Stone Age population densities. For instance, in all of France 
during the late stone-age there were probably no more than 20,000 and possibly as few as 
1,600 human beings (Harris). 116 
Further, aside from comparatively egalitarian behavior, savage peoples enjoyed a 
comfortable standard of living. In all likelihood a workday of four hours, a concept that 
would make most living in modernity jealous, provided more than enough resources for 
survival -not above subsistence, but survival nonetheless. Dental records from roughly 
25,000 years ago suggest that individuals within savage society societies were well 
nourished, eating a diet rich in protein (Harris). Their average life expectancy of roughly 
thirty-five years for men and thirty years for women was comparable with life expectancy 
figures of the most "developed" countries just two hundred years ago. Most instances of 
increased life expectancies within contemporary nation-states, broaching 70 years in many 
modernized nations, are largely the result of better prenatal, postnatal, and geriatric care. 
116 The notion of population density is a constantly occurring theme in social and political thought. As 
population increases social dynamics seem to undergo almost axiomatic changes, which in turn bring with them 
certain changes in political structures, i.e. increases centralization. Foucault, for instances, discusses how 
increases in population densities during the late 17th century automatically led to societies undergoing the 
institutionalization of "disciplinary structures," i.e. prisons, mental hospitals, schools etc. 
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The Social Group Survives and Distributes Interdependently 
Aside from the "Neanderthal controversy" another important human event occurred 
roughly 30,000 years ago, the ability to routinely hunt and kill big game. Prior to 30,000 
BCE animal remains have been found at Old World habitation sites, but these animals 
probably died natural deaths, or were trapped or wounded by nonhuman predators. 
Scavenging and gathering "leftovers," rather than hunting, probably marked the mechanism 
of survival for humans prior to about 30,000 BCE. By about 30,000 years ago, however, the 
situation had changed dramatically, and bands of hunter-gathers possessed the technologies 
for killing and butchering the largest of animals on a fairly routine basis (Harris). Hunters 
often cornered their prey by setting fires and then chasing them off cliffs, or overwhelming 
the animal with an arsenal of finely tuned stone and bone projectile points, spears, darts, long 
knives, and bows and arrows (Harris). A significant shift in the balance of ecological power 
(hunting and killing) was taking place, and as a result struggles between humans and "other 
animals" became less important for the course of social and biological evolution. 
Accordingly, human evolutionary disputes -"the struggle for existence"- have increasingly 
been the result of intraspecies tensions. Social reforms intended to alleviate some of this 
tension, i.e., poverty welfare, might serve to make social evolution a smoother operating 
process. 117 This is important because nonhuman animals are almost always, in an 
evolutionary sense, contending with the pains of "natural selection" from the vantagepoint of 
struggles from both "within" and "outside" the species. At least for the past 30,000 years, 
117 Here I mention the notion of a "smoother operating" process in a positive manner, but this does not settle the 
matter. Most everyone wants a system, be it social or otherwise to operate smoothly, but is this desire 
paramount. In other words, is there anything to be desired more highly than smooth operation as a general 
aspiration? 
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however, human evolutionary concerns along these dualistic lines have been comparatively 
much less significant. Often this distinction between the struggles of human and nonhuman 
evolutionary processes are not included in comparative evolutionary discussions. This 
oversight is unfortunate because such discussions would likely lead to mention of important 
differences between human social evolutionism and the evolutionism of animals that must 
naturally undergo "dualistic struggle." 
This general schema of human life before the sedimentary reality of agricultural 
production represents one of the most independent eras in human history, yet in a number of 
important ways, interdependence continued to mark the primary mechanism of human 
survival. This mechanism was simply realized on a more individualistic level before the 
"creation of class."118 In the 1996 film The Ghost and the Darkness, Michael Douglas and 
Val Kilmer play big game hunters, both equipped with high power rifles and precision 
scopes, employed to kill troublesome lions impeding the "progress" of an African railroad. 
In the movie this trained duo, even with the technology and skilled use of high-powered 
rifles, had more than their fair share of big-game hunting. In order to hunt and kill the kind 
of game, i.e., woolly mammoth, woolly rhinoceros, steppe bison, and giant elk, routinely 
pursued by humans between 30,000 BCE and 12,000 BCE the task at hand was certainly 
almost always a group effort. The means of subsistence (survival) in savage society, where 
the killing of big game is the difference between life and death, was necessarily a matter of 
interdependent group hunting. 
118 In this way, the biological notion of "natural selection" was probably most applicable to people during the 
savage era, and has, with the creation of social class and the continued notion of "interdependence" become 
increasing less directly involved with social evolution. 
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Not only was the killing of prey made by the actions of the group, so too were 
decisions regarding the distribution of this life-giving kill. Examining the Kung, a group of 
Kalahari foragers, illustrates a case of savage group distribution. 119 The Kung must 
effectively deal with "upstarters" -members of the community who attempt to break social 
solidarity by engaging in selfish or deviant actions (Boehm). Upstarters were, in other 
words, individualistic members of the group. The potential exists for upstaters to be 
members of the community who, through their hunting ability, provide others with the means 
of subsistence. The sociopolitical "problem" for the Kung was to find a means to avoid the 
potential for intimidation and domination based upon some -the upstarters- taking "hostage" 
the resources of the many. Boehm (1999: 46) described the Kung's chosen means to resolve 
this vexing sociopolitical "problem": 
As with other forager groups, hunting prowess brings great respect among the! Kung because large 
game meat is shared by all households within the band .... Credit for the kill goes to the owner of the 
first arrow to hit the game. This man (who may not have even been present) has to distribute the meat 
formally to all households heads in the band -a task associated with not only prestige, but tension. 
Because the Kung trade arrows often, the responsibility of owning the meat while it is distributed is 
randomized, thereby preventing the more successful hunters from presiding over there own 
accomplishments. In effect it is a way to remove the temptation to dominate. 
Initially this means of distribution appears to be an individualistic matter; however, a social 
dynamic was created, as the credited hunter must distribute the kill to all other members of 
the band. 120 This ingenious method of "credited distribution" acts as a powerful social check 
against the overly proud and ambitious upstarter. If the same skilled hunters are constantly 
119 The Tlingit Indians in the northwestern United States offer a second example of group distribution. The 
Tlingit held Potlatches -a winter celebration featuring singing, dancing, feasting, and the lavish distribution of 
wealth and property. While a Potlatche could easily bankrupt the host, if successful they would raise the 
prestige of the host as well as his clan. Often this trade of material possessions for social status was thought to 
be well worth the exchange. 
120 This example nicely illustrates that even before agriculture created a means of survival above subsistence the 
fundamental social question of "Who Deserves What" still was a matter than needed to be socially settled, 
perhaps with more deliberate speed than if a means of subsistence above survival did exist. 
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bringing the entire band their means of substance, a deadly form of contempt might emerge 
within the group directed towards the perpetual "bearer of survival." For this reason the most 
skilled hunters within the band often "traded arrows" -credit for the kill- and actively 
downplayed their essential hunting role (Boehm). Not only was the killing of prey the means 
of survival for the group and the individuals therein, but a product of group coordination and 
cohesion. So too was the method by which food was allocated within the group. 
Generational Technological Interdependence 
Aside from the actual hunt and subsequent distribution, savage social structures were 
marked with a kind of "generational technological dependence." The view of the 
technologically ignorant "caveman" is largely folklore, as well as an illegitimate means to 
practice "modem self-indulgence." As Harris (1977:9) argued, 
Humans who lived between 30,000 BCE and 12,000 BCE were no technological amateurs; they 
achieved total control over the process of fracturing, chipping, and shaping crystalline rock, which 
formed the basis of their technology. 
One of the most practical applications of savage technology was the creation of the "laurel 
leaf' knife, eleven inches long but only four-tenth of an inch thick, a technology that still 
cannot be duplicated in mass by modem industrial techniques (Harris). Aside from the 
technology of weaponry other anthropological discoveries suggest that housing technology 
made the cave of the hunter-gatherer as formidable a dwelling as many contemporary 
American inner city housing units. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, Winter dwellings with 
round floor plans twenty feet in diameter were already in use more than 20,000 years ago 
(Harris). These dwellings were lined with rich furs for rugs and beads, as well as plenty as 
dried animal dung or fat laden bones for the hearth. In addition, the ability to "control fire," 
a technology thousands of generations in development, represents a socially acquired type of 
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technological skill; a specific element of culture that Talcott Parsons explained as being 
"learned, shared, and transmitted (Goubsblom)." The possessions held in post-industrial 
society, all the material comforts that Americans possess, are not "our own"; they are instead 
the product of a complex series of technological generational transfers that began at least as 
far back as 30,000 years ago. 
These few, but impressive, examples of early human technological savvy represent an 
effective way to understand what Burke might have meant when he spoke of a strange 
compact with "those who are dead." Technology is a cumulative, usually very slow paced, 
endeavor and as such sophisticated weaponry or artificial dwellings do not appear suddenly 
with the gleeful undertakings of an uninfluenced group or individual. The technologies that 
allow for human survival, instead represent the cumulative endeavors of the dead mixed with 
new innovations of the living. Interdependence, in particular of the technological variety, 
"becomes a partnership not only among those who are living, but among those who are 
living, those who are dead, and those who are to be bom."121 
The ecological balance, however, that allowed for a savage lifestyle and social 
structure would be altered beyond repair as of about 13,000 years ago when a global 
warming trend signaled the beginning of the terminal phase of the last ice age. As the 
climate became less harsh, forests of evergreens and birch invaded the grassy plains, 
nourishing the prey essential to the hunter-gatherer's means of subsistence (Harris). Given 
121 Burke himself, largely due to ignorance of recently discovered anthropological evidence, would probably not 
have made such a case involving "primitive man." In certain discussions of Modern American and European 
thinkers, however, some of this critique along these same lines simply goes too far in its negative treatment. 
Thomas Jefferson, for instance, would note that the sociopolitical arrangements of the American Indians was 
actual superior to that of European Arrangements, and that such a structure allowed the Indians to be generally 
much happier than Europeans. 
113 
these environmental dictates biologically driven concerns of human survival, and 
interdependence evolved abruptly towards a new class-based human era, the agricultural age. 
Barbarism: Agrarianism Begins Class Interdependence 
As a period of global warming began to render hunting moot as a means of survival, 
stationary planting entered the ecological and social fray to provide people with a typical 
means of subsistence. The emergence of agriculture would mean much more to the social 
order than the planting of crops, and peoples becoming more geographically stationary. 
Johan Goudsblom (1996:32-33) noted that the instigation of agriculture led directly to five 
important dominant trends at the societal level of social organization: 
1. Toward an increase in food, and an increase in people; 
2. Toward greater concentrations of food, and greater concentrations of people; 
3. Toward an increasing specialization in the production and consumption of food, 
and an increasing specialization of people; 
4. Toward the growth of organizations allocating greater qualities of food and 
coordinating larger number of peoples over longer distances; 
5. Toward an increasing differentiation of power or "stratification" among people. 
The social incorporation of these "dominant trends" represented one of the most dramatic 
and straightforward cases of biologically/environmentally driven social evolution. The social 
shift consistent with transference from hunting and gathering to agricultural production was 
likely a result of biological necessity, and not a "choice of interest."122 People "chose" to 
lead more stable, less mobile, lives and to grow their subsistence because the choice was 
consistent with the environmental exigencies of the "struggle for existence." Hunting on 
barren plains could have continued, but it would inevitably have lead to the deaths of most 
122 Agriculture does provide a "storage of subsistence," however it is unlikely that this storage was reasoned to 
be worth the trade-off of four-hour workday for that of at least an eight-hour day. Also, as we will see 
agriculture necessarily means discipline and control, it is unlikely that people would have "chosen" an agrarian 
option if they did not have to. 
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hunters who made this valiant attempt. In remaining consistent with the idea of 
interdependence, if many members of the band perished, the survival of the entire band was 
threatened. 
Roughly 12,000 years ago, agriculture addressed the biological "struggle for 
existence" while simultaneously making major alterations, as Goudsblom's five jolting long 
lasting (still existing) social trends suggest, to human social organization and social 
evolution. Biological necessity can serve as a major force "encouraging" the direction of 
social evolution. This is not to suggest that all social interactions and organizations past, 
present, and future, are a closed deterministic matter; only that the aspirations which a people 
might desire to attach with social evolution cannot "play" tug of war with biological 
evolution, at least not for long. It is important to note that, in all likelihood, Goudsblom' s 
dominant social trends were not products of intentional planning. These trends, instead, were 
a "necessary contingency" inescapably chained with the evolving mechanism of human 
social evolution, better understood as interdependence. 
A close review of Goudsblom's third, fourth, and fifth dominant trends suggest that 
specialization associated with the planning, planting, maintenance, and harvest of crops led 
to an increasingly complex set of social relations, and as such the emergence of social 
class. 123 Four major divisions of social class emerged in concert with the agricultural scheme 
of social development: peasant/farmer, artisan/craftsmen, priest/clergy, and warrior. The 
existence of social class distinctions tended to create inevitable situations of material and 
nonmaterial inequality, and thus bred social conflict. Given the conflict associated with the 
123 Recall that the interventionist is concerned with the (re) distribution of wealth from one class to another. 
The interdependence of the hunter-gather created the foundational evolutionary treatment of this argument. As 
class and interdependence is concerned, however, the argument is best to begin with agriculture. 
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inequities of class distinction, why would any people create and maintain a class based social 
order? To reiterate it would be a mistake to assume that the inception of class was an entirely 
"planned" activity; however, the continuance and maintenance of a class based social order 
does entail a certain level of deliberation. The reasons for maintaining a class system 
superseded oppositional concerns with the conflict associated with such a system. The 
function of class based social structures, in other words, outweighed concerns of conflict. 
Perhaps the class conflicts of early and contemporary social structures were and remain the 
inevitable results of socially negotiated and generally accepted functionality. 
The codification of a distinct class based social order was largely a continuance of the 
importance placed upon the notion of interdependence that marked the beginnings of human 
history. Accordingly, class based distinctions within the social order grew out of the function 
associated that these distinctions had in concert with interdependence. Socioeconomic class 
and production deviations therein, came about, and continue to exist, because without 
socially accepted deviation it would be nearly impossible to engage in socially shared 
production. Notice that this functional type argument avoids both teleological and 
tautological fallacies that often plague functionalism. The argument is not that x supports y, 
which in turn supports x, in an eternal free-for-all of circular reasoning. Instead, an open 
ended but evolving sense of interdependence (the language of natural selection translated by 
human society) is best maintained and advanced, when a stationary social structure is 
involved, by the use of a codified class system. 124 Here the distinction between "static" and 
124 This line of thought potentially expressed by the interventionist will sound very dissimilar to a Marxist 
notion that wishes to "transcend class." Either a functionalist or conflict approach could be incorporated into an 
evolutionary argument that seeks to distribute wealth. A functional argument, moreover, as advanced above, 
can formidably and forcefully decry certain gross inequities associated with class struggles. 
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"codified," as applied to social order, is important to note. Static social orders, those in 
which the "role players" are mandated, generally become stale and unproductive quickly. On 
the other hand, codified social orders, those in which the "role rules" are mandated, generally 
encourage enough vitality to spur positive social advancements. 
The Functional Creation of Class 
The creation of social class during the dawn of the agricultural age occurred in 
tangent with the delegation of specific "production roles." A sedimentary, commodity based, 
community that lacks a "consistency of role understanding" will likely fail to produce a life 
supporting level of substance. 125 For instance, envision a small agriculturally based village 
where the residents awake every morning and shortly thereafter meet in the center of the 
village to socially negotiate their "roles for the day."126 Assuming that squabbles over this 
means of social organization would not intensify into the night and postpone the next 
morning's meeting; such a method of dividing labor would be highly unproductive, perhaps 
so unproductive as to challenge biological survival. A peasant/farmer, for the sake of the 
community, had better be apt at planting and harvesting crops, a priest (during the inception 
of agriculture) had better be very good at predicting when to plant crops, and a warrior had 
better be equally as good at defending the crops. Barring a community of "supermen" who 
were equally well-versed in all essential social functions (those functions which are 
necessary for survival), the trajectory of social evolution moved as Goudsblom suggested, 
"toward an increasing specialization in the production and consumption of food, and an 
125 Here questions of dysfunction become secondary to concerns of survival. Conflict within a social order is 
actually only a luxury to be enjoyed after concerns of function have been addressed and decided. 
126 During the Cultural Revolution in China Mao actually attempted to have large industrial facilities function in 
a "pick your role" fashion. This idea failed and Mao regrouped with the idea that each Chinese family would 
smelt their own iron in their backyard. This back-up plan never was brought to fruition. 
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increasing specialization of people." In other words, the well being of the individual is 
increasingly evolving a greater dependence upon the function associated with their class 
expectations. In tum, this dependence of individuals with their class is wrapped around a 
much broader interdependence of social classes. 
The Guidance of the Priest and the Reciprocity of the Peasant 
The influential moral philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche speculated, consistent with his 
skeptical view of (Christianity) religion, that via some form of trickery the priest was able to 
displace the warrior and achieve upper class or "first estate" status, thus implying that the 
warrior originally occupied upper class status. The rise of the priestly class, however, to 
"upper class" status was much more likely not a product of "tricking" the warrior, but instead 
an "understanding of interdependence" based upon guidance and reciprocity between the 
peasant/farmer and the priest. Nietzsche failed to realize that during the inception of human 
agriculture, the function of the warrior was limited, while the function of the priest was 
essential. 
During temple ceremonies in ancient Mesopotamia archeologist Seton Lloyd ( 1996: 
36) described a rather secular purpose of ritualistic sacrifice. 
Their (the Gods) food included bread in large quantities, the meat of sheep or cattle and drink in the 
form of beer, which was greatly favored by the Sumerians. Among provisions listed in later times 
were honey, ghee, fine oil, milk dates, figs, salt, cakes, poultry, fish and vegetables ... The meal of the 
god was technically a banquet to which other deities were invited and at which the human worshippers 
and even the dead might be present. The gods themselves received special parts of the animals, the 
remainder going to the king, the priests and the temple staff (Goudsblom). 
Clearly, wealth ( as represented by a cornucopia of gourmet food) was being distributed from 
the peasant -lower class- to the priest -upper class- through the use of a perceived 
supernatural medium. Thus, an initial instance of class directed material redistribution was 
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not an effort to assist the poor, but was instead a way to support the upper class priest. The 
first cases of poverty welfare were not top-down attempts to help the poor, but instead 
bottom-up offerings of reciprocity. The material benefit accorded the priest is obvious, but 
what social service did the peasant gain materially from the relationship?127 A proper reply 
to this question must recognize that agrarian societies were labor-intensive creatures of 
production and vulnerability. 128 In order to establish an agrarian regime, people needed to 
have knowledge of plants and animals, and the conditions furthering or impeding their 
growth. In other words, the planting of crops must involve human intervention into the blind 
process of natural selection between and within numerous species of plants and animals 
(Goudsblom, 38). Viewed in this manner it would be a mistake, far too frequently made 
today, to understand agriculture as a second hand or natural activity. In fact, nothing could 
be further from the truth. Everything about agriculture must be learned, and in this way the 
priests offered reciprocation to the peasant. 
Agriculture is an endeavor that requires expertise in "extrahuman nature" 
(Goudsblom). The evidence suggests that this was an area in which priests claimed -and to 
some extent also possessed- such expertise. Much literature, for instance, examines the 
"mediating" role of the ancient priest between this world and the next (Goudsblom). Under 
closer examination, however, in many cases this mediation transpired between ordinary 
people and the supernatural notions of weather and the seasons or parasites and pests. 
127 Typically the answer to this question would involve how naturally religious people (peasants) gain freedom 
from supernatural fear or the redemption of their soul. This type of nonmaterially dependent answer is one of 
great assumption and probably not true. 
128 Agriculture is usually thought of as part of a larger industrial or post-industrial division of labor. However, 
in strictly agrarian societies agriculture is not a part, but the entire process surrounding the division of labor. 
For this reason it is not an overstatement to suggest that a crop failure in an agrarian society might have 
triggered death on a massive scale. Being able to succeed with agricultural production meant being able to live. 
In this way production was a necessity and vulnerability sprung from this necessity. 
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Priests retained their class status primarily because their "mediation," and sense of critical 
crop timing, was at least moderately successful. How did the priest manage this feat? 
Most likely priest's success could be attributed to the fact that ancient priests often 
times were entrusted to control and interpret the agrarian calendar. Accordingly, they had to 
register, by observing the position of the sun, moon, and stars, whether the time was ripe for 
certain essential agrarian activities, such as planting or harvesting crops. Without the 
employment of this crucial "timing" function provided by the priest it is doubtful that early 
agrarian societies could have produced even a minimal amount of subsistence. Religion -
worshiping the priest, who in tum worshiped the "stars" that told him when growing and 
harvesting could occur- may or may not have been natural, but it was certainly functional, 
not in the sense of "progress" per-se, but in the sense of survival. 
It would be disingenuous to treat ancient religion as analogous with modern religion. 
The ancient priest made predictions, through a perceived supernatural medium, that were 
meant to be, and often were, realized in a practical human application. In this respect, using 
a "prediction to occurrence" formula, the ancient priest was much easier to understand in a 
modem context as the "first scientist." If the priest used any type of deceit, it was not in 
tricking the warrior, but actualized with "monopolizing the earliest forms of science." In an 
interdependent manner, the peasant revered and supported the priest while the priest made 
"mystical" (scientific) predictions that decreased the vulnerability of agrarian life while 
simultaneously raising production levels. Hence, the contention that guidance marked the 
beginnings of class interdependence; this guidance, it should be noted, existed because it 
helped sparked the mechanism of natural selection as applied toward peoples, class 
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interdependence. It continued to strive, however, because of accepted level of reciprocity 
ensued between the peasant and the priest. 
Interdependence, in the above context, appears to be much more a function of 
"expected reciprocity" than general benevolence. Classes were, and still are, interdependent, 
not necessarily because they believe it offers some sense of a Platonically inspired "good 
life," but instead because they expect their survival to be secured or enhanced by such 
interdependent action. Speculation about motivation is usually frivolous; 129 however, as 
survival is concerned, motivation seemed fairly straightforward. The peasant farmer 
supported the priest and his lavish habits, but the priest had better have properly exercised his 
role of "mediator" between God and crop. Likewise, the priest will predict when the peasant 
ought to plant and harvest crops, but the peasant had better realize this function with lavish 
gifts for the Gods, and leave the leftovers for the priest. 
Class as a Means of Protection 
Two circumstances signaled the general social evolutionary trend away from an 
agrarian based priestly upper class, catapulting the warrior to such high social status. First, 
mystical (scientific) secrets held by priests, solidifying their compulsory social roles, would 
proliferate, far too significantly for the priest to continue the monopolizing "mystic 
knowledge." Second, consistent with Goudsblom second dominant trend, as human 
population density increased, so too did the need to defend agricultural commodities, (not 
surprisingly it is easier to steal food than worry with the regimented and orderly lifestyle 
necessary for producing food.) Thus, in functional terms, social class based interdependence 
129 Evidence from social psychology has never established a strongly statistical relationship between attitude 
and behavior. Actually if anything regarding the literature on the subject is interesting it is that the general 
connection between attitude and behavior is extremely disconnected. 
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would once again undergo evolutionary development. This time, however, it would move 
correspondingly with the tit-for-tat nature of violence best exemplified by the ethos of the 
warrior. Similar to the Hegelian dialectic, as agriculture became more productive, in that it 
was able to support more people, it became, due to an influx of agriculturally supported 
peoples, a lifestyle increasingly vulnerable to violent attacks. The "better" the agricultural 
method, the more incentive there was for thievery, looting, and violence. 130 Moving in 
tangent with an increase of "violence inspired technology"; the monopolization of knowledge 
held by the priest would be unable to compete with the monopolization of violence advanced 
by the warrior. During the outset of agrarianism, as production levels were low, there was 
little incentive to use pilferage as a means of survival. As agricultural methods improved, 
however, pilferage, as opposed to actually working the land, became an ever-increasing 
temptation. 
As it would be a mistake to assume that humans are naturally religious, it would also 
be a mistake to assume that humans are naturally violent or warlike. It is, instead, more 
accurate to presume violence and war serve a particular function, and that this function 
created an increasing amount of interdependence among various social classes. 
Archeological evidence in Mesopotamia, China, and Mesoamerica suggest that the first cities 
were built around temples that apparently were not strongly fortified (Goudsblom). Thus the 
creation of the city, a major social evolutionary event, did not initially entail a strong military 
presence. However, this method of social organization, void an active military presence, 
would prove to be disastrous. The first temples were burned to the ground, and in their place 
130 Hegel argued that every argument contains the seeds of its destruction (dialectic). The case of militant 
agrarian regimes might represent a case were this statement is literally true. The seed of agriculture, if realized 
in its best possible sense leads to its eventual demise. 
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fortified military-style "temples" were erected to ensure that such destruction would not recur 
(Goudsblom). Hence, the professional socially supported "full time" warrior became a 
byproduct of the reaction to the violent booty supported "part time" thieves who preyed upon 
the excess production of vulnerable agricultural regimes. 131 A non-militaristic agrarian 
community was virtually defenseless against bands of thieves unless it could mobilize an 
army of its own. The function of the warrior, therefore, was simply to fight against other 
warriors ( or looters if such a distinction can be made). How could a sociopolitical 
community prevent its means of substance from being looted, and its geographic enclave 
ransacked by violent intruders? The only acceptable answer, consistent with the "struggle for 
existence," demanded a firm response, one the peasant and priest most likely equally held in 
disgust, develop and maintain an upper warrior class with the vital purpose of protecting the 
community. Those in post-industrial society are generally quick to suggest that, "violence 
does not solve anything."132 This sentiment, in the context of protection based class 
interdependent social orders, could not be further from the truth. fu protection-based 
agrarian societies, the ability to combat violence with violence solves "everything" of 
immediate concern. 
Barring any other deterrent, socially supported violence from within a community 
was a functional requisite, because it was the only mechanism that could serve to adjudicate 
violence from outside the community. Social controls from within a community could 
usually prevent and punish internal violence; however, these controls, e.g., shunning, 
131 In these regimes the priest was of great help with increased production, but could do little to deter the innate 
physical vulnerability of the farmer and his crop from roaming violent bands. 
132 The Christian adage "turn the other cheek" would not have been very appealing, or have made very much 
sense, in the age of "Barbarism." Even the religious adages that most take for granted are largely a product of 
"civilization" -representing at most only about a quarter of human history. 
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exclusion, or imprisonment, meant nothing if the bearer of violence had every intent of 
leaving the community after the violent act. Violence instigated from outside the community 
could only be dealt with by violence from inside the community. Only after the success of 
agriculture did the control and use of violence begin to guide social evolution. A violent 
trend that, in one form or another, remains evident to this day. 133 The retention of "violence" 
and protection, should make it clear that as interdependently directed social evolution occurs, 
it would be a mistake to assume that change suggests the elimination of past interdependent 
mechanisms. Guidance and protection as social evolutionary manifestations of class-based 
interdependence have not disappeared. 
The diametric differences between the warrior and the peasant created an ideal 
circumstance for class interdependence. While the peasant farmer was productive and 
vulnerable, the warrior was largely unproductive and destructive. After all, the function of 
the warrior was, and still is, to either destroy or protect from destruction, but never to 
produce. In many ways, the unproductive nature of the warrior lends credibility to a 
functional argument. Warriors were unproductive either because they used brute cohesion to 
force their unproductive will upon the defenseless peasant, or unproductivity was "allowed" 
because a function (protection) enabling the productivity of the peasant was at stake. 
Certainly brute force was always an understood threat; however, the implied threat of 
violence in conjunction with the function of protection was most likely a result of the nature 
of the relationship between peasant and warrior. 
The German historian Alexander Rustow explains the relationship between peasant 
133 If violence replaced knowledge as the mark of interdependence then what if anything in the future can 
replace violence? 
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and the warrior as one of the warrior class "overcasting" agrarian society (Goudsblom, pp. 
57). Hence, an adhesive bond is produced between protector and producer. The peasant 
agreed to feed and support the unproductive warrior on the condition that the warrior would 
protect the peasant and the territory needed to produce subsistence. Interestingly enough, by 
protecting the peasant's wheat, the warrior was, in a direct sense, protecting his own dinner 
as well. All the parts of the system ( distinct social classes) must work together, not because 
they want to, but because they have to if they wish to prevail in the "struggle for existence." 
No one person or small group can successfully grow crops while simultaneously protecting 
those crops from roaming bands of thieves. 134 Only through relying on an integral system of 
interdependent human classes, and their agents therein, can human survival and social 
evolution advance. Once agriculture was introduced into human history, individualism 
necessarily becomes a lesser mechanism of survival than class-based interdependence. 
Recall that in the case of savage societies and guidance based agrarian regimes, 
interdependence meant that survival and development was largely a matter of obtaining skills 
from another and then utilizing these skills in the best possible way. Those unable to learn 
the "skills of survival" would likely perish, and if they did so before they could reproduce 
then Darwinian "natural selection" could certainly have been at work. However, due to the 
nature of the warrior's "fulfillment of the social bargain," this socio biological evolutionary 
trend would evaporate. An upper crust of warriors does not disperse skills instead they offer, 
at best, protection. Individualism, in an evolutionary sense, is rendered almost completely 
134 In an argument that Thomas Hobbes used to defend absolute monarchy, he stresses that whether a social 
order exists does nothing to change the biological fact that Man needs to sleep. Further, our biological make-up 
renders us dependent on others for protection. As such it is better, for Hobbes, that we accept the limitations of 
our biological and embrace social order in whatever form it takes. 
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meaningless if survival, as it did roughly 9,000 years ago, becomes a matter of protection by 
another and not the adaptation and use of survival skills, such as hunting a wholly mammoth 
or planting berries. The increasing complexity of social structure all but assured that social 
evolution would slowly escape meaningful individualistically based influences. The 
individual, consistent with an increasingly complex division of labor and protection, has 
increasingly less unilateral control over his or her survival and condition. Thus, the notion of 
the "struggle for existence" evolves with time, and this evolution has suggested that humans 
do not survive and advance absent a social environment. 
As the protection of the warrior became increasingly important as to become 
crystallized with a system of social class, the "struggle for existence" became largely a 
product of which warriors one chooses, or is able to, align themselves under. 135 This notion 
seems to make the notion of a "struggle for existence" almost completely void of 
individualistic concerns. Why is someone "better," or more suitable to survive, simply 
because they are successfully protected by another? Of course, this choice, a choice 
separating the winners from the dead, is almost entirely a fictitious one. As civilization 
began to emerge, class interdependence (the human translation of natural selection) would 
evolve away from the "transference or guidance of skill" and the ensuing "dependence of 
protection," and move toward the increase of "perceived opportunity." This dominant trend, 
largely mandated by broad structural social changes, would produce the social climate for the 
rise and development of civilization (city dwelling), as well as the "lines of chalk" that would 
135 The choice here is, of course, almost always a false choice. In almost all cases, extending into the present 
day, one is protected by the social system to which they are born. 
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draw the boundaries between nation-states. 
The Emergence of Class Perceived Opportunity 
One of the most serious problems with discussing civilization is that its very 
invocation often erroneously signifies, for many, the beginnings of a "worthwhile," yet 
ambiguous, historical or evolutionary review of human history. Even Merriam Webster's 
(1999: 210) dictionary falls into this trap by defining civilization as, 
A relatively high level of cultural and technological development: the stage of cultural development at 
which writing and the keeping of written records is attained. 
This notion of a "relatively high level," in this context, does not seem to significantly add to 
a definition of civilization. John Dewey (1934:336) expressed the frustration with a 
"dictionary" definition of civilization as he wrote, 
I find that even the dictionary avoids defining the term "civilization." It defines civilization as the state 
of being civilized and "civilized" as being "in a state of civilization." However, the verb "to civilize" 
is defined as "to instruct in the arts of life and thus to raise in the scale of civilization." Instruction in 
the arts of life is something other than conveying information about them. It is a matter of 
communication and participating in values of life by means of the imagination, and works of art are the 
most intimate and energetic means of aiding individuals to share in the arts of living. Civilization is 
uncivil because human beings are divided into non-communicating sects, races, nations, classes, and 
cliques. 
Dewey's account of civilization emphasizes two important thoughts. 1) Civilization is a 
process, which necessarily depends upon a diverse exchange of values, art, and life 
instruction, and 2) it would be wrong to confuse the notion of civil with that of civilization. 
The diverse exchange, mentioned in the above first point, tends to suggest that civilizations 
are involved with a number of activities beyond agrarian production; that such social orders 
are actively transmitting knowledge, skill, and instruction in lieu of an increasing number of 
perceived production opportunities. In conjunction with the second observation Dewey 
argues that the distinction which we create in states of "civilization" actually tend to make 
those within civilization generally more uncivil. In other words, by producing the in-groups 
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that best help advance our perceived opportunities a paradox is created wherein the 
development of out-groups becomes a natural by-product of such "advancement." Thus the 
more civilized our social environment becomes the move uncivil we tend to treat those 
members of society whom do not happen to occupy the niche which we perceive as 
benefiting our sphere of opportunity. Perhaps in this fashion, generally the more advanced 
civilization becomes the more uncivil out-groups, i.e. lower social classes, are treated, i.e., as 
h . 1· I f . 136 avmg 1tt e or no unction. 
It seems best to think of civilization as the relative time period, which signified that 
non-agrarian based labor options became available or, more aptly put as the idea of perceived 
opportunity suggest, were believed to have become available. No longer was agrarianism the 
only lifestyle "choice." Before the advent of a social structure complex enough to support 
the diversities of city life, class based interdependence was an easily observable phenomena, 
as it was necessarily linked directly with agricultural production. With the complexities 
associated with a civilized -or city based- social order, it becomes more difficult to observe 
the direct interdependence of class. 137 This difficult, nonetheless, can be overcome by an 
appeal to what Emile Durkheim coined the transition away from "mechanic solidarity" and 
towards "organic solidarity." At this juncture it should be clear that for whatever civilization 
might signify it does not represent the beginnings of meaningful human history or social 
136 The ideas become very difficult at this point when speaking about civilization in terms of a large 
conglomerate, it is not. Civilization, is instead, a collaboration of historical processes. Such processes cannot 
tend to produce a common understanding of "perceived opportunity," different ideological underpinnings will 
treat various notions of "perceived opportunities" differently. 
137 This is a reason why beginning a social evolutionary discourse with the notion of "civilization" is usually not 
advantageous for the interventionist. 
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evolutionary trends. Civilization, 138 in fact, as a social order and distinct stage of social 
evolution, could only come about only after the development and maturity of both savagery 
and barbarism. 139 
Mechanical solidarity, for Durkheim (1972: 139), occurs, "In societies where were 
this type of (interdependent) solidarity is highly developed, the individual is not his own 
master, and as we shall see later; solidarity is, literally something which the society possess." 
The social conditions of mechanical solidarity would seem to mark a level of adherence and 
discipline necessary to effectively operate an early agrarian regime. Mechanical solidarity, 
however, becomes increasingly less necessary as the opportunities provided by an expanding 
division of labor lead to more autonomous social beings. As Durkheim (1972: 8) defined 
organic solidarity, 
Organic solidarity thus consists in the ties of co-operation between individuals or groups of individuals 
which derive from their occupational interdependence within the differential division of labor. ... The 
term "organic" solidarity is used to stress that the organization of developed societies resembles the 
structures of an advanced organism, in which the functioning of the organism depend upon the 
reciprocal relationships which the various specialized organs of the body have with each other .... The 
removal of an organ will hamper the workings of the body, or even put an end to its existence 
altogether. 
138 The early sedentary settlements established patterns for future civilizations in Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, 
and Africa. The levels of specialization and political organization present in the towns were critical to new 
inventions and techniques appearing in the fourth millennium BCE. The plow increased crop yields; wheeled 
vehicles eased transport. Bronze replaced copper and stone in weapon and tool production. Writing in 
Mesopotamia and other later civilizations permitted expanding trading networks and enlarged bureaucracies. 
All allowed the growth of larger nonagricultural populations. The isolations of the American peoples prevented 
the new technology from reaching them. They remained isolated from the rest of the world until the sixteenth 
century (Pearson education online). 
This very parsimonious treatment of civilization allows for a number of insightful generalizations. 
One, early agricultural settlements established during the eras of guidance and protection were necessary for the 
establishment of civilization. Two, civilization is a social order based upon the dual realization of both 
"deagrarianism" and an increased specialization of task. Three, different types of technologies were created in 
order to facilitate the changes in both individual task and accompanying social schema. Geographic isolation is 
an important contributing factor, which might well slow the spread of forces that serve to underpin civilization. 
139 By suggesting that civilization is part of a larger process supporting the maturity and development of both 
savagery and barbarism I do not mean to suggest that this process must be understood as "good." 
129 
The idea here is of tremendous assistance to the interventionist when trying to explain the 
mechanism of class interdependence in civilization. Increased opportunities within a social 
structure able to support Durkheim's organic solidarity serve to increase, not decrease, the 
level of interdependence among various social classes. Only with the "creation" of more 
diverse opportunities does this interdependence become more difficult to orchestrate. Using 
Durkheim's organic analogy we might suggest that, as matters of social structure are 
concerned, human social evolution has not always been equally complex, i.e. the organism 
used in any analogy to describe social evolution is not merely evolving in terms of life stages 
from birth until death, but transforming from a simple to a more complex organism. 
The mere invocation of the term, city is likely to create within many a diverse set of 
passionate sentiments. The city can be busy, dirty and unsafe, while at the same time it is the 
hub of innovation and change. When thinking about "city life," however, and how is has 
served to shape civilization it is best to appreciate what the city accomplishes, as opposed to 
merely the multitude of social problems that result from the increased aggregation of 
individuals within the city. The social organization of a city allows for a highly specialized 
division of labor, from this occurrence two important social consequences arise. First, social 
stratification within a city reaches levels that would likely be dysfunctional within a rural 
sparsely populated (mechanical) environment. Second, and more to the point of 
understanding what a city adds to social evolution, Rowe (1900: 722) argued: 
The close association of city life first makes possible the division of labor, and with such division of 
labor comes increased productive power. Every advance in productive power creates new wants and 
involves new possibilities of enjoyment. 
Rowe then explains the positive results attached with this division of labor and increased 
production power, "Throughout the history of civilization we can readily trace the close 
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relation between the aggregation of population and the development of the arts and sciences." 
Without a complex division of labor each person or small unit of people must spend their 
time directly fulfilling the needs associated with the "struggle for existence." In tandem with 
a complex division of labor, however, individuals who occupy various social classes may 
work towards extremely diverse goals, while at the same time inadvertently support the 
"struggle for existence" for other social members. 
The advent of the city ( civilization) creates the groundwork for the shift from 
mechanic to organic solidarity. As this shift occurs, however, the linkage of interdependence 
among the various social classes becomes one of perceived opportunity. Lower 
socioeconomic classes perceive an opportunity to move away from a regimented agrarian 
lifestyle and find more "chances of diverse labor selection" in the city. The term perceived is 
used here because often these "chances" are often unrealistic "hopes." Upper socioeconomic 
classes, consequently, perceive the opportunity to become what Veblen coined the "leisure 
class." These dual perceptions of opportunity, while vastly distinct, stress a strong degree of 
class interdependence. In civilization the poor perceive the rich as providing them with the 
opportunity for multiple forms of labor, they -the rich- provide them -the poor- with their 
bread. The rich understand the poor to be providing them with their means of leisure. The 
relationship is, strangely, one based upon interdependence. 140 Such a relationship did not 
occur absent an imputes. There are no natural mechanisms that suggest certain people or 
classes will necessarily have lower expectations than others. How did this strange difference 
in perceived opportunity come about? An answer will not be elaborated here, but consider 
140 Here it is important to look at who controls the discourse of "Who Deserves What." Consider the 
ideological tones of the leisure class as they argue that, "we are providing the poor with jobs and opportunity." 
It is rarely argued the opposite way; that is the poor are providing the rich with their leisure. 
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the likelihood that power differentials beginning first with guidance extended through 
protection and resulting with perceived opportunity likely helped shape contemporary 
notions of "expected opportunity." Social classes are interdependent, and the cumulative 
historical effect (social evolution) of this interdependence has formed the basis for 
contemporary discourses regarding "poverty welfare." 
Summing Up the Argument 
For the interventionist "complex interdependence" is abound in the modern world. 
Almost every possession of the typical twenty-first century American was mass-produced by 
technologies representing the ingenuity of hundreds, if not thousands, of successive 
generations. These very possessions, moreover, were most often mass-produced in a process 
involving scores of laborers. Contemporary American interdependence, however, does not 
cease with material possessions. For instance, one gets sick and goes to the doctor; needs 
protection and calls the police, uses the internet or goes to the library to find possible answers 
to a vexing question, and the list could continue almost indefinitely. With so many avenues 
and extensions of interdependence, the complexities of which make class the appropriate unit 
of analysis, the question rightfully becomes, what does the "lone individual" actually 
autonomously accomplish? The interventionist is quite happy to answer this question using 
an immense amount of cumulative historical knowledge with a scream of nothing, and feel 
quite confident that the contrarian will have a formidable task in challenging this one word 
answer. 
The giving of poverty welfare is typically viewed as a process whereby the upper 
classes give money to financially support the lower classes. I suggest, however, that when a 
broad historical -social evolutionary view- is taken the lower classes have, for the most part, 
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"supported" the upper classes. 141 This support, however, has existed with the mandate of 
past interdependent class-based relationships. Understood in this fashion Veblen's 
distinction between the "industrious" and "leisure" class is insightful. There exists no class-
based integrated understanding of "Who Deserves What." The question, while being 
fundamental, is answerable, in its present understanding, only in the context of the 
"industrious"/"leisure" dichotomy. 142 It is simply wrong to suggest that the "marketplace" 
unilaterally addresses the question of "Who Deserves What," nothing intrinsic to the market 
dictates that the industrious laborer live in squalor while the bond clipping millionaire in 
luxury. These conditions are agreed upon, they are not determined. We control the 
"marketplace," it does not control us! And in this spirit, social evolutionary arguments may 
rightly be used to justify a sociopolitical community's decision to aid the poor. 
141 This "support," however, has been reciprocated with functional sorts of activities, i.e., guidance and 
protection. Nonetheless, it would seem that as social evolution "advances" this reciprocation has become less 
and less functional. 
142 This dichotomous treatment is, of course, too cut and dry, i.e., there are rich who are industrious and there 
are poor who live in leisure. Veblen's treatment, however, is useful enough in challenging the domain 
assumptions often associated with "poverty welfare." 
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CHAPTER 8. THE CONTRARIAN REBUTTAL 
Contrarian Thought Examined 
The contrarian, while unlikely to deny the historical establishment of class 
interdependence, takes issue with poverty welfare as the proper form of reciprocity in the 
current relationship among the social classes. Social evolution has "made" certain social 
classes what they are and what degree of material they posses, why should a sociopolitical 
community (government) make any attempt to alter or displace class divisions hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of generations in the making? The interventionist's answer of reciprocity 
is not sufficient justification for the contrarian. Similarly, to the interventionist, the 
contrarian adheres to a series of principles meant to form a clear and adhesive bond attaching 
social evolutionary arguments with a corresponding stance toward poverty welfare. The 
contrarian's stance, of course, uses the derivatives of these arguments to justify the exclusion 
or removal of poverty welfare as a viable sociopolitical option. 
Contrarian arguments can generally be reduced to the following categories: (1) 
competitive individualism, as opposed to group cooperation, best describes the process of 
social evolution and advancement. This argument typically places a heavy emphasis upon 
the "great" accomplishments of a few exceptional people, and downplays any importance of 
the masses. As will be explored, Friedrich Nietzsche greatly subscribed to, and expanded, 
this line of thought. Thus the "herd," as Nietzsche referred to the masses, deserve nothing 
from the rich nobleman. Any attempt to "take" from the rich is an act of jealously and 
hatred. (2) Money and morality are somehow integrally connected; i.e. the poor are by 
definition immoral. The poor have only themselves to blame for their present condition, and 
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poverty welfare can only (immorally) denigrate any positive developments of social 
evolution. Accordingly, giving poverty welfare to the poor will only encourage their 
immorality. Thomas Chambers made zealous attempts to collaborate accounts of morality 
with an individualist account of social evolutionism. William Hanna (1862: 384), for 
instance, would cite a February 7, 1811 letter written by Chambers as stating: 
It is quite vain to think that positive relief will ever do away with the wretchedness of poverty. Carry 
the relief beyond a certain limit, and you foster the diseased principle which gives birth to poverty .... 
The remedy against the extension of pauperism does not lie in the liberalities of the rich; it lies in the 
hearts and habits of the poor. Plant in their bosoms a principle of independence - give a high tune of 
delicacy to their character - teach them to recoil from pauperism as a degradation. 
(3) A dominant trend of determinism (anti-action) runs through a great deal of contrarian 
thought. Consistent with this tend, the implication is often advanced that social reform, i.e. 
poverty welfare, will inevitably fail because such reform is engaged in a hopelessly waged 
antagonistic struggle with an opposing "natural non-reform way." Reform, therefore, in its 
opposition to the natural way of social evolution, while often good intentioned, will simply 
never achieve the anticipated result. ( 4) Last, the contrarian might advance the argument that 
government has evolved into an "organization not to be trusted," and consistently has no 
business deciding, "Who Deserves What."143 Consider, for instance, the way in which 
classical American writer Henry David Thoreau describes receiving help from others, "If I 
knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing 
me good, I should run for my life"(Bay, pp. 96). Thoreau's point is expressive of the strong 
143 This fourth position is likely the least effective in the contrarian's arsenal. I would suggest, as was earlier 
considered in note31, that this view is dependent upon how "government" is understood. The important 
distinction being either "us" or "them." I would suggest that in contemporary United States culture the later has 
somehow become much more prevalent. 
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mid-nineteenth century American transcendentalist movement. 144 This movement stressed 
the positive aspects of nature as well as the ability of the individual to "transcend" concerns 
of a social structure. Accordingly, people have evolved beyond concerns of interdependence, 
which plagued their ancestors. Thus social evolution has advanced "beyond 
interdependence"; and "good doers" wrapped in "kindness" not realizing this "truth of social 
advancement" are to be feared. 
John Locke as an Alternative to Edmond Burke 
The force of Edmond Burke's notion of social compact, and the importance he 
attached with social relations, is not lost on the contrarian. If people are indeed, "a number 
of vague loose individuals and nothing more," absent a social structure to allow meaning in 
life, then the reciprocity of interdependent social classes appears to be sensible. Competition, 
even within Burke's system, could readily occur, but only after some sort of cooperative 
social organization had been established. Thus the position of the contrarian becomes a 
secondary or tertiary concern. Moreover, if we adhere to Burke's understanding of social 
creation, cooperation and sociability -as opposed to competition and individuality- are the 
logical pillars underpinning social evolutionism. This appreciation becomes important as we 
consider the practical logistics of mandated poverty welfare. After all, the state is playing 
Robin Hood. A sociopolitical community, of course, ought to have the force backing a 
decision to mandate poverty welfare, if the advent of such a community is a necessary 
144 Both Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson would, through literature, extol the benefits of individuality and 
self-reliance. Thus strongly encouraging the American value schema to place "rugged individualism" over that 
of the lesser notion of "solidarity or cooperation." Thoreau, (1849) in fact, opens the influential Civil 
Disobedience the following way, "I heartily accept the motto, -- "That government is best which governs least;" 
and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, 
which I also believe, -- "That government is best which governs not at all;" and when men are prepared for it, 
that will be the kind of government which they will have. 
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condition of a meaningful (individual or social) existence. The contrarian cannot, unless they 
wish to abandon their argument, allow such an understanding of social creation to be applied 
towards social evolutionism, the logical extensions hinting towards poverty welfare are 
simply too strong. The contrarian, therefore, uses the thought of John Locke to rebut the 
conception of social creation and sociability offered by Burke. 
Locke recorded his arguments regarding the characteristics of people, absent a social 
order, amidst a concern of the "absolute state." 145 If everything worthwhile arrives from the 
state -"the solidification of the social"-, then what reason could be given for curtailing any 
state action?146 Locke sought to argue that everything worthwhile does not arrive from the 
advent of social relations, and as such, at times, individualistic claims might be held to 
supersede the will of the state. The implication is, of course, that certain individualistic 
claims might warrant a curtailment of the good intentions sought by the interventionist. As 
Waldron (1994:54) maintained, 
Locke's opposition to absolutism is based on the idea that government is founded on individual 
consent and that there are clear limits on what individuals will or may give consent to. "A rational 
create cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into subjection to another, for his own harm." 
What then, for Locke, exists prior to the "social," and what type of individualistic claims 
might supersede the will of a sociopolitical community? It is found in the answers to these 
145 Notice that for the differences we can rightfully point out separating the thought of Burke and Locke a 
glaring similarity is apparent in both. Both thinkers were devising arguments that warranted their respective 
ideological stance toward present concerns of sociopolitical structure. Burke, was more than happy to develop a 
system of thought, which led logically to the exclusion of rebellion as a viable option. Locke, on the other 
hand, devised a system of thought, which gave people reason to challenge the notion of an absolute 
Monarchical system of governance. I will stress again that the connection between ideology, thought, and 
theory is much more closely linked than many are willing to admit. 
146 Thomas Hobbes argued that short of the "open killing" of citizens the answer is, and ought to be, nothing. 
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concerns that the contrarian might best begin the support of their position. 
Locke (1997: 218) argued that before the existence of a discernible social order there 
existed a "state of nature" wherein, 
All men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of 
their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking 
leave or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than the 
creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and 
use of the same facilities, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or 
subjection. 
Thus it was quite possible in Locke's view to imagine a "state of nature" in which all people 
enjoyed a high degree of freedom, and an almost certain degree of equality. Locke had a 
ready response for those who argued his conception of a "state of nature" was pure fantasy. 
As Waldron (1994: 59-60) noted a likely reply from Locke, 
Government is everywhere antecedent to records, and letters seldom some in amongst a people, till a 
long continuation of civil society has, by other more necessary arts provided for their safety, ease, and 
plenty. The result is that civil societies, like human individuals, are commonly ignorant of their own 
births and infancies. Therefore, it is not at all at all to be wondered that history (in the sense of 
historical records) gives us but little account of Men, that lived together in the state of nature. 
Yet, although Locke appears to accept both the factual accuracy and the positive aspects of 
the "state of nature," he does realize how such a state might prove disadvantageous. 
Freedom and equality, on their face, seem to be positive virtues (a face which sees only 
through the lens of a social environment); however, too much freedom -absolute freedom-
merely suggests one can "do" whatever they wish. Surely this is not always for the best of 
either the individual engaging in freedom, or those around him. Absolute equality, likewise, 
tends to suggest that in a "state of nature" men become the "judge of their own case," and 
accordingly accounts of justice (and punishment therein) are as diverse as bodies to hold 
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them. Acts of retribution, within a "state of nature," become the responsibility of the 
"wronged" individual. Thus while the "state of nature" was much more, for Locke, than a 
"number of vague loose individuals," it nonetheless was far from representing an 
advantageous social order. 
Given considerations of the degree to which freedom and equality were present in a 
"state of nature," Locke speculated that this state could quickly become a "state of war." As 
Locke (1997: 222) maintained, 
The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: And therefore declaring by word or action, not a 
passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man's life. Puts him in a state of war 
with him whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power to 
be taken away by him, or any one that joints with him in his defense, and espouses his quarrel: it being 
reasonable and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction. 
This passage suggests that asocial beings might have existed in a "state of nature" - before a 
codified social structure. This existence, however, was easily interrupted by the absolute 
freedom of one or some in the system challenging the life of others, i.e., creating a "state of 
war." This occurrence, surely, happens within contemporary modem nation-states, the 
difference being that currently, under normal circumstances, if an individual decides to begin 
a "state of war" they will have to contend with the sanctions set by socially designated 
authorities. It is, indeed, states that cannot offer such sanction and authority that are 
commonly referred to as "in a state of chaos." Due to the tension created between the "state 
of nature," and the "state of war" Locke (1997: 223) concluded, 
To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least 
difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one of the 
great reason's of men's putting himself into society, and quitting the state of nature. 
Notice the telling language Locke used to describe exiting the "state of nature." Man has the 
option of quitting such a state. Burke, on the other hand, with his understanding of the "state 
of nature" as nothing more than an abstraction, would have seen such an option as illogical. 
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Quitting, a designated social structure, is a calculated activity that must involve an analysis of 
costs and benefits, for Burke, such a calculation becomes an absurdity when man is 
considered in a "state of nature," a state Burke might have labeled "the phantom state." 
How then would one, or a group, go about "quitting" the "state of nature?" Locke 
( 1997: 221) suggested that quitting the "state of nature" must involve consent, "all men are 
naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves 
members of some politic society." Accordingly, for Locke, natural rights precede the 
creation of the state or any benefits derived thereof. Moreover, Locke extends this argument 
by suggesting that such consent is, likely rationally given, because men in the "state of 
nature" accept that the rule of a sociopolitical body can protect their natural rights of life, 
liberty, and property, better than the dictates of the ever shifting "states of nature and war." 
Thus the "social" would not exist, for Locke, if it were not socially accepted -and consented 
upon- that life, liberty, and property could be better protected within a system of codified 
governance. Social evolution, therefore, is best advanced when the agreed upon 
sociopolitical community makes their first priority the protection of life, liberty, and 
property. Absent this "first priority," Locke suggested, people might well be better suited to 
take their chances in the "state of nature." 
While this listing of natural rights -life, liberty, and property- is open too wide 
latitudes of interpretation, notice that "reform" is strikingly absent from this list of rights. 
Consistently, the contrarian emphasizes the governmental responsibility to protect property, 
i.e., money. Further, by mandating that some people (classes) make some of their wealth 
available to other people (classes) the charge is leveled that government, in tum, is wrongly 
reneging on a primary duty (protection of property), in order to "decide" the secondary 
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matter of poverty welfare. While all the arguments cannot be exhausted here, it is 
appropriate to conclude that Locke could be read to discourage the act of poverty welfare. 
Such a reading might suggests that consent to quit the "state of nature" would not have 
occurred if the government created therein took property from some as a way to alleviate the 
poverty of others. This notion is no less controversial than Burke's conception of the social 
contract, but it represents the best starting place for the contrarian. 
Nietzsche and the "Will to Power" 
The late nineteenth century German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, expressed an 
odd configuration of diversely scattered thought. Most of what he considered a consistent 
pattern of thought, many observers have scrutinized as contradictory or worse hypocritical. 147 
He, for instance, held staunchly conservative aristocratic values -advocating what he saw as 
a clear delineation between "strong" and "weak," while at the same time strongly supporting 
the postmodern notion that truth is nothing but an illusion. In many ways Nietzsche's 
perspectivism formed the underpinnings for what is now contemporary post-modernism. 
Nietzsche was not a social evolutionist per se. He did, however, use historical/evolutionary 
arguments in a limited fashion to suggest that Christianity and Modernity were the dual 
sources that most threatened any potential real meaning attached with life. Many of his 
arguments, nonetheless, speak directly to points of contention that the contrarian might raise 
with the interventionist. His thought, in other words, can quickly become part of an 
evolutionary argument. 
The interventionist, as well as many contemporary Americans, takes as given that 
generally: a democratic sociopolitical environment is for the best, reciprocity within 
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interdependent relations is clearly a good, and helping others in need is not only admirable, 
but also indicative of advancements in social evolution. Through a variety of strategies, 
Nietzsche takes aim at each of these assumptions, and concludes that they constitute nothing 
more than the dominance of Christianity and the unfortunate rejection of the "will to power." 
Nietzsche's thought is extremely complex, and its richness cannot be captured in a few 
pages; however the following points are strategies that might be given force by the 
contrarian. ( 1) His treatment of the "will to power," (2) treatment of Christianity and 
Christian virtues, (3) the evolution of morality, and the distinction between master (noble) 
and slave (herd) morality. The purpose of this presentation is not to suggest that the 
contrarian would utilize all of these Nietzschean notions to justify the exclusion of poverty 
welfare. The contrarian, however, is apt to minimally take pieces of the above arguments as 
an initial step in challenging the interventionist. For whatever might be said, and many 
things could, to lambaste Nietzsche's thought one thing is for certain, it is extremely, and 
increasingly, influential. For this reason it deserves our attention here. 
For Nietzsche, human struggle is largely wagged between competing "wills" -namely 
the "will to power," and the "will to truth." The latter is a figment of the imagination, a 
creation the weak "invented" to escape the strength of the former. As Nietzsche ( 1977: 226) 
observed, 
And you too, enlightened man, are only a path and footstep of my will: truly, my will to power walks 
with the feet of your will to truth! He who shot the doctrine of "will to existence" at truth certainly did 
not hit the truth: this will - does not exist! For what does not exist cannot will; but that which is in 
existence, how could it still want to come into existence? Only where life is, there is also will: not will 
to life, but-so I teach you- will to power! The living creature values many things higher than life 
itself; yet out of this evaluation itself speaks -the will to power! 
147 See Peter Gay's introduction to Walter Kaufmann' s Basic Writings of Nietzsche (2000; New York) 
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Admittedly, Nietzsche's style of writing (typically in somewhat confusing aphorisms), as 
with many of his German cohort, is difficult to decipher. This difficulty, however, is not 
insurmountable. Further, once Nietzsche is better understood his thought is reducible to 
some quite simple assertions -this more than any other reason suggests his immense 
contemporary popularity. Nietzsche argued that people naturally strive to gain power, and if 
necessary dominate others, i.e. the will to power. Thus within each of us exists a "will to 
power," which is intrinsic to our very nature. 
Further, Nietzsche utilized the tragic view of life expressed by the Ancient Greeks to 
demonstrate that power, more than any other will, is the true expression of human 
existence. 148 The "will to power," on its face, does not appear to be very controversial (it is 
indeed the way in which many view savage society), it becomes controversial as Nietzsche 
agues that man does not, and cannot, evolve beyond such a will. It was present in the first 
man, and will remain in the last. The "will to power" lingers within us, and there can be no 
evolving past its grip. The interventionist talk of cooperation and reciprocity, in the name of 
poverty welfare, is a denial of the "will to power," a corruption of human nature. The 
interventionists, therefore, good intentions or otherwise does nothing but advance a position 
that can only corrupt our nature of power and domination. If people cannot find a way to get 
what they need on their own -through an exercise of power, then perhaps they should not get 
it at all. 
Why then is helping others (intervening on their behalf) generally viewed as a good? 
Nietzsche suggests that an answer can be found in the European acceptance and spread of 
148 In Nietzsche's doctoral dissertation, The Birth of Tragedy, he examined the tense struggle between 
Apollonian reason and Dionysian impulse. The attempt is then advanced to carry this tragic Greek struggle to 
an analysis of Modern (late nineteenth century) German culture. 
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Christianity and Christian virtues. 149 Christianity professes a "will to truth" in kindness, 
mutual aid, and "turning the other cheek." All values which, if practiced in their full, offer 
an easy alternative to the "will to power." Nietzsche offers two reasons why the masses -or 
the herd as he calls them- might opt for the false "will to truth" as opposed to the naturally 
intrinsic "will to power." First, the weak will always detest the "will to power" because they 
can never gain it. Second, Christianity offers the "herd" an appealing reason to hate that 
which life is, a "will to power." Thus a denial of the "will to power," best exemplified 
through Christianity, represents, for Nietzsche, a hatred for what life best represents -a tragic 
struggle. As Nietzsche (2000: 23) suggested, 
Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with life 
merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as faith in another or better life. Hatred of "the 
world," condemnations of the passions, fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond invented to better 
slander this life, at bottom a craving for the nothing for the end, for respite, for the Sabbath of 
Sabbaths ... at the very least a sign of abysmal sickness, weariness, discouragement, exhaustion, and 
the impoverishment of life. 
Christian values, i.e. reciprocity, and kindness, (values not lost on the interventionist), 
therefore, constitute a hatred for life. Life is tragic; poverty, social ills, and death are but 
parts of life's tragedy. These social ills are only intrinsically bad, for Nietzsche, if 
accordingly life is understood as bad. For Nietzsche, if we are to love life we must also 
appreciate its tragic quality. Using this logic the contrarian could argue that the 
interventionist is trying to do the impossible, alleviate life itself. Poverty is not to be fixed; it 
is instead a tragic condition that must be embraced if life is to appreciated. Thus, social 
evolution, if it is to include any particular ethos, suggests finding ways to advance the "will 
to power," not trying to alleviate the hardships of others. 
149 By introducing this line of reason I do not intend to equate, in every case, the interventionist with the 
Christian. 
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A rejection of the "will to power" comes about only after the "herd" establishes its 
own moral code. As Nietzsche (1977: 102) plainly stated, "Morality is the herd instinct in 
the individual." Such an instinct comes about only after the "will to power" within the 
individual becomes displaced by a communal "herd-like" mentality. Thus as Nietzsche 
(1977: 94-5) maintained, 
What is wanted -whether it is admitted or not- is nothing less than a fundamental remolding, indeed 
weakening and abolition of the individual: one never tires of enumerating and indicting all that is evil 
and inimical, prodigal, costly, extravagant in the form individual existence has assumed hitherto, one 
hopes to manage more cheaply, more safely, more equitably, more uniformly if there exists only large 
bodies and their members. 
The displacement of individuality is synonymous with the taking of the "will to power." 
Morality becomes, for Nietzsche, the act of following custom. Following custom, however, 
becomes an act inspired by function. As such, the function of the "herd" becomes -
especially with the advent of Christianity- to engage in what Nietzsche labels "slave 
morality." In describing "slave morality" Nietzsche (1977: 108) extrapolated, 
Suppose the absurd, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those uncertain of themselves should mobilize: what 
would their moral evaluations have in common? Probably a pessimistic mistrust of the entire situation 
of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man together with his situation. The slave is 
suspicious of the virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical and mistrustful, keenly mistrustful of 
everything "good" that is honored among them - he would like to convince himself that happiness 
itself is not genuine among them. 
Thus the weak, unable to practice the "will to power," have devised a system of morality -
"slave morality" - which serves to make "good" a function of weakness, and "evil" a function 
of power. The weak can never gain power; therefore, they despise the power and comfort 
that accompany the strong and noble. To act in any other way would be in opposition to the 
nature of the weak. As Nietzsche ( 1977: 115) argued, 
To require of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a desire to 
conquer, a desire to subdue, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistance and 
triumphs, is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength. 
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Most of Nietzsche's thought would be unable to find an approving audience in 
contemporary America; it is difficult to form a collective base when your thought revolves 
around the dismissal and condemnation of the collective as "herd." Nonetheless, his 
emphasis upon, individuality, strength, and will is attractive to many, even if they must read 
such notions away from the prying eyes of others. When the poor are seen as weak, they are 
simultaneously viewed as "drags on the system," or a hindrance to the advancement of all. 
The question "Who Deserves What," for Nietzsche, becomes answered, with the response, he 
who can muster the power to gain it. This power becomes the basis for the competitive 
individualistic ethos of the contrarian. Herbert Spencer was one such contrarian not afraid to 
add a dose of evolutionary moralism with Nietzsche's individualistic "will to power." 
Herbert Spencer: The Apex of "Evolutionary Individualism" 
It would not be an over-statement to suggest that, absent the thought of Herbert 
Spencer the contrarian position as defined within the parameters of this thesis would scarcely 
exist. One might, of course, for any number of reasons, complain about poverty welfare, but 
this complaint becomes reasonably wrapped within an evolutionary framework only after 
Spencerian thought served to include individualistic sentiment as a correlate of social 
evolutionism. Social evolutionists, such as those we have already examined, are typically 
quick to emphasize the collectivist implications of evolutionary arguments, i.e., the species 
evolves through collective, as opposed to individualistic mechanisms. Spencer, on the other 
hand, used his brand of social evolutionism to support: extreme individualism, laissez faire 
economics, the abolishment of "poor laws" (the equivalent of the expression "poverty 
welfare"), and the general restriction of most governmental intervention. The late nineteenth 
century American thinker Oliver Wendell Holmes placed Spencer's intellectual influence 
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second only to Darwin when he expressed his doubt that, "Any writer of English except 
Darwin has done so much to affect our whole way of thinking about the universe (Hofstadter, 
1992; 32)." The respect afforded to Spencer's evolutionary synthesis allowed him to 
lambaste the interventionist. As Spencer (1868: 354) argued: 
Spurious philanthropists who, to prevent present, would entail greater misery on future generations. 
Blind to the fact that under the natural order of things society is constantly excreting its unhealthy, 
imbecile, slow, vacillating faithless members ... in their eagerness to prevent the really-salutary 
sufferings that surround us, these sigh-wise and groan-foolish people bequeath to posterity a 
continually-increasing curse. 
Spencer came as close to a real representation of the contrarian as any "popular" thinker ever 
has. How did Spencer brilliantly blend social evolutionism with an exceptionally harsh 
treatment of poverty welfare? The answer, as will be explored, is dependent upon the 
individualistic telos of Spencer's social evolutionary system. It is important to remember as 
suggested by Hofstadter (1992: 35-6), "His (Spencer's) social ideas are intelligible only in 
the setting of his philosophy; his social laws were but special cases of his general principles." 
As valiantly as it might be attempted, the breach of Spencer's evolutionary synthesis with his 
social thought is a battle to be waged in frustration. Spencer's contrarianism exists only 
because of his larger evolutionary synthesis, or visa-versa, but in either event they are 
separable only at the risk of misunderstanding his evolutionary synthesis. 
Spencer was born (1820) in a small brick house on the outskirts of Derby, England. 
Spencer's early childhood involved a strain of intellectual and religious influences. His 
mother, a devote Methodist, would regularly take young Spencer to Sunday religious service. 
Spencer's father, on the other hand, had decided to leave the Methodist church, and attend-
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less supernaturally inclined- Quaker meetings. 150 Instead of being absolutely pulled in one of 
these directions, Spencer was socialized into both, very different, spiritual settings -provided 
the Quaker meetings he attended with his father involved much more intellectual 
conversation than religious proselytizing. Later in his life while compiling his autobiography 
(1904) Spencer would speak glowingly about his father's influence, and give only scarce 
mention to his mother. For whatever else socialization agents produced in Spencer 
childhood, they certainly created an extremely individualistic and non-conformist young 
man. At age thirteen, for instance, Spencer was sent to live with his Uncle, and attend Hilton 
Charterhouse in Somerset. After three days, however, a disgruntled Spencer decided to leave 
with no money and little food. After three days of near-continuous walking he arrived home 
in Derby. This incident was to set the indignant and individualistic tone prominent in the 
whole of Spencer's thought. 
Spencer's three-day march back towards Derby did not produce his desired effect. 
He was sent back to Somerset, were he would continue his study of: Euclid geometry, Latin, 
French, Greek, trigonometry, mechanics, chemistry, and political economy, until he was 
sixteen. At the age of sixteen Spencer would cease formal schooling, and take a job serving 
as an engineer for the railroad. When the voluminous quantity, quality, and breath of 
Spencer's work is considered, it is astounding that his formal schooling ended before his 
seventeenth birthday. Spencer's lack of academic credentials produced both positive and 
negative consequences for the treatment of his work. While he gained a great deal of popular 
respect, large potions of his works were strenuously critiqued in academic circles -perhaps a 
150 These meetings were often frequented by some of the most respected thinkers in England. For instance, 
Spencer, in his early adolescence, would meet and discussed issues of the day with Erasmus Darwin -Charles 
Darwin's grandfather. 
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greater deal of critique than a fellow colleague would have endured. In particular, the 
American pragmatist William James -Professor at Harvard- would devote countless lectures 
to the thrashing of Spencer's work. Apparently Spencer's feeling towards academics was 
mutual. He rarely used academic sources in his writings, and when he did most were 
references to obscure thinkers. Further, when Spencer did read the thoughts of others he 
usually found them, as in his reading of Kant, to be "rubbish" (Kaldenberg). Spencer's 
distance from academia, however, gave him a considerable amount of intellectual sway with 
those skeptical of academics and intellectualism. If a profound social theorist such as 
Spencer had no need for higher education, then what good was it to anyone? Spencer did not 
need the government for education, and he used his self-sufficient style of learning to argue 
against the intervention of government into the education of its citizens. Spencer (1868: 366-
7), for instance, would argue: 
Legislators exhibit to us the design and specification of a state-machine, made up of masters, ushers, 
inspectors, and councils, to be worked by a due proportion of taxes, and to be plentifully supplied with 
raw material in the shape of little boys and girls, out of which it is to grind a population of well-trained 
men and women who shall be useful members of society. 
For Spencer state education was little more than a devise the government could easily use to 
thwart the individuality of its citizens. In many of his diatribes, stressing the "evils of 
government," the non-academic Spencer could freely voice what he understood as the logical 
extensions of his evolutionism without biting the hand that feed him -a unique position for 
most involved with intellectual pursuits. 
Spencer was a "Social Darwinist" in name recognition only. In fact, Spencer was 
scarcely a Darwinist at all. As discussed earlier Spencer was a Lamarckian; consistently his 
biological and social evolutionary synthesis stressed Lamarckian as opposed to Darwinian 
evolutionary principles. That is, they espoused the belief that the inheritance of acquired 
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characteristics is a means by which species can originate and advance. Accordingly, if 
acquired characteristics are the primary mechanism of evolutionism (they are not, since the 
early twentieth century Darwinian evolutionary principles, i.e. natural selection, have 
consistently shown to be the likely driving force behind -physical- evolution) then it makes 
more sense why Spencer would have been so inclined to have a detest for the "undeserving 
poor" or the "good for nothings" as he was prone to label them in his writing. It is inaccurate 
and unproductive to conceptualize Spencer as any type of Darwinist, social or otherwise. 
Tim Gray argued that there exists in Spencer's thought a tension between the 
organicist conception of social order, and (potentially) inconsistent views towards 
individualism.151 Thus it is possible to read many portions of Spencer's thought, which 
sounds very much like the views of the interdependent hungry interventionist. As 
Kaldenburg (1977: 35) explained, Spencer's general evolutionary synthesis as applied to 
human society suggested that: 
Finally evolution occurs sociologically in human societies where instead of each man fulfilling all the 
roles need to survive, each man assumes one of the roles to the exclusion of the others. By assuming 
one role he becomes able to perform its tasks better and at the same time becomes dependent upon 
others in society in order to survive. 
If one were to use, as Spencer did, an analogy wrapped in organicism to describe social 
order, how could they avoid relying heavily upon the notion of interdependence -the very 
notion that the interventionist argues represents the mechanism of natural selection as applied 
to class based social orders? Spencer, after all, in his Principles of Sociology asks his own 
rhetorical question, "what is society" with the quipped answer "society is an organism."152 In 
151 Gray's book, The Political Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, (1996), is a wonderful treatment of the tension 
between Spencer's adhere to both organicism and extreme individualism. 
152 I found this reference to Spencer in, Kaldenburg (1977: 37) 
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addition, Spencer often supported the practice of certain types of governmental intervention. 
In regards to public sanitation, for instance, Spencer ( 1902: 157) commented: 
Public control of individuals is needful in the sphere of hygiene as in other spheres ... In a town, care 
of the roads and pavements must obviously be undertaken by a public authority, as also sewage. 
How can such a position be reconciled with Spencer's more anti-interventionist stance -a 
stance to be expanded in this section? Such reconciliation might not exist, and if it could its 
examination would likely broach the trajectory of the arguments here. I offer, however, one 
reason as to why Spencer seems to be caught somewhere in between the sentiments of 
interdependent organicism and extreme individualism. By all accounts, Spencer was an 
egotistical and arrogant thinker. Perhaps, Spencer viewed his greatest intellectual opponent 
as himself. Spencer might have, in other words, very well viewed himself as his greatest and 
perhaps only worthy adversary. This explanation might help explain the ease at which 
Spencer can change from a position of interdependence to one of self-sufficiency in almost 
the same breath. It would be impossible to argue that Spencer was typically a consistent 
thinker, he certainly was not. His arguments, nonetheless, can, when Spencer is in the 
individualist mood, form a very strong contrarian rebuttal; a rebuttal he would probably be 
happy to argue against. 
Spencer's evolutionary synthesis allowed him to reveal his "individualistic mood" 
with a great deal of ease. Recall from the earlier brief discussions of Spencer's evolutionism 
that he viewed evolution to occur as a process wherein change came about with a shift, from 
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the undifferentiated to the differentiated. In 
other words, social evolution was a result in change from the similar to the dissimilar. 
Spencer maintained that this general evolutionary synthesis could be applied to human social 
order. This application of social evolution took place as society evolved from the militant to 
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an industrial social stage. In describing the militant stage of social order ( a stage that appears 
strikingly similar to Durkheim's notion of mechanical solidarity)153 Spencer (1882: 571-72) 
places heavy emphasis upon the lack of individuality: 
His life is not his own, but is at the disposal of society. So long as he is capable of bearing arms he has 
no alternative but to fight when called on ... Of course, with this goes possession of such liberty only 
as military obligations allow. He is free to pursue his private ends only when the tribe or nation has no 
need for him; and when it has need of him, his actions from hour to hour must conform not to his will 
but to the public will. So, too, with his property ... in the last resort he is obligated to surrender 
whatever is demanded from the communities use. 
For Spencer such a way to live -condemned to serving as little more than a tool for public 
needs- represents a lesser-evolved social order. Interdependence, for Spencer, does not get 
more complicated; instead -if society is to evolve- it withers away. Thus the more 
homogeneous and interdependent the social order under review necessarily tends to suggest a 
correspondingly low level of social evolution. Life in militant society was/is a hindrance to 
the full capacities of people, for social evolution to occur the state must move beyond this 
stage. If the state can order its people to kill and die, then accordingly the individuality and 
differentiation of people is in a position of constant jeopardy. Towards the end of his life 
Spencer became an increasingly indignant anti-war activist. War, for Spencer, was the path 
of devolution, the path that paved the way for the state to dominate the interests and 
advancement of people. Spencer was horrified with British involvement in the Boer war, so 
much so that he would publicly announce that he was "assumed of his country," strong words 
for a proud Brit (Grey). 
Spencer (1900: 375-6) makes his disgust for militant society clear as he wrote: 
153 Jonathan Turner writing in Herbert Spencer: A Renewed Appreciation, comes very close to suggesting that 
this similarity is more than a coincidence, and that Durkheim should have actively credited Spencer's thought 
more than he did. 
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Advance to man and higher forms of society essentially depend on the decline of the militancy and 
growth of industrialism. This I hold to be a political truth in comparison with which all other political 
truths are insignificant. 
In very non-negotiable language Spencer draws a steadfast line in the sand. Social 
Evolutionism can never fully occur, for Spencer, unless a significant social shift away from 
the militant and towards the industrial takes place. Consistent with a shift to the industrial 
Spencer formed the "law of equal freedom" ( everyone has freedom to do as he wills, 
provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man). 154 In a perfectly evolved 
Spencerian evolutionary social synthesis it would be this law that would mark the pathway of 
human behavior. Thus if Spencer's evolutionary stage of industrialism is carried to its 
logical conclusion it is clear why he placed such an importance upon individualism, and, at 
almost every tum, found fault in government intervention. Any form of government 
intervention, which interfered with Spencer's "law of equal freedom," was bound to face his 
challenge. The intervention was, indeed, serving only to disrupt, or worse prevent, Spencer's 
complete evolutionary synthesis from reaching positive human social fruition. Only when 
the individual155 is free to live under a law of equal freedom can social evolution reach its 
highest apex. For this reason it is not wrong to label Spencer an "individualistic (social) 
evolutionist." 
154 Spencer's "law of equal freedom" is almost identical with John Stuart Mill's "harm principle." Interestingly, 
when Spencer was running low on funds, Mill in an act of academic cooperation, lent Spencer a sizable amount 
of money. 
155 Spencer, for all his emphasis toward the individual, never actually offered a clear definition of individuality. 
Instead he explained (1898: 249); "there is ... no definition of individuality that is not unobjectionable. All we 
can do is make the best practicable compromise." Spencer offers the compromise of considering the individual 
to be independently self-sufficient, a few pages latter he writes, "to consider as an individual any organized 
mass which is capable of independently carrying on." These passages present an interesting question, that is, do 
individual humans exist? Americans are socialized to believe, of course, that the answer must be a resounding 
yes. This answer, however, ought to be open to more discussion than it is usually afforded. 
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Spencer ( 1981: 100) would note that all progress is a derivate of individual aspiration 
and ingenuity, 
That abundant crops now grow were once only wild berries could be gathered, is due to the pursuit of 
individual satisfactions through many centuries. The progress from wigwams to good houses has 
resulted from wishes to increase personal welfare; and towns have arisen under like promptings. 
Beginning with traffic at gatherings on occasions of religious festivals, the trading organization, now 
so extensive and complex, has been produced entirely by men's efforts to achieve their private ends. 
Perpetually, governments have thwarted and deranged the growth, but have in no way furthered it; 
save by partially discharging their proper function and maintaining social order (Ashley and Orenstein 
pp. 121). 
Thus it is through the actions of private interests that offered force to positive social 
evolution. Spencer's interpretation of evolutionism would have garnered no less than a grin 
from Adam Smith. What is to be said, however, of a collective community driven conscious 
in the process of social evolution? Spencer's answer to this question, which could have 
asked by either Marx or Durkheim, was to deny the existence of any conscious other than 
that of "individual conscious." As Spencer ( 1950: 397) maintained: 
It is well that the lives of all parts of an animal should be merged into the life of the whole, because the 
whole has a corporate consciousness. But it is not so with a society; since its living units do not and 
cannot lose individual consciousness, and since the community as a whole has no corporate 
consciousness. This is an everlasting reason why the welfare of citizens cannot rightly be sacrificed to 
some supposed benefit of the state, and why, on the other hand, the state is to be maintained solely for 
the benefit of its citizens. 
This passage points to an important difference of thought separating the contrarian from the 
interventionist. The interventionist understands the individual as an abstraction and the 
community as real, while the contrarian, taking an almost opposite view, understands the 
individual as real and the community as the abstraction. A productive discourse surrounding 
poverty welfare must commence with this important difference. 
Whenever a government (sociopolitical community) attempts to intervene in the 
interests of one group they will, for Spencer, axiomatically disrupt the law of equal freedom 
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for others. Taking from one and giving to another, i.e., playing Robin Hood, because it is 
thought of as a "social good," does nothing except make society weaker (the body grows 
weak if "harmful" agents persist within). Thus in describing government intervention 
Spencer (1868: 366) suggested: 
And yet strange to say, now the truth is recognized by most cultivated people ... now more than ever in 
the history of the world, are they (interventionist) doing all they can to further the survival of the 
unfittest! 
Spencer absolutely despised the state deciding, "Who Deserves What;" by making any such 
decision the interventionist was doing nothing more than ensuring that "survival of the 
unfittest" would occur. State intervention -or interference, as Spencer would have labeled 
such state action- breeds a sort of paternalism at odds with his "law of equal freedom." Even 
as health care is concerned, Spencer (1843: 35) argued that any state intervention is ill 
advised, and insulting to the autonomous person. 
No one has a claim upon the legislature to take that care of his health which he will not take himself ... 
It (health legislation) treats them as so many children. It puts the people into leading strings. Poor 
things! If we do not look after them they will be going to ignorant quacks for advice, and perhaps get 
poisoned! 
While Spencer did not coin the phrase "big brother" to describe government action, he was 
astutely aware and extremely mistrustful of the paternalistic implication attached with the 
interventionist. If the state insists on continually looking after your "best interests," then the 
implication for Spencer quickly becomes that individuals will never do this "looking" for 
themselves. For this reason Spencer (1868: 230) remarked, "Government is essentially 
immoral ... the offspring of evil, bearing about it all the marks of its parentage." Spencer 
(1868: 234) was not through with his tyrant, he would continue, "even its most equitable 
form it is impossible for government to dissociate itself from evil." 
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Spencer is perhaps most ambivalent as he wrote about English "poor laws" -
legislative attempts to alleviate poverty. Spencer gives mixed messages as to whether he 
opposed "poor laws" because he wants to help the poor in the "long run," or because he 
opposed such legislation because of his detest with the poor. For whatever reason, Spencer 
would contend that such legislation is necessarily at odds with his first social law of "equal 
freedom." Assuming the former explanation Spencer (1868: 358) argued, "to the extent that 
a poor-law mitigates distress in one place, it unavoidably produces distress in another." 
Consistently, Spencer argued that the working-class poor would bear the heaviest burden of 
supporting the "undeserving poor." Thus by eliminating poverty welfare the poor were 
actually -as a collective- better off. In addition, Spencer would conclude that by giving extra 
money to the poor they would likewise be encouraged to have more children than they could 
support absent poverty welfare. Spencer, likewise, often claimed in his writings that his 
position towards "poor laws" were compassionate to future generations of potentially 
avoidable "poor births" that, if welfare was withheld, could avoid the pains of poverty. A 
little Malthusian pressure, for Spencer, represented a positive mechanism of social evolution. 
Nonetheless the potentially compassionate aspects of Spencer's rejection of poverty 
welfare are eclipsed by the greater possibility that, Spencer simply had no room for the poor 
in his evolutionary house. In haste language Spencer (1868: 414) leaves no acceptable social 
space for those who cannot sustain self-sufficiency. 
If they are sufficiently complete to live, they do live, and it is well they should live. If they are not 
sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die (Hofstadter pp. 41 ). 
In describing the "idle poor" Spencer (1950: 22) maintained: 
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They have no work, you say. Say rather that they either refuse work or quickly turn themselves out of 
it. They are simply good-for-nothings who in way or another live on the good-for-somethings vagrants 
and sots, criminals and those on the way to crime. 
Why should, as Spencer would ask, the working-poor be stripped of some earnings in order 
feed the idle poor? Spencer did not dislike the poor per se, only the "idle poor" who refused 
to work. Interestingly, this condemnation did not extent to a critique of the "idle rich," a 
group that if they knew the meaning of industriousness had practiced such an art only once at 
birth (perhaps this assessment of the idle "well-to-do" hits to close to home for Spencer, who 
received a sizable inheritance from his uncle). Spencer (1904: 394) seems to capture an 
aspect of Nietzsche's thought as he suggested that suffering might be the only way the poor 
can escape their social position. 
The mass of effete humanity to be dealt with is so large as to make one despair: the problem seems 
insolvable .... Certainly, if solvable, it is to be solved only through suffering. 
Spencer reasons that the problem of poverty appears unanswerable not because of a flaw in 
nature -or his evolutionary synthesis-, but because do-gooders have attempted to corrupt, 
with advancements of poverty welfare, the ''survival of the fittest." 
The irony in the above assessment is that Spencer was quick to use deterministic 
(anti-action) arguments when they suited both the purposes of his evolutionary synthesis and 
his individualistic implications therein. Spencer ( 1868: 170), for instance, argued: 
One would have thought it sufficiently clear to everybody that the great changes taking place in the 
world of ours are uniformly slow. Continents are upheaved at the rate of a foot or two a century. The 
deposition of a delta is the work of tens of thousands of years. The transformation of barren rock into 
life supporting soil takes countless ages. If any think society advances under a different law, let them 
read. 
This gradualist position is optimistically extended to an examination of human social order as 
Spencer (1868:454) later in the same work concluded: 
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The seeds of civilization existing in the aboriginal man, and distributed over the earth by his 
multiplication, were certain in the laps of time to fall here and there into circumstances fit for their 
development; and in spite of all blightings and uprootings, were certain, by sufficient repetition of 
these occurrence, ultimately to originate a civilization which would outlive all disaster and arrive at 
perfection. 
The peculiarity here is that Spencer is advocating both a destiny of social perfection, and the 
position that "poor laws," and other aspects of "government interference," are detestable and 
a hindrance to social evolution. Spencer's dual positions seem odd for two reasons. First, if 
Spencer's brand of social evolution leads to a specific telos, it is strange, perhaps 
inconsistent, to think that poverty welfare could thwart this end. Second, the notion of 
"interference" could occur in at least two ways. Spencer viewed governmental intervention 
as seemingly the only type of socially destructive interference; however, restricting a 
sociopolitical community from deciding "Who Deserves What" in a manner consistent with 
poverty welfare could also be viewed as interference. If "Who Deserves What" is a 
fundamental sociopolitical question without negation, then it seems that some type of 
"interference" by some party is unavoidable. The contrarian may rightly claim many things, 
but one cannot be that they are opposed to all interference, there stance necessarily suggests 
interfering in the decision of a community to construct a system of poverty welfare. 
Spencer, at the time of his death (1903), lived long enough to see Darwin credited as 
the father of evolutionary theory (a title Spencer should have had if he would have simply 
abandoned his Lamarckianism) as well as the increased implementation of governmentally 
mandated social programs. The weight of these factors led Spencer to die an unhappy and 
regretful man. The headstone of Spencer's grave in London's Highgate Cemetery overlooks 
Karl Marx's tomb. Marx's tomb is tended to by a single attendant who must sort and 
organize the barrage of messages to the departed father of communist political theory. The 
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flora that tends to tangle itself around the mass of forgotten dead, on the other hand, often 
overruns Spencer's grave. Spencer was no less the thinker than Marx, and ironically they 
wished for the same end to social evolutionism. They both wished for, and foresaw, the 
"inevitable" withering away of the state. The difference is that whereas Marx foresaw 
cooperative social relations as the apex of social evolutionism, Spencer was much more 
comfortable in viewing this apex as the solitary individual -after all, for Spencer "collective 
consciousness" was the abstraction, not visa versa. 
William Graham Sumner: The Forgotten Man 
While Spencer is the father of contrarian thought, it was William Graham Sumner 
that brought contrarianism to a broader American audience. It was Sumner, not Spencer, 
who is properly labeled a "Social Darwinist." In describing the important linkage between 
Spencer and Sumner, Kaldenburg (1977: 80-1) explained: 
The Social Darwinist disciples of Spencer were found in most English speaking countries. Yet his 
effect was probably greatest in the United States where one of the first noted followers was the 
sociologist William Graham Sumner. Sumner fought a battle with the officials of Princeton University 
who had placed a ban on the use of Spencer's books at the university on the grounds that their 
agnosticism would destroy the moral character of the students at Princeton. Sumner was able to 
encourage the university to allow the books to remain; and in doing so he won, not only a battle for 
Spencer in the United States, but also a victory for academic freedom. 
Sumner, therefore, served as an extremely important advocate for the academic appreciation 
of Spencer's work. Spencer's evolutionary synthesis, and implications for poverty welfare 
therein, either stand or fail on there own merit; however the implications of his contrarian 
thought were dependent upon others -such as Sumner- hailing and "reproducing" his work. 
Sumner was Spencer's American messenger, and his letter was titled "Social Darwinism." 
Sumner ( 1934: 56) would, like Spencer, understand "survival of the fittest" in 
comparison with its antithesis. 
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If we do not like the survival of the fittest we have only one possible alternative, and that is the 
survival of the unfittest. The former is the law of civilization; the latter is the law of anti-civilization. 
Thus, for Sumner, if social order is to become, or remain, a "civilization," then a necessary 
cause of such an order is an appreciation for the "survival of the fittest." Sumner creates a 
two fold typology of the "struggle for existence" (survival of the fittest) in order to show that 
those who favor government interference -the interventionist- are ignorant of man's dual 
evolutionary processes. As Sumner (1911: 176) argued, 
We have noticed that the relations involved in the struggle for existence are twofold. There is first the 
struggle of individuals to win the means of subsistence from nature, and secondly there is a 
competition of man with man in the effort to win a limited supply. The radical error of the socialists 
and sentimentalists is that they never distinguish these two relations from each other. They bring 
forward complaints which are really to be made, if at all, against the author of the universe for the 
hardships which man has to endure in the struggle with nature. The complaints are addressed, 
however, to society; that is, to other men under the same hardships. The only social element, however, 
is the competition of life, and when society is blamed for those ills which belong to the human lot, it is 
only burdening those who have successfully contended with those ills with the further task of 
conquering the same ills over again for somebody else. 
Accordingly, the interventionist is almost always engaged in trying to alleviate -through 
taking from one and giving to another- the hardships, which only the "author of the universe" 
is responsible for. Why should one pay to "fix" hardships they are not responsible for? Is 
this reciprocity? Life is a battle with necessary, natural or divinely inspired, hardships. 
Sumner, as Nietzsche did, subscribes to this tragic metaphor of life. This metaphor is 
extremely powerful, because, among other things, it shapes the extent to which social 
evolutionism can be viewed as positive. If life is necessarily tragic, then the reform of the 
interventionist is by extension a wasted, harmful, and likely unjust effort. 
In addition, if hardship is viewed as normative -as in Sumner's case- then a reply to 
"Who Deserves What," typically will shift the language of "deserves" to one of "owes." 
People deserve nothing because they will unavoidable experience the hardships of life, and 
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for such hardships only the "author of the universe" can offer redress. What then does 
society "owe" its members? Sumner ( 1911: 177) addressed this question as he argued: 
The law of the survival of the fittest was not made by man and cannot be abrogated by man. We can 
only by interfering with it, produce the survival of the unfittest. If a man comes forward with any 
grievance against the order of society so far as this is shaped by human agency, he must have patient 
hearing and full redress; but if he addresses a demand to society for relief from the hardships of life, he 
asks simply that somebody else should get his living for him. In that case he ought to be left to find 
out his error from hard experience. 
Sumner's naturalistic argument speaks directly to the question of deservedness. If another 
person inflicts harm, then full redress of the grievance should be expected. Alternatively, on 
the other hand, if harm is self-inflicted, or if a person falls upon a hardship that is the fault of 
no one then they deserve nothing. Deservedness is a matter to be settled on a case by case 
basis, therefore, legislative do-gooders who attempt to settle such concerns with the foul 
swoop of a legislative wand will necessarily be in error, and will likely only encourage the 
"survival of the unfittest." Using both naturalistic competitive language and a Newtonian 
analogy Sumner ( 1934: 153) stressed that any effort of the interventionist to thwart 
competition is bound to end in failure. 
Competition can no more be done away with than gravitation. Its incidence can be changed. We can 
adopt a social policy, "Woe to the successful." We can take the prizes away from the successful and 
give them to the unsuccessful. It seems clear that there would soon be no prizes at all, but that 
inference is not universally accepted. In any event, it is plain that we have not got rid of competition -
i.e., of the struggle for existence and then competition of life. We have only decided that, if we cannot 
all have equally, we will all have nothing. Competition does not guarantee results corresponding with 
merit, because heredity conditions and good and bad fortunes are always intermingled with merit, but 
competition secures to merit all the chances it can enjoy under the circumstances for which none of 
one's fellowmen are to blame. 
Sumner presented his naturalistic antagonism to social reforms, i.e. poverty welfare, 
as part of his larger mission as "champion to the middle class." The typical member of the 
"middle class," for Sumner, was facing, due to the expansion of social welfare programs, the 
destruction of their livelihood. In describing this member of society Sumner ( 1934: 4 77) 
noted, 
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Now who is the forgotten man? He is the simple, honest laborer, ready to earn his living by productive 
work. We pass him by because he is independent, self-supporting, and asks no favors. He does not 
appeal to the emotions or excite the sentiments. He wants only to make a contract and fulfill it, with 
respect on both sides and favor on neither side. He must get his living out of the capital of the country. 
The larger the capital is, the better living he can get. ... But we stand with our backs to the independent 
and productive laborer. 
The forgotten man does not ask for, nor would he accept, the help offered by the 
interventionist. Instead, the interventionist offers help only to the "greasy wheel," squeaking 
by with a request for help, largely to redress hardships that society has no business 
addressing. As Sumner (1883: 132) described the invisible status of "the forgotten man." 
When we see a drunkard in the gutter we pity him. If a policeman picks him up we say that society has 
interfered to save him from perishing. Society is a fine word, and it saves us the trouble of thinking. 
The industrious and sober workman, who is mulcted of a percentage of his day's wages to pay the 
policeman, is the one who bears the penalty. But he is the forgotten man. He passes by and is never 
noticed, because he has behaved himself, fulfilled his contracts, and asked for nothing. 
Thus poverty welfare serves only to rob the forgotten man of his wages. The interventionist 
argument that such robbery should be done in the name of "compassion," neglects to 
calculate compassion toward the labor and earnings of the forgotten man, as well as ensuring 
that the unfittest will survive and thrive. Sumner (1883: 123), in a mathematical form, 
described the "real" effect of the interventionist' s good intentions by arguing: 
A and B put their heads together to decide what C shall be made to do for D. The radical vice of all 
these schemes, from a sociological point of view, is that C is not allowed a voice in the matter, and his 
position, character, and interests, as well as the ultimate effects on society through C's interests, are 
entirely overlooked. I call C the forgotten man. 
The short-lived but widespread acceptance of Sumner's Social Darwinism (roughly a 
twenty year period around the tum of the twentieth century) can be somewhat explained by 
his framing of contrarianism into a position of middle class admiration. Sumner advanced a 
naturalistic reason why everyone except the "good-for-nothings" had reason to be skeptical 
of the interventionist. During the tum of the twentieth century Sumner altered the question 
"Who deserves What" to that of "Who Owes What." This significant shift in the American 
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understanding of the socially fundamental had serious implications for the way in which 
poverty welfare was viewed. We are, for Sumner, "owed" in proportion to how each of us 
can fulfill personal "social duty." A duty that Sumner (1883: 113) explained with the 
following language: 
Every man and woman in society has one big duty. That is, to take care of his or her own self. This is 
a social duty. For, fortunately, the matter stands so that the duty of making the best of one's self 
individually is not a separate thing from the duty of filling one's place in society, but the two are one, 
and the latter is accomplished when the former is done. 
With this sentiment the contrarian closes their rebuttal. 
Closing Thoughts on the Use of Discourse and Ideal Types 
This chapter outlining a formidable contrarian argument, like the proceeding 
interventionist chapter, is not intended to "close" the issue. The closure of a fundamental 
social question is unlikely; nonetheless, advancement can be made after discourse is allowed 
to flourish. Consistently, more issues and respective challenges could be raised; the attempts 
here are designed only to survey some of the more important aspects of the ideal types. The 
discourse between our ideal types could inevitably spawn well beyond the scope and 
parameters granted in the preceding two chapters. The chapters, however, offered a brief 
summary and treatment of the major points and ensuing arguments each side of the discourse 
will likely raise. The contrarian case, for instance, is largely dependent upon two correlates. 
1) Social order evolves beyond as opposed to through interdependence, and 2) the individual 
is real, and social order is an abstraction created to support the natural (property) rights of the 
individual. The intent here is not to find a means by which these correlates can be weighed 
against the interventionist argument; such a process is outside the bounds and intentions of 
this work. It seems, instead, that the discourse of poverty welfare often occurs with as much 
precision and mutual understanding as an ill-fated game of blindfolded "pin the tail on the 
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donkey." The blindfolds are self-imposed, as we rarely understand why we believe what we 
do regarding poverty welfare. When those blinders are removed, I would suggest, 
evolutionary and naturalistic arguments often become quite illuminating. The two sides 
rarely talk with each other because often, sadly enough, they rarely understand the imputes 
for their own position, much less an appreciation of the "other side." Thus in presenting the 
arguments in the present context, people might learn better the undertones of their own 
position towards "Who Deserves What." Only after this process of self-knowledge occurs 
can truly productive discourses surrounding, "Who Deserves What" emerge. 
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CHAPTER 9. SOCIAL EVOLUTIONISM AND AMERICAN POVERTY 
Making Poverty Welfare Real 
This chapter will outline156 the evolution of action and sentiments toward American 
poverty welfare. As the title of the chapter suggests, however, an inclusion of evolutionism 
within the general evolutionary trend of poverty welfare will -when helpful- be mentioned 
and discussed. The American treatment of poverty welfare can roughly be 
compartmentalized into three general categories, 1) pre- civil war, 157 2) pre -"New Deal," 
and 3) post- "New Deal."158 The arguments presented in the proceeding chapters were 
heavily involved with demonstrating the importance of evolutionary arguments in the 
shaping and legitimization of positions toward poverty welfare. In this chapter, however, the 
goal is to bring social policy toward poverty welfare "alive" by discussing its predominant 
trends (evolution), and reviewing the practical implications thereof. It is cautioned, however, 
that any broad treatment of poverty welfare is inevitably wrapped in the larger concern of 
deservedness, i.e., "Who Deserves What." The approach of this chapter does not seek to 
abandon the importance of social evolutionism in the discussion -relevant mention of theory 
meeting practice will be given considerable treatment. The "real" affects of a sociopolitical 
community's decision regarding the practice and magnitude of poverty welfare can be fully 
156 The purpose of such an outline is not necessarily to offer a timeline of the most influential aspects of 
American policy toward policy welfare; such efforts have already been done by numerous sources. The outline 
here, instead, is intended to speak directly to the question of deservedness, and accordingly challenge certain 
"domain assumptions," regarding poverty welfare in American history, that are held by a vast number of 
contemporary Americans. 
157 The American civil war ended in 1865, six years after the publication of Darwin's Origin. Thus, in the 
second period of examination it could also be understood as reviewing the post- Darwinian period. 
158 Of these three periods I would suggest that the first is the most important as it sets the groundwork for the 
other two. Also, the last of these periods will be given attention in so much as an appendix of material stressing 
quantitative data. 
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appreciated only after an examination of the impact of such decisions are examined. It is one 
thing to engage in a discourse regarding "Who Deserves What," it is quite another to see 
what actual effect this discourse helps create. Moreover, if social theory-unlike social 
philosophy- is an activity that creates explanations of the real, then -especially in a discourse 
and theoretical treatment of poverty welfare- it is important to generally understand the major 
trends and practical effects of welfare policy. 
As this chapter reaches its conclusion, the use of specific state empirical data 
regarding poverty welfare will be given apt consideration. While none of these states is a 
pe,ject representation of either the contrarian or interventionist each provides a real 
representation of how each of these positions might actually impact a sociopolitical 
community. This analysis is, of course, interwoven into a complex array of issues, i.e., the 
level of federal poverty welfare support, the concentrations of wealth within the state under 
review, the number of poor within the state, etc... The work in this chapter will not untangle 
all of these complexities. This chapter will, however, given specific parameters of poverty 
welfare, empirically demonstrate the actual policy manifestations of such decisions ( 1958-
2001) with individual states as the units of analysis. 
The History of American Poverty Welfare Prior to the Civil War 
The Idealistic picture of happy, virtuous, high-spirited, and well-fed American 
"pilgrims," as representing the "typical" early Colonial immigrant, is largely a matter of 
folklore and false "historic nostalgia." Those espousing the hard-working Puritan ethos of 
early American immigrants, often neglect to mention that most early American immigrants 
were "escaping England" for strictly monetary or legally mandated, as opposed to religious, 
reasons. Walter Trattner described both the hardships of "coming to America" before 1700, 
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as well as the effects of English law in the immigration of "unsavory peoples" to America 
during the Colonial period. As Trattner ( 1999: 15) maintained: 
Those who came to the colonies (land proprietors, tax-dodgers, and a handful of others excepted) were 
of moderate or poor means. The English practice as authorized by Parliament and the transportation 
laws, of shipping to America thousands of rogues, convicts, political prisoners, beggars, vagrants, 
orphans, the unemployed, and other undesirables hardy helped. Then there was the trip across the 
Atlantic; not only a prolonged but also a debilitating experience for many. Passengers were packed 
into tiny ships with filthy and foul-smelling quarters, lack adequate food and drinking water and 
exposure to disease. Many did not survive the wretched conditions the voyage; those who did 
frequently reached shore ill or infirm. 
This description of both the living conditions of those making the journey to the New World, 
as well as the types of people embarking upon such an "adventure" suggest a few noteworthy 
points. 
First, given the conditions of the treacherous three-month Atlantic trip there would be 
few reasons compelling enough to sway the decision of the typical European to make such a 
voyage. It is not impossible to imagine such a decision in contemporary times. hnagine that 
a new space colony has just been erected, and the United States government is looking for 
volunteers to make the journey. The advertisement might read something like this: 
Do you love to travel, seeing new places, experiencing new things, then space colony travel is right for 
you. During your three month journey you will be cozy living conditions not much larger than your 
typical closet, the food will likely rot, and the water undrinkable. Once you arrive, if you arrive, you 
might have to contend with "alien" populations fairly upset that you have trespassed on their lands. To 
make matters better you will leave behind everything, both material and non-material that you have 
accumulated thus far in your life. Now, just sign below, and this once in a lifetime chance could be 
yours. 
Few reasons existed to explain why anyone would make such a life altering and likely 
devastating choice. Reasons most early American immigrants included, destitution, penalty 
of law (roughly a quarter of all convicts in England were sentenced to "transportation to 
America"), escaping legal punishment, being sold into slavery, becoming an indentured 
servant, and the commonly cited and idealized reason, fleeing religious persecution. The 
myth of early American colonists as pure and virtuous men, women, and children fighting a 
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resilient battle against religious oppression invokes only a small piece of the colonies' true 
early immigration picture. 
Second, the affect of appealing to the "early immigration myth" is powerful beyond 
the typical amount of good will that accompanies any virtuous view. The Puritan ideal of 
hard-work and religious obedience was reinforced as "proper" because it was mandated as an 
order to be applied "to all." The expression "to all," as seen above, did not solely imply 
those fleeing for religious reasons, but included everyone. With this nearly impossible 
inclusion, disenfranchisement became problematic. The beginnings of American history may 
be told by two groups, i.e., the worthy who brought official charters, religious scars, and hard 
work, and the unworthy who brought the badges of destitution, punishment, or slavery. 159 
The "early immigration myth" is easier to accept if the virtues and policies toward "Who 
Deserve What" represented everyone, but they did not. The respect assigned to the myth was 
often explained using the erroneous belief that all, or most, were politically represented. 
Thus as early American attitudes and approaches toward settling the fundamental question, 
"Who Deserves What" are discussed, it is important to remember that the sociopolitical 
community making the decision "for all" did not represent the concerns and interests of all 
immigrants during the colonial period. America, from its outset, would settle the question of 
deservedness with the few who believed that they were, and others agreed, most deserving. 
The worthy, therefore, determined deservedness, the options for the unworthy were then to 
agree, leave, or rebel. So long as the unworthy did not opt for the latter option, the worthy 
were usually content. 
159 Badges, in this sense, go well beyond the invocation of a metaphorical illustration. In many of the early 
colonies the poor actually were mandated to wear a badge, based on the assumption that such shaming would 
convince the poor to lead more virtuous lives. 
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William Quigley (1996: 35) described the standards of deservedness as applied to the 
poor during the colonial period by stating: 
The ability of a person to work was the preeminent in determining whether they were worthy of public 
assistance. Those determined able to work were not eligible for help; people already working were not 
eligible. Although widows and children in need were given assistance, they also were expected to 
work. Only those unable to work were considered truly worthy of poor relief. Of course this rule did 
not apply to slaves, free blacks, or Native Americans. 
The ability to work marked the threshold of deservedness as applied to poverty welfare in 
Colonial America. Captain John Smith (1986: 265) -the leader of the early Jamestown 
settlements-, for instance, directly stated the above point as he maintained, "those who would 
not work, must not eat." If a person could work and chose not to do so, then the 
sociopolitical community owed him nothing at all. On the other hand, if a person was unable 
to work, the early colonists saw it as their social, political, and religious duty to assist. As 
Quigley (1996: 55) described, 
Colonial poor laws continued the English poor law concept of classifying the poor based on their 
ability to work. Relief was provided only to the "worthy poor," i.e. those unable, by reason of some 
infirmity, to work. Those in need who were able to work were rarely provided assistance under the 
colonial poor laws. In the colonies, as in England, voluntary idleness was regarded as a sin and a 
crime. The able bodied unemployed were either bound out as indentured servants, whipped and run 
out of town, or jailed. 
Assistance for the poor was, in fact, offered, to some degree, in all thirteen colonies. 
Americans have always, since the advent of the first settlements, addressed "Who Deserves 
What" with certain provisions consistent with active poverty welfare. 
Often specific measures were taken so that such an address would be kept to a 
minimum. For instance, Trattner ( 1999: 21) described the common colonial practice of 
requiring sea captains to post bail for newly arriving American immigrants: 
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The Massachusetts General Court and other colonial legislatures even required masters of all vessels to 
post a bond for each person they brought to the colonies. In 1721, the New York Assembly passed a 
similar measure requiring ship captains to file passenger lists with the town recorder within twenty-
four hours after docking. Then they had to post fifty pounds security for each passenger who might 
become a public charge or else return that person to his or her point of embarkation. Again, in most 
places, ship captains were required to post binds for sick mariners left in port. 
In addition to charging sea captains with certain economic responsibilities for their 
passengers, most colonies passed residency requirements for those seeking relief from 
poverty. Massachusetts, for instance, maintained a standard three-month residency 
requirement for those seeking the aid of the colony. Deservedness, in this sense, was largely 
thought to be a product of one's place within the sociopolitical community. Thus the 
wandering trapper or hunter was owed nothing, because he had no community from which to 
make a claim of assistance. "Who Deserves What," therefore, for the colonists became 
settled by the dimensions of established custom and place. 160 
Assistance for the poor and categories of "poor assistance administration," absent a 
federal system of regulation and oversight, was tailored to the specific cultural or moral 
concerns of the various colonies. As Quigley ( 1996: 61) maintained: 
The first method of assistance was always to look to the family. Family members of the poor were the 
primary group responsible for their support, and only if they did not provide support did the poor relief 
system begin .... If the family was unable to assist, the colonies utilized one of four basic methods of 
assisting the nonworking poor: (I) a contract between a town and a provider; (2) auctioning off the 
acre of the needy person to the lowest bidder; (3) requiring the needy to move into poorhouses or other 
institutions and there to receive assistance (often classed indoor relief); or, (4) giving assistance 
directly to the poor and allowing them to live wherever they pleased (often called outdoor relief). 
The dependence of "family intervention" during the Colonial Period served largely to make a 
sociopolitical address of deservedness a back-up measure. Typically, and this is as accurate 
today as when the first American settlements were created, the less a sociopolitical 
160 Not only were the parameters of who could be helped a matter of the established practice of residency so to 
was the actual legal basis for poor assistance. Not surprisingly the colonists borrowed heavily from the English 
poor laws of 1601. Consistently, these laws established poverty welfare for those unable to work, but 
prescribed harsh -often violent- penalties- for those who chose not to work. 
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community has to address "Who Deserves What," the more comfortable it will be. Throwing 
matters of deservedness to the realm of the family relieves the community from addressing 
such essential concerns. The family, however, is simply unable to eliminate all concerns 
associated with such fundamental social questions. The community, in fact, must address 
such questions because of breakdowns within the family. How can the family address 
questions related to the abandonment of children? In addition, the notion of "welfare to 
work" is not novel to the late twentieth century. Poor assistance to the able bodies has held a 
long American tradition of "forced employment." It was not atypical, for instance, in 
Colonial America to observe unmarried women or widows -unable to support themselves- on 
the "auctioning block" prepared to be "sold" to the highest bidder willing to pay for 
"domestic services." 
Despite Colonial attempts to preempt or alleviate poverty, the problem continued to 
persist and grow increasingly worse in tangent with rapid industrialization. As Trattner 
(1999: 30) explained the increasing attention devoted to poor assistance in Colonial America: 
Not only was the number large (of those in poverty) but each year it increased, as did relief 
expenditures and taxes. In 1700, the residents of Boston spent 500 pounds on public relief; by 1715 
the annual expenditure was more than 2000 pounds, half of what it would be some twenty years later. 
By 1753, poor relief expenditures in Boston climbed to 10,000 pounds per year, and the figure 
continued to increase even more rapidly each thereafter through the 1770s, even though the population 
was relatively static by that time. The same was true for New York. By 1752 the needy so burdened 
the city's residents that in order to care for them poor law officials had to borrow 150 pounds against 
next year's taxes. 
This description challenges the erroneous notion held by many in contemporary America 
that, the forefathers were rugged individualists, who would scoff at helping the poor. 
Colonial policy makers, in fact, did not scoff at such a notion; instead, in lieu of increasing 
poverty, they offered increased assistance to the poor. Contrary to what certain 
contemporary conservative personalities might suggest, American policy makers have never 
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been comfortable watching the deserving, or the undeserving starve. This desire to help the 
deserving poor was strong. Colonial cites, for instance borrowed large sums to help the 
poor. 161 A strange notion today when domestic public assistance comprises less than five 
percent of the federal budget, and does not approach that figure in any state jurisdiction. 
Today public debt is incurred to bolster the military, or to pay the interest on debt incurred to 
bolster past projects of the military. 
Tensions, including shipping restrictions between America and Britain, even before 
the effects of the Revolutionary War, took a heavy economic toll on the residents of the 
colonies. At the outset of the Revolutionary War more than a quarter of all colonists lived in 
poverty. It would be intuitive, especially considering contemporary modes of political 
socialization, to believe that on the brink of the Revolutionary War George Washington 
would have nothing but war on his mind, but this was not the case. Even in the midst of 
military tensions, Washington (1889: 236-7) took the time to write the agent of his estate at 
Mt. Vernon to specifically, and personally, addressed the issue of assistance to the poor. 
Let the hospitality of the house, with respect to the poor, be kept up. Let no one go away hungry. If 
any of this kind of people be in want ... supply their necessities; and I have no objection to your giving 
my money in charity to the amount of forty or fifty pounds a year .... What I mean by having no 
objection is that is my desire that it should be done (Trattner). 
Washington was offering much more than the statement, the poor should be helped. He was, 
instead, opening his house to those in need. Washington could have just as easily, ordered 
his forty pounds to be spent "securing" his mansion from the poor who might try to take what 
was his. How many current congresspersons would open their house to help the poor? It 
would seem that the number living in exclusive gated communities hints at the answer. It 
161 Today the poor are viewed as a burden to be "dealt" with. This view, however, was less likely to surface in 
Colonial America because with abundant land and a scarcity of people helping others was viewed as an 
investment. Now, the poor are not invested in, but dealt with. 
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would be inaccurate, though not ineffective, to cite influential colonists to justify treating the 
poor like the plague. 
After the Revolutionary War a number of important steps toward the solidification of 
state intervention in matters of poverty welfare were undertaken. While private sources, e.g., 
churches, charities and private donors, have always had a strong tradition in America of 
assisting the poor, secular and public statutes mandating poverty welfare had existed in every 
state since the end of the Revolutionary War. As described by Trattner (1999: 40-1 ): 
In New York, for example, a state body -the Committee on Superintendence of the Poor- was 
appointed to administer emergency relief to persons removed from their places of settlement because 
of the war. The principle of settlement was thereby relaxed as a prerequisite of public aid .... So it was 
that the state began to assume added responsibility for public relief; in 1796, it allocated funds to New 
York City ( and then other municipalities) "for the maintained and support of such persons as shall not 
be gained settlement in the state." ... In the North, then, as people migrated from the eastern seaboard 
to he areas west of the Appalachian Mountains, they reenacted amidst the difficulties of frontier life 
the poor laws they had brought with them, just as their forefathers had enacted similar statutes carried 
from England to the New World. Thus in 1790, only three years after its establishment, a poor law 
based on those of the northeastern states was enacted in the Northwest Territory .... As the southern 
states drew up new constitutions, between 1780 and 1785, they created the position of county overseer 
of the poor, elected by the freeholders within the county to collect and administer relief funds raised 
through a compulsory tax. 
Assistance to the poor was not unique to large northeastern cities. Those who proclaimed 
poverty welfare as synonymous with "liberal" northeastern jurisdictions are correct only in 
that these jurisdictions were the trendsetters, largely because they held the first established 
settlements. As other areas of the country grew and sociopolitical communities began to 
form, however, poverty welfare proliferated. It is not surprising that poverty welfare reached 
the western states last; they after all were the last to form sociopolitical communities. 
The above description is not intended to argue that poverty welfare was embraced by 
a strong majority of early Americans. Many Americans, in fact, held steadfastly to the belief 
that the only way in which pauperism could effectively be eliminated was with the 
elimination of "poor laws." So long as the poor were relegated to remote locations to starve, 
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the problem would take care of itself. The debate between those advocating poverty welfare, 
and those opposed to it grew increasingly aggressive in the early nineteenth century. The 
antagonism between these "two sides" grew to the point where it became common practice 
for city officials opposed to assistance, to "run" the poor just far enough out of their 
jurisdiction so assistance would become the "problem" of another jurisdiction. Often this 
repugnant cost-saving activity was carried out in the dark of night. The poor were led away 
under threat of violence, to become the problem of a different sociopolitical community. The 
state legislature of New York realized that if assistance was to be effective, such clandestine 
and unproductive practices had to be put to an end. 
The Yates Report ( 1824 ), the first comprehensive survey of relief for the poor in the 
United States and one of the most influential documents in American social welfare history 
(Trattner), was conducted for the purposes of holding New York state's poverty welfare 
system under the scrutiny of "program evaluation." Yates outlined the types and problems 
associated with the major variants of poverty welfare available in the state of New York. As 
described by Trattner (1999: 57), 
Yates cited four main methods of public assistance that were used throughout the state - institutional 
relief, home relief, the contract system, and the auction system - and outlined what he felt to be 
cruelty, waste, and inefficiency arising from the chaotic system. Where the poor were "farmed out," 
through either the contract or the auction system, they were often treated cruelly, even inhumanly. 
Moreover, the "education and the morals of children were almost wholly neglected" and, according to 
Yates, "They grew up in filth, idleness, and disease, becoming early candidates for prison or the 
grave." 
Yates evoked a humanitarian concern for the poor. It was not enough just to keep people 
alive; instead they ought to be provided with the tools that will help them become productive 
members of society. Thus, the Yates report was much more than an administrative 
document, it outlined the principle that the poor deserved more than just their lives. Social 
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reform, that is, was not simply about keeping people alive; it was about helping the poor 
become "better" people. Such an appeal made no sense if the poor were naturally doomed to 
fail. Thus for the Yates report to have the effect it did, naturalistic assumptions about the 
poor could not have concluded that such a group was bound to fail, for if they did, Yates 
would have been talking in a foreign language. Social reform above the level of pity for 
another's life, must assume that nature does not prevent such reform from working. 
This sentiment (the notion that natural process did nothing to hamper positive and 
meaningful social reform), therefore, signaled the change from the notion that the deserving 
poor deserved as much as keep them alive, to the notion that the deserving poor deserved an 
opportunity to excel. Consistently the Yates report outlined three major steps that ought to 
be, and subsequently would be, taken by the New York legislature if it hoped to rescue the 
"failing" system of assistance. 1) No able bodied person between the ages of eighteen and 
fifty would be given public assistance; 2) for the old, young, and disabled, institutional relief 
would be supplied; 3) each county within the state would establish a poorhouse and replace 
the town as the administrative unit. Of these three "program enhancements," the latter is 
often viewed as having the most influence. It was also this third suggestion, which solidified 
the increased centralization of poverty welfare, and created the "poorhouse," which became 
the prominent mode of poverty assistance well into the twentieth century. The township had 
proven an ineffective provider of assistance to the poor, and deservedness became the 
concern of larger sociopolitical communities. 
American Poverty Welfare Post Civil War 
The level of destruction during the American Civil War ushered in an era of 
substantially increased assistance to the poor. As in most wars, the American Civil War 
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substantially altered general perceptions of deservedness. Not only did the horrors of 
wartime battles have a chilling effect on contrarian ideas, so too did the manner in which 
most perished during the Civil War. While (typical) battlefield fatalities were inordinately 
high, an even greater number of deaths were caused by unsanitary medical conditions. This 
condition led directly to the post-war creation of the Red Cross, as well as passage of one of 
the first federal steps toward the direct intervention into poverty welfare with the creation of 
the creation of the National Board of Health in 1879. 
Perhaps the contrarian could advance the argument that survivors of wartime battles 
were simply better adapted than their dead companions, and thus deserved to live, prosper, 
and multiply. Thus interference with post-war remedies were inappropriate. This argument, 
however, became unrealistic when it was taken into account that many of the dead found 
their fate due to infection, not inferior fighting ability. If America learned anything from the 
brutality of the Civil War, it would have been that the survivors of war were no better or 
more adaptive than the dead. The living owed their lives to a crafty general or a backfiring 
rifle; they were no more or less deserving than the dead. Further, and more to the point of 
poverty welfare, how could the families of the dead be blamed for the sudden loss of the 
family's "breadwinner?" The war created a greatly expanded appreciation of the deserving 
poor. This expansion included the sons, daughters, wives, and parents of dead or disabled 
soldiers. Consistently, state assistance to the poor, and where this was implausible federal 
assistance, skyrocketed during the years following the war. 
With the war at an end, America embarked upon an almost universally unprecedented 
level of industrialization. Trattner ( 1999: 81) described this massive industrialization by 
noting: 
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Between the years 1865 and 1900, America underwent a spectacular expansion of productive facilities 
and output that was without parallel in the history of the world. Statistics tell part of the story. In 
1860, approximately $1 billion was invested in manufacturing plants; the annual value of 
manufacturing plants was $1,885,000,000; and 1,300,00 workers were employed in American 
factories. By the turn of the century, the amount of capital invested had risen to more than $12 billion, 
the yearly value of the products to over 11 billion, and the number of workers to 5,500,000. 
What all this industrialization meant, of course, was that America was becoming a much 
more urbanized nation. Industrial factories, particularly those operating at the tum of the 
nineteenth century, required an abundant amount of skilled and unskilled labor. This 
situation created new questions of deservedness that did not force themselves upon less 
industrialized sociopolitical communities. The Jeffersonian ideal, for instance, envisioned a 
small family-farm operation that produced enough for subsistence, but was uninterested and 
not dependent upon trading with other family-farms. Given this agrarian based assumption, 
the question of deservedness becomes a fairly simple one. Small family operations deserve 
exactly what they are able to produce nothing more or less. Jefferson might have softened 
this notion by suggesting if a family could not produce subsistence, then a neighbor would 
have likely helped out, but this was no guarantee. On the contrary, work in an industrial 
setting served to further remove the laborer from the means of subsistence. Before the 
advent of industrialization, people ate what they could produce, while after industrialization 
people bought food with the money they earned, i.e., deserved. An overstated response to 
this last observation is that the market makes such a determination, but this not so. The 
market does not decide the acceptable level of profit to be extracted from a factory. If a 
worker were paid "what is left over," how could the difference be anything except a question 
of "intentionally-reasoned" deservedness? 
Aside from the increasing complexity of addressing standards of deservedness in 
conjunction with increased industrialization the shift in American social structure from 
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agrarianism to industrialization produced unexpected and troubling consequences associated 
with working conditions. The conditions in many early twentieth century industrial factories 
were unacceptable by contemporary American standards. O.S.H.A., and other federal 
regulatory agencies, did not exist to regulate standards safe working conditions. Further, 
given the diversity of industrial life and the lack of dissemination of information regarding 
factory condition it is not clear if a "public standard" existed. As Upton Sinclair (1905: 328) 
described the conditions of the urban laborer in a Chicago slaughterhouse shantytown, 
All day long the blazing midsummer sun beat down upon the square mile of abominations: upon tens 
of thousands of cattle crowded into pens whose wooden floors stank and steamed contagion; upon 
bare, blistering cinder-strewn railroad tracks and huge blocks of dingy meat factories whose labyrinth 
passages defined a breath of fresh air to penetrate them; and there are not merely rivers of hot blood 
and carloads of moist flesh, and rendering vats and soup caldrons, glue factories and fertilizer tanks 
that smelt like the craters of hell-there are also tons of garbage festering in the sun, and the greasy 
laundry of the workers hung out to dry and dinning rooms littered with food black with flies, and toilet 
rooms that are open sewers. 
More to the point, Sinclair (1905: 70) mentioned all factory conditions, and labor relations, 
as he stated, 
So from the top to the bottom the place is simply a seething caldron of jealousies and hatreds; there is 
no loyalty or decency anywhere about it, there is no place in it were a man counted for anything 
against a dollar. 
The important consideration raised by Sinclair in the preceding passages is that, with 
industrialization necessarily came different considerations of deservedness, primarily those 
associated with working conditions, that were originally thought best settled in the "private 
sector." Deservedness is as static or dynamic as the social structure in which it is considered. 
Americans, as a collective sociopolitical community, decided shortly after Sinclair published 
Jungle, that their political representatives were better suited to handle such matters of 
deservedness that were private actors. Poverty welfare is simply an extension of earlier acts 
of intervention that Americans have already endorsed. 
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The most significant and noticeable collaboration between social reform and 
approaches to evolutionary theory can be seen in public and academic attitudes, as well as in 
polices, toward negative eugenics 162 or sterilization laws. The widespread legality of 
compulsory sterilization laws -existing in varying latitudes in 30 states by 1920- tended to 
suggest the support for negative eugenics crosscut Americans of all belief-systems and 
political patronage. Eugenics was simply not something to be feared, unless, of course, one 
was determined to be "unfit." Much of the widespread acceptance of sterilization laws 
stemmed from the naturalistic and social assumptions many held about the poor, that they 
were the seed of sloth, disease, and immorality. Children of the poor often, in their 
adulthood, became poor themselves. Thus while it might be humane to assist the living poor, 
it was just as humane to ensure that future generations were not forced to undergo a similar 
fate. In a strange twist, therefore, many social reformers of the early twentieth century 
adopted a Spencerian adherence to preventing the poor from reproducing. Social reformers 
were collectively minded, whereas Spencer was individualistically minded. Oddly, both 
positions were mixed with naturalistic assumptions of the poor and "stupid" to support their 
hopes with compulsory sterilization. Consider, for instance, the way in which E. S. Gosney 
(B.S., LL.B) and Paul Popenoe (D. SC.) (1929: v) described the evolutionary and social 
162 Darwin never advocated the manipulation of human reproduction as a means by which to better human 
society. Darwin's cousin Sir. Francis Gaulton, however, would herald the good of Eugenics as a means of 
social improvement. Gaulton would discuss two types of Eugenics, 1) positive eugenics which suggested 
encouraging the "fit" to reproduce at a higher rate than the "unfit," and 2) negative eugenics which suggested 
preventative measures so that the "unfit" could not reproduce. For Gaulton the better method to be attempted 
was positive eugenics. Americans, however, were much more receptive to negative eugenics. 
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need of sterilization: 
The human race has developed through countless ages of under the laws of heredity under the laws of 
the survival of the fittest. The weak and defective have perished. Only the physically strong and 
mentally alert could withstand the severe conditions of early life, reach maturity, and become the 
fathers and mothers of the next generation. Modern civilization, human sympathy, and charity have 
intervened in Nature's plan. The weak and defective are now nursed to maturity and produce their 
kind. Under Nature's law we breed principally from the top. Today we breed from the top and 
bottom, but more rapidly from the bottom. Today the most intelligent and efficient, the strongest 
strains of blood, as a rule, limit their children to a point that means the extension of a family in a few 
generations. 
Many involved with social reform would hold the above position to be consistent with the 
mission of "helping" the poor. It is important to remember that supporting social reform and 
assistance for the poor was not considered to necessarily contradict an acceptance of the 
tactics used by eugenicists. 
The underlying, and often concealed, tensions behind eugenics are the assumptions 
by which people attribute the "cause(s)" of poverty. A related question is whether poverty is 
a condition of structural or biological "failure?" Consider the implications of selecting either 
option. If poverty represents a biological failure, then the only party responsible might be the 
"author of the universe." Alternatively, if poverty represents a certain dimension of 
structural failure within a social order, the blame is to be placed on the structural conditions 
imposed by ancestors and reinforced actions of those currently living. A claim of structural 
failure might even imply the challenge of an idea as sacrosanct as the "American Dream." 
Because the separation of these assumptions, are too troubling for most a simple thought-
scenario should offer the best way to gauge a position. Assume that all the poor were 
gathered up and offered the following contract: 
I hereby accept payment of 300, 000 dollars on the sole condition that I will ask for no addition money, 
and that I relinquish the right to reproduce in any capacity. 
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Would such a condition, if agreed, to and followed by all, eliminate poverty. If yes, then 
poverty is a biological trait that could potentially find its extinction with negative eugenics. 163 
If no, then one likely subscribes to the belief that poverty exists, perhaps inevitably, because 
of social structural conditions. Interestingly, it would take the market failure of the great 
depression -displacing millions of the middle-class into the "doldrums" of the poor, before 
deserving Americans, in a personally relevant way, finally recognized that poverty was in 
part influenced by structural factors, and not biologically determined. 
Eugenics is often, in contemporary America, viewed as something that Hitler ordered, 
or if order in America, must have been done for a justifiable "greater good." Such 
monstrosities could not possible exist in progressive twenty-first century America, right? 
Without broaching problematic issues associated with serve mental illness the answer is more 
complex than most ever considered. A number of states, increasingly upset with AFDC (Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children) expenditures, have legally mandated that women 
receiving the aid be required to undergo doctor-supervised birth control. It appears that the 
assumptions and logic behind the state mandate are quite comparable with those who 
exposed broad sterilization laws just seventy years earlier. The technology of birth control 
has made such assumptions regarding the biological aspects of poverty kinder and gentler to 
carry out, but the position has not substantially changed. If the poor can be prevented from 
having children, then poverty will be reduced. This assertion is logical in so much as poverty 
is not a structural condition. 
163 The logic here is the same as was followed by supporters of the American eugenics movement in the early 
twentieth century. The only difference is that the act of compulsory sterilization was cheaper and more certain 
to have the desired effect. 
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When the Great Depression destroyed economic prosperity in 1929, suffering was 
immediate and widespread. Absent federal intervention, the unforgiving and devastating 
consequences of rapid and almost total market failure was felt like the throbbing pain 
inflicted by a well-placed bayonet. Private charities made valiant attempts to assist the 
masses of poor, but the task was simply too weighty to be carried out entirely by private 
charities. As Trattner ( 1999: 273) described the relief effort attempted by private sources, 
The task of relieving the jobless and their families was first undertaken by private local agencies. It 
quickly became evident, however, that they were unprepared to meet the crisis. To begin with they 
were ill suited to the task because the "services" they performed would not feed the hungry or feed the 
homeless. Furthermore, the financial needs of so many people -not only the aged, the sick, the 
disabled, and other members of the lower classes but also the plain, ordinary middle class people who 
had worked all their lives but who were now unemployed, penniless, and hungry, the so called new 
poor -were clearly beyond their meager means; indeed between 1929 and 1932, about one-third of the 
nations private agencies disappeared for lack of funds. 
Clearly, private charities could not offer meaningful poor assistance, to the bulk of 
Americans living with the pains of Depression Era poverty. To make matters more 
desperate, relief from the federal government between 1929 and 1932 was almost 
nonexistent. What factors, especially given the failure of private charities, could possibly 
account for the non-action of the federal government? The answer to this question was 
largely grounded in the naturalistic assumptions of then President Herbert Hoover. 
For Hoover, any suggestion that people be supported by the "public dole," 
represented an unacceptable implication of "moral deterioration." People were not meant to 
feed from the fingers of government. Such assistance was tantamount to treating people as if 
they were animals, and any exceptions to the rule would only serve to solidify its practice. 
Consistent with this naturalistic holding in December of 1930, President Hoover approved a 
congressional appropriation of forty-five million dollars to feed the livestock of Arkansas 
farmers, but opposed an additional twenty-five million dollars to feed the starving farmers 
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and their families (Trattner). President Hoover's absolute contrarian appeal was imbedded in 
the belief that values other than life, e.g., self-respect and pride, represented the true essence 
of human nature. It would seem to this observer that a man who has bread should never have 
the authority to make such a determination. 
The Roosevelt Era 
At the same time President Hoover was deciding that livestock were more deserving 
of famine assistance than people, a young New York Governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was 
charging his state with the unprecedented responsibility of large-scale poverty welfare. In 
August of 1931, amidst ever-increasing unemployment, Roosevelt called a special session of 
the New York legislature wherein he argued that, those suffering from unemployment were 
as responsible for their present economic shape as widows or orphans. Many of the 
unemployed were members of the deserving poor and the state, absent any positive federal 
action, ought to offer poverty welfare. Sympathetic to this appeal, the legislature quickly 
passed provisions that provided immediate emergency relief, in what came to be known as 
the first governmentally mandated act of unemployment assistance (the Wicks Act). In a 
landslide presidential election, little more than a year latter, Governor Roosevelt defeated 
Republican nominee Alf Landon to become the nation's thirty-second President. With the 
country still deep in the depression, Roosevelt did not hesitate to continue his interventionist 
strategy. 
The nation that President Roosevelt inherited from his predecessor was in economic 
shambles. To make matters worse, the contrarian policies of the Hoover administration led 
to widespread, sometimes loud, "whispers" of rebellion. It was not that considerations of 
rebellion were a direct result of poverty and hunger, but that people could not understand 
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what ideal (naturalistic, in the case of Hoover) could possibly be held as more important than 
their lives. People with little or no food were more than a little incensed at the notion they 
needed "character building" lessons. 164 President Roosevelt quickly and decisively, as he 
had done in New York a year before, acted to directly intervene in the economic processes 
that were so badly trampled by the once sacrosanct market. Below are a few of the more 
important programs passed into law under the strength and guidance of President Roosevelt -
these are often referred to as the New Deal. 
*Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) -this program created jobs, usually at state or federal 
parks or some other environmentally based activity, for millions of unemployed Americans. 
The pay was meager-usually around a dollar a day, and often this amount was to be sent 
"home" to help support one's family- Workers were however provided their room and food. 
*Emergency Banking Act/ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) -this legislation 
ordered all American banks shut-down and reevaluated, as well establishing insurance for all 
bank deposits in the amount of 5,000$ (this sum has sense increased to 100,000$) 
*Civil Works Administration (CW A) -this program was similar in design the to (CCC), but 
differed in that the work offered with this project focused on the construction of 
infrastructure, i.e., roads, airports etc. It is estimated that at the high of the program it 
employed more than 4 million workers. This program was similar to the (WPA) -Works 
Progress Administration- that program provided more than 8 million jobs. 
Roosevelt's New Deal, constituted the passage of more than twenty separate legislative 
actions, most of which would not be classified as instances of "poverty welfare." Roosevelt 
was primarily interested in getting people back to work as well as "fixing" the structural 
problems imbedded in the, once thought indestructible, American economy system of the 
1920's. 
164 I find it a mystery of history as to why Hoover's economic policy between 1929 and 1932 did not trigger 
massive revolt. 
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Nonetheless, as the American economy grew stronger and federally subsidized jobs 
were of lesser concern, Roosevelt's New Deal had its greatest long-term impact in the 
passage of the 1935 Social Security Act (SSA). This act established: old-age pensions, 
unemployment insurance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and care for the blind 
and disabled. This act served to establish contemporary standards of deservedness as applied 
to poverty welfare. Notice the recipients of the type of governmental aid offered in the SSA 
were given monies and expected to render no service in return. This was allowable because 
the one-way transfer of funds was consistent with of determination of deservedness, i.e., poor 
women with children and no means of support were deserving of poverty welfare. This 
stipulation also applied to the old and the sick. Interestingly, it has been the AFDC provision 
of the 1935 SSA that has suffered the most challenges as it is related to deservedness. The 
act offers assistance to those, e.g., the disables, poor women, and children, who have 
traditionally held little or no political or social power. Deservedness, in a fashion that would 
make Nietzsche grin, has a strong tradition of being settled by those who hold power. It is 
important, however, that remember the distinction between power and authority. Authority 
is to legal "right" to impose one's will. Power, on the other hand, is the ability to achieve 
one's goal despite resistance (Weber). Accordingly, both power and authority are social 
phenomena that are agreed to and accepted, even by the "subjugated" party. Likewise, when 
deservedness is discussed it is not enough to speak about the power involved with 
"controlling" the question from the standpoint of the powerful. It is just as important to 
discuss the consent, either explicit or tacit, that must be given in order to create the powerful. 
The best way to approach discussing more recent approaches toward poverty welfare 
involve reviewing the trends of various states. Appendix B contains information that 
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graphically and quantitatively evaluates the state welfare spending of the four poorest and 
four richest states, including Wisconsin as representative of a "medium" income state. The 
quantitative data presented can tell us "what" happened, but they do little to address the 
fundamental, and thus are considered on my account to be tertiary to an address of "Who 
Deserves What." Acknowledging that administrative matters of dispersing poverty welfare -
the interplay among local, state, and federal involvement are admittedly more convoluted 
than presented here, Appendix B quantitatively demonstrates various state poverty welfare 
per capita spending from 1958 through 2001. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
What more could be said of the linkage between social evolutionary or naturalistic 
sentiments and policy toward "Who Deserves What?" Given that, to my knowledge this 
thesis is the first attempt to formulate the fundamental as "Who Deserves What," much more 
can and should be voiced about this encompassing question. The purpose of this thesis as 
stated from the outset was one of "discourse formation"; a formation which is inescapably 
affixed with our broader assumptions regarding the worth and nature of peoples. 
Unfortunately, because there is often a lack of understanding of how and why these 
assumptions originate, discourse often breaks apart before anything productive results. This 
thesis offers one measure by which we might go about better understanding our own 
assumptions and approaches toward the stated fundamental social question, "Who Deserves 
What." 
After the discourse commences, however, the debate begins, and debate necessarily 
leads to increased turmoil and conflict. The winners of debate, be it waged on an intellectual 
or physical playing field gain power, while the losers must struggle with what they are 
determined to have deserved. Neither the contrarian nor interventionist has "won" at this 
juncture in an address of the fundamental, but the playing field that might enable a debate has 
been drawn. The concerns of this thesis, however, are much more complex. For the 
interventionist, they signify the cooperative extensions of positive social reforms, and the 
lifting of all peoples to their perfectible end. The contrarian, on the other hand, must prevail 
so that the competitive, and often individualistic, aspects of social evolution are not corrupted 
by the "survival of the unfittest." 
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The suggestion of discourse signifies a softer, more friendly and gentle notion that the 
abrasive undertones of invoking a debate, for this reason many contemporary sociologists 
invoke an appeal to discourse and scarcely mention the abrasive debate. Discourse, 
nonetheless, leads to the emergence of debate. While the simple act of discourse is 
important, it is limited precursory stage in the development of intellectual progress. For the 
process to reach fruition conflict and debate must ensue. Let no one who reads these pages 
suggest this author's adherence to the assumption that any fundamental social question can 
be addressed in an "easy" and painless manner. No such position is set forth. 
As was maintained in the introduction, the question, "Who Deserves What" is 
fundamental to the very notion of social order, and as such is not subject to negation. The 
treatment of fundamental social question(s), however, need not involve poverty welfare. The 
same question could be applied to health care, state-sponsored building contracts, admission 
into a public college or university, or almost any juncture at which a sociopolitical 
community must ( or could) make an evaluation of deservedness. Social evolutionary 
arguments, moreover, need not represent the only mode by which to render such an 
evaluation. I have, nonetheless, argued, and continue to support the notion that the beginning 
of productive discourse must involve a common starting point, and that this starting point -
for both ideal types- can reasonable be grounded in evolutionary and naturalistic appeals. As 
it has been observed throughout this work, evolutionary appeals do not offer an escape from 
"morality plays," but they do serve to guide morality in a coherent scientific appeal. 
Removing morality from an address of fundamental social question(s) would be tantamount 
to suggesting that those engaged in discourse abandon the "good" in their respective 
positions, a qualification that seems antithetical to social bargaining. 
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Whenever one invokes "natural law" or "evolution" some reaction is to be expected. 
Most people have a minimal level of subjective knowledge of what these expressions mean, 
even if they have never read a line of Darwin, Kropotkin, or Spencer. One cannot suggest 
social evolution without drawing a raised eyebrow from those with strong views of religion, 
"man's perfectibility," or a host of other views that frequently become entangled with 
evolutionism. If one had to point toward the two most controversial topics in contemporary 
America, he could reasonably conclude them to be discussions of social class and the 
mention of social evolutionism. For these reasons, such appeals are often interwoven with 
seemingly less divisive issues. Evolutionary appeals as applied to the question "Who 
Deserves What," however, are far from dead. Evolutionary appeals will live, change, and 
develop for so long as the fundamental remains. In other words, they are as permanent or 
temporary as social order itself. 
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APPENDIX A. REP. GEPHARDT'S CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
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In a February 2003 campaign stop in Des Moines, Iowa democratic presidential 
nominee hopeful Rep. Dick Gephardt offered this compelling interventionist appeal. 165 
*************** 
You know, before I decided to take this step to run for President I thought a lot about what I wanted 
to say in this campaign. When I look at it, I really want to say things to America that probably will be 
seen as hard by a lot of people, and not easy. There's usually an inclination in campaigns to go with 
what's easy, and not what's hard, but I think right now we need to hear what's right, but sometimes 
difficult. You know it's easy to give a corporation a quick tax break, get support from that sector. 
It's a little harder to finally fix the public schools and fix the education system so that every young 
person gets a good start. It's easy to wring our hands and say, Oh we just can't figure out the answer 
to this health care problem it's too hard. I hope you can afford it, but not much we can do. It's hard to 
find an answer to this problem, this timeless problem. It could really pass the congress, pass the 
muster of the American people and get done. It's easy to sign trade agreements that just open up 
more trade and allow our company's to go all over the world and find the cheapest labor they can 
find. It's hard to have trade treaties that require minimum standards and it's hard to lift wages over 
seas so we can compete and workers everywhere can live a better life. When I thought about this I 
thought, you know there really is a different world-view between what I think and what George Bush 
thinks. You see, I think we're all tied together. I think we're all bound together whether we like it or 
not. Martin Luther King once said "We're all tied together in a single garment of destiny. What 
effects one directly affects all of the rest ofus indirectly." He put it another way, he said, "I can't be 
what I ought to be, if you can't be what you ought to be." And if you think about it, that's really true. 
If you don't have health insurance, when you get sick you go to the emergency room you'll get health 
care and then the hospital will try to add that bill onto everybody else who has health care. That's 
part of the reason health care costs are going through the roof. We got 42 million people who don't 
have health insurance in this country, most of them work. If your child doesn't get a good education, 
winds up on welfare or worse winds up in crime, all the rest of us pay the price. You see we're all 
tied together whether we want to be or not. I'm the best example. As I told you a minute ago I got to 
165 This portion of the speech represents the last five minutes of the thirty-minute campaign speech. Special 
thanks to Susan Roe -station secretary- who served as a valuable intermediary, and Rick Fredericksen -news 
director- who went out of his way to make a usable copy of the speech for my purposes. The presentation of 
Gephardt's speech here is transcribed exactly as given, making no corrections for usage. 
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go to college, I got to go to law school. Not because of what I did necessarily, but because of what 
my parents did, because of what my church did, because of what my government did. I got that 
education because I had help. I've been leader of the Democrats in the United States Congress for 13 
years. I'm running for President of the United States. I didn't do it on my own. I had help. George 
Bush, I think, believes we're all separate. If you can make it great, survival of the fittest that's the 
way it works. If you don't, it doesn't make any difference. You see I just don't believe that. I want 
to get in a room with George Bush and I want to get in those final debates and I want to argue my 
view of America and the world against his. I want to talk about people like my parents and the people 
that I grew up with, because those are the heroes of this country. I want to bring a view that we are 
all tied together and that we only succeed when we all succeed. I want us to be a country where we 
really reach out to help one another succeed because that's the way we succeed. I want America to be 
an even better place than it's ever been in our past and I believe with all my heart that with leadership 
and the great work and effort of the American people and the values of the great American people in 
our workers we will do just that. I'm going to be here a lot, I'm going to be working hard to win this 
campaign and it's not about me, it's about us. And it's about what we want America to be. Thank 
you, God bless you. Thank you for listening to me this afternoon. 
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APPENDIX B. STATE POVERTY WELAFARE DATA 
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Graph one compares the economic trend of the four richest and four poorest states 
between 1958 and 2001, using Wisconsin as representative as the closest approximate to the 
U.S. average (as determined by a running average of per capita disposable income). The 
data were collected as a part of publicly available sources tabulated by the United States 
Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). The data are limited to the 
contiguous forty-eight states. 
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This graph leads to important generalizations as well as interesting questions. 
Wealthier states, since 1958, have been significantly better off economically than poor states. 
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One might claim that cost of living measures would render this relationship moot, but this 
would be an over simplification. The gap among the poorest states has lessened to the point 
where currently, all four (Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas, and West Virginia) of the 
poorest states are huddled in mass at approximately the 20,000 dollar per capita disposable 
income amount. This is distressing news when it is considered that the 2003 federal poverty 
guidelines have established poverty guidelines for a family of four at 18,400 dollars. Also 
there seems to be a "slumping effect," beginning in the early 80's that effects poor states, but 
not their wealthier counterparts. This is, however, not surprising, considering that the largest 
transfer of wealth (form poor to rich) took place in America during the 1980's. The question 
that arises from graph 1 as related to poverty welfare is, which set of states is more apt to 
endorse provisions of poverty welfare. By looking at the next set of empirical data results, 
the discovery, or lack thereof, of the best representative contrarian or interventionist should 
reveal itself. Here then is the trend in poverty welfare within state jurisdictions between 
1958 and 2001. 
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Graph 2 
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Graph 3 
Per Capita Welfare Spending in Massachusets Between 1958 and 2001 
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Graph 4 
Per Capita Welfare Spending in Conneticut Between 1958 and 2001 
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Graph 5 
Per Capita Welfare Spending in New Jersey Between 1958 and 2001 
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Graph 6 
Per Capita Welfare Spending in Wisconsin Between 1958 and 2001 
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Graph 7 
Per Capita Welfare Spending in Mississippi Between 1958 and 2001 
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Graph 8 
Per Capita Welfare Spending in West Virginia Between 1958 and 2001 
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If the totals spent on poverty welfare were calculated using a running average over the forty-
three year period in question the results would be as such: 
Graph 9 
Per Capita State Welfare Distribution 
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States 
The data gathered for the graphs regarding the poverty welfare figures, like the 
figures about state per capita income, were gathered from a publicly available source 
provided for the U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). It is 
important to explain the standards by which a determination of "poverty welfare" as an act of 
spending was determined. Often welfare becomes calculated as the total "transfer payments" 
from governmental organizations to individuals. This practice, however, created a much 
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broader scope of poverty welfare than has been examined thus far. Therefore, in determining 
how a conceptualization of poverty welfare ought to occur, the following categories from 
within the larger transfer payment data records were selected. The categories as descriptors 
of poverty welfare included, income maintenance benefit payments, supplemental security 
payments, family assistance (including AFDC), food stamps, other income maintenance, 
unemployment insurance benefit payments, and state unemployment insurance 
compensation. All other transfer payments including Medicaid, Medicare, old age, and 
veterans programs were excluded from the analysis. 
The data suggests the following. First, as the empirical component of the original 
hypothesis is considered, it seems to only be half supported. New York with its strong 
interventionist history continued, in the late twentieth century to be representing the 
interventionist -reform minded- ideal type. It is suspected, however, that a clear contrarian 
would emerge from the empirical data. This does not seem to be the case. There is simply 
no state that has abandoned the main tenants of deservedness established with the passage of 
the (SSA) in 1935. This could, of course, change dramatically with the 1996 Personal 
Opportunity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, state mandated welfare to work laws, 
and the proposal sought by President Bush to greatly involve (religious) charities in the 
determination of deservedness. 
Another important finding from the empirical data suggests that the wealthiest states 
spend more money on social services or AFDC than the poorest. The difference in spending, 
however, is not overwhelming, nor absolutely true. Both West Virginia and Mississippi, for 
instance, spent more per capita addressing poverty welfare concerns than Connecticut, the 
richest state. Poor states and rich states alike are increasingly interventionist (nonetheless 
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developments in changing perceptions of deservedness threaten the expansion of this 
increase) the extent to which is highly dependent upon their respective histories and 
fundamental assumptions. 
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